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ABSTRACT
SHADWORTH HODGSON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WILLIAM JAMES:
EXPERIENCE, TELEOLOGY AND REALISM
by
RICHARD PAUL HIGH 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1978
In the last fifteen years there has been a renaissance of scholarly 
activity on the psychological thought of William James from both the Con­
tinental and Anglo-American philosophical traditions. These works are 
illuminating in a number of respects, as James did anticipate a number of 
the central themes of contemporary phenomenology and logical positivism.
A problem which pervades this literature, however, is that it is method­
ologically presentistic. That is, it tends to view the past, in this case 
James's Principles of Psychology, out of its historical context, focussing 
instead on its distinctively modern aspects. The result is that James is 
portrayed as a thinker who was moving toward either a phenomenology or 
logical positivism, depending on the predisposition of a particular writer. 
This study seeks to redress this problem by examining the origin and 
development of the fundamental themes and/or theories in James's Principles. 
Three general areas of James's psychological thought are considered:
vi
(1) philosophical psychology, (2) cognition and (3) perception. Once this 
clearly historical orientation is adopted, the importance of Shadworth 
Hodgson, a nineteenth century English philosopher who has been ignored in 
contemporary James scholarship, comes to the foreground. This study is 
composed of five chapters.
The first chapter is a general introduction to James's early life 
and thought and seeks to integrate relevant biographical material with his 
published writings between 1861 and 1884. After examining his early con­
flict over the question of freedom vs. mechanism, it is argued that his 
voluntaristic solution formed the conceptual basis of his general account 
of philosohpical and scientific activity. This solution is articulated on 
the basis of a series of philosophical essays he published between 1877 
and 1884. The chapter concludes with a preliminary sketch of some of the 
problems which his voluntarism created for his later program of scientific 
psychology.
The second chapter is devoted to an examination of James's debt to 
Hodgson with respect to the philosophical assumptions which underlie the 
Principles. Three philosohpical problem areas are considered. First, 
James's methodological orientation is explicated within the context of 
his notion of the psychologists' fallacy. It is argued that his call for 
an assumptionless description of experience is an outgrowth of what Hodgson 
called the method of reflection, which arose in conjunction with a critical 
interpretation of the two dominant philosophical traditions of the nine­
teenth century. Second, it is argued that James's epistemological dis­
tinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about is a devel­
opment of Hodgson's distinction between first and second intention 
descriptions. Lastly, James's somewhat contradictory statements regarding
vii
dualism in the Principles is examined within the context of Hodgson's 
more consistent formulation of a philosophical monism and methodological 
dualism for scientific psychology.
James's formulation of the higher mental processes in the Principles 
is examined in the third chapter. This chapter begins with a consideration 
of his debt to Hodgson in offering a dynamic formulation of the laws of 
association. In examining James's formulation of reasoning (cognition) and 
valuing (belief), however, it is argued that he went beyond the letter and 
spirit of Hodgson's philosophy. With respect to human cognition, James's 
biological interpretation of the a priori is set forth as an attempt to 
synthesize Kant's rationalism and Mill's empiricism. His formulation of 
the sub-universes of reality (belief) is then interpreted as an attempt 
to deal with the dynamic, transitive portions of the stream of thought.
In the fourth chapter James's theory of perception is examined in 
relation to the perceptual realism he found in Hodgson's analysis of space 
and time. James's critique of the empiricist account of space perception 
is examined within the context of three problems in perceptual psychology: 
(1) simultaneous color contrast, (2) the eccentric projection of sensations 
and (3) form perception. Hodgson's influence with respect to James's 
notion of the spatial quale is then examined, followed by James's attempt 
to retain a perceptual realism while acknowledging the role of intellect 
in perception.
The concluding chapter summarizes the impact of Hodgson on James's 
psychology and briefly sketches the impact of James on psychology between 
1900 and 1920. Two somewhat distinct lines of influence are delineated:
(1) the dynamic, cognitive psychologies of Calkins, MacDougall and Baldwin 
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INTRODUCTION
William James is perhaps best known as the founder of pragmatism, 
an early twentieth century American philosophy which Old World philoso­
phers immediately branded anti-intellectual. In the eyes of these tradi­
tionalists, James's system— if it could even be called a system-— was 
little more than an oblique expression of the rather crass, practical 
spirit of a nation which possessed an over-abundance of natural resources 
and an undying will to exploit them. In a sense, James set the stage for 
this characterization with his scathing attacks on the great systems of 
European philosophy and his embarrassingly persistent insistence that we 
look to the "cash-value" of concepts to find their meaning and truth.
At another level, however, the response of the European philosophical 
community can be viewed as jaundiced and rather superficial. As Ralph 
Ross has written, James's "philosophical beliefs were more caricatured 
than comprehended" by his contemporaries.^ This judgement gains support 
from contemporary philosophers, who have returned to James as far more 
than a symptom of the pioneer spirit of an expanding America.
In fact, in the last fifteen years there has been a renaissance 
of scholarly activity on James by members of widely divergent philosophi­
cal traditions. From our perspective, this literature is particularly 
interesting because his psychology has been rediscovered along with his 
philosophy. A. J. Ayer, for example, has recently examined James's
^William James, The Meaning of Truth, introduction by Ralph Ross 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. ix.
1
2psychological and philosophical thought and concluded that he must be
viewed as a forerunner of the tough-minded philosophy of logical posi- 
2
tivism. He argues that James implicitly distinguished between three
types of statements— those of empirical science, logic/mathematics and
metaphysics/aesthetics— and that the pragmatic criterion of emotional
satisfaction was offered only for our metaphysical and aesthetic beliefs.
In the realms of science and logic/mathematics, Ayer attempts to show
that James, the psychologist-philosopher, was in fundamental agreement
with the Vienna Circle— verifiability principle included! The fact is
that James did offer a version of the verifiability principle in The
Meaning of Truth; and one of Ayer's lasting services is his refutation
of the view that James ever maintained that a person can believe in
3
anything which he finds emotionally satisfying. At the same time, how­
ever, calling James a forerunner of logical positivism does not fit well 
with the active, voluntaristic conception of human nature which pervades 
his psychology and philosophy.
While Ayer's interpretation paints an illuminating picture of the 
tough-minded side of James, a number of phenomenologists have recently
centered their attention on the tender-minded side of America's first 
4
psychologist. Taking Edmund Husserl's laudatory evaluation of James's 
2
A. J. Ayer, The Origins of Pragmatism: Studies in the Philosophy of 
Charles Pierce and William James (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co., 
1968).
3
James, Meaning of Truth, p. xxx.
4
Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1964); Hans Llnschoten, On the Way Toward a Phenomeno­
logical Psychology: The Psychology of William James (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1968); Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology:
A Study of the "Principles of Psychology" (Bloomington: University of 
Indiana Press, 1968); John Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James
3psychology as a starting point, no less than five phenomenologists have 
offered detailed analyses of the philosophical implications of a number 
of the seminal ideas in James's Principles of Psychology.^  It is simply 
impossible to do justice to such a large body of research in a short 
review, but these commentators have: (1) articulated the similarities 
between James and the phenomenologies of Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and others, (2) offered phenomenological solutions to some of the contra­
dictions and problems in the Principles and (3) integrated aspects of 
James's psychology with contemporary thought in phenomenological, exis­
tential and gestalt psychology. These writers have been especially 
concerned with the descriptive aspects of James's psychology, his de­
scription of experience as a fringed, flowing stream, the notion of self 
as a distinctive member of the stream, his description of the experience 
of freedom and lastly, the perspectivalism or contextualism which per­
meates his psychology. Although this literature does more justice to 
the details of James's psychology, it suffers from two disciplinary 
prejudices. First, as phenomenologists of the German tradition, these 
people have steadfastly ignored the positive influence of British empir­
icism on James. This omission becomes especially conspicuous because, 
as we shall argue, a number of James's so-called phenomenological insights 
can be traced to Shadworth Hodgson, an Englishman working within the 
empiricist tradition. Second, as non-scientists, the phenomenologists 
have been unsympathetic to the fundamental goal of the Principles— to 
create a scientific psychology.
(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969); Richard Stevens, James and Husserl: 
The Foundation of Meaning (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
^See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2 vols. 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 1:67; 113.
4The one methodological feature which underlies both the phenomeno­
logical and positivistic interpretations of James is that both seek to 
recast his thought into terms which are compatible with the fundamental 
postulates of a contemporary philosophy. This is, in some respects, a 
thoroughly reasonable and understandable aim; contemporary systems should 
be able to withstand the challenges of, and find support in, previous 
systems. But a problem which hovers over any attempt to integrate aspects 
of the present with the past is the tendency to view the past out of its 
historical context, to subordinate the past to the present. Herbert 
Butterfield has called this the whig interpretation of history;
The total result of this method is to impose a certain form upon 
the whole historical story, and produce a scheme . . . which is 
bound to converge beautifully upon the present— all demonstrating 
throughout . . . the workings of an obvious principle of progress.
A whiggish strain can be discerned in the contemporary literature on 
James. It appears most clearly in the conclusions of this otherwise val­
uable literature. That is, James is portrayed as a thinker who was moving 
toward either a phenomenology or logical positivism, depending on the pre­
disposition of the writer. In either case, however, a contemporary scheme 
is imposed on James's writings and he emerges as a prophet for some modern 
school of thought. The problem is that an important aspect of William 
James is lost as he is cast in the role of a harbinger of either phenom­
enology or logical positivism. The positivist interpretation, for example, 
fails to integrate his conception of human nature with his formulation of 
the nature of scientific inquiry, a theme which pervades his early works.
On the other hand, the phenomenological interpretation simply does not
^Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Co., 1965), p. 12.
5take his program of scientific psychology seriously, despite the fact 
that the Principles was written for exactly that purpose. And while there 
surely are phenomenological as well as positivistic strains in James's 
psychology, neither aspect alone does full justice to the contents of the 
Principles.
In this study— "Shadworth Hodgson and the Psychology of William 
James: Experience, Teleology and Realism"— we shall examine the origin 
and development of the fundamental themes and theories of the Principles. 
Our method is historical and our goal is to clarify some aspects of 
James's psychological thought. The assumption which ties our method and 
goal together is the belief that James's psychology can be best under­
stood through an analysis of its development from its beginnings in the 
1870's to its culmination in 1890. In adopting this method, we are try­
ing to approach the Principles as James himself approached it— as an 
attempt to integrate the best of philosophy with evolutionary biology 
and thereby create a scientific psychology. Thus this is a study in the 
history of psychology. Accordingly, the bulk of our study— chapters two, 
three and four— is devoted to an analysis of three general areas of the 
Principles: (1) philosophical psychology, (2) cognition and (3) perception. 
Moreover, the scope of this work is clearly limited to James's pre-1892 
writings, for after publishing his Psychology in that year he turned to 
philosophy until his death in 1910. In limiting our scope in this way, 
we shall not take up either of his mature philosophical doctrines—  
pragmatism or radical empiricism. Hopefully, what has been consciously 
sacrificed in breadth will be recompensed by the depth and detail of our 
analysis of James's psychological thought.
6Describing this work as a study in the history of psychology would 
be misleading unless two qualifications are made explicit at the outset. 
First, the historical reality is that James's psychology developed hand- 
in-hand with a complex of related philosophical and ethical positions 
during the 1870's and 1880's. The commonly held opinion that he progressed 
gradually from physiology to psychology to philosophy is simply inaccurate 
and serves only to obscure the threads which tie these areas of his 
thought together. Instead, however, of avoiding the complexity of the 
historical record or treating it as an unsettling complication, we have 
tried to use it to our advantage. Thus, in the first chapter, James's 
early philosophical and ethical thought will be presented as the assump­
tive frame of reference from which his psychology emerged. From this 
perspective, his early philosophical and ethical thought can be viewed 
as a vital source of enrichment to his scientific psychology— it raised 
questions (e.g., human freedom, the status of consciousness and a priori 
knowledge) which he later sought to answer in the Principles.
The second sense in which this study departs from the history of 
psychology proper is Shadworth Hodgson. To call Hodgson anything but a 
metaphysician would be positively misleading. He did, of course, keep up 
with the latest developments of the psychology of his time but even in 
this respect his fundamental goal was philosophical. As we shall see, his 
philosophical system was founded upon distinguishing scientific psychology 
from philosophy on methodological grounds. At this juncture, we would 
simply like to make Hodgson's role in this study explicit; to state, in 
general terms, why his name graces the title of this work. Put simply, 
on reading James, Hodgson and Ralph Barton Perry, it became clear that 
Hodgson's thought served as the philosophical point of departure for James's
scientific psychology. Hodgsonian insights, and applications of principles 
which can be traced to Hodgson, served as the foundation upon which James 
constructed his psychology. It should be stated clearly that we shall not 
do full justice to Hodgson’s philosophical system. Given the goal of
this study, we shall use him selectively, as James did in the Principles.
At the same time, however, this study is organized around the belief that
Hodgson had an important, and perhaps the most important, impact on the
structure and contents of the Principles.
In closing, one aspect of the style of this study deserves comment. 
Since deciding to work on James, my goal has been to provide an in-depth 
historical analysis of his psychological thought. What I failed to real­
ize until I began writing was that an in-depth analysis— at least at 
this stage of my understanding of James— entails a considerable amount 
of attention to the details of his writings. James is simply not a 
person who can be easily classified into the dichotomies of the history 
of philosophy and psychology, e.g., rationalism-empiricism, idealism- 
realism, subjectivism-objectivism. In an attempt to preserve the richness, 
and most importantly the integrity of his thought, I have taken the 
liberty of using excerpts of his writings rather liberally. My funda­
mental goal is to provide a clear picture of what James was saying and, 
quite frankly, there are times when his precision and descriptive genius 
cannot be equaled.
^Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935).
CHAPTER 1
WILLIAM JAMES: THE YOUNG PHILOSOPHER-PSYCHOLOGIST
The fundamental task of history, if it wishes to be in all 
seriousness a science, must be to show how this philosophy, or 
that political system, could only have been discovered, 
developed, and, in short, lived by a particular type of man 
at a particular date.*
Ortega y Gasset's statement can stand as an eloquent and succinct 
formulation of the goal of this chapter, for here we shall seek to root 
the dominant themes of William James's early philosophical thought in 
his life in nineteenth century America. The task ought to be a joyous 
one for a psychologist, for there is a great wealth of seductively psy­
chological conflicts in James's early life. One finds, for example, 
young William James thinking of suicide, being harassed by innumerable 
psychosomatic disorders and then being saved by a conversion experience, 
if one takes that term in its broader sense. Furthermore, these psy­
chological conflicts clearly find their way into James's early philo­
sophical writings before 1884.
Before moving incautiously into a psycho-historical exposition,
however, one would do well to read William Earle's admonishment that a
study of James "must be diverted from his life, however interesting, to
2
his published philosophy." The conflict exemplified in Ortega y Gasset
^Jose Ortega y Gasset, What is Philosophy?, trans. Mildred Adams 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1960), p. 25.
2
William Earle, "William James," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
8 vols., ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), 4:241.
8
9and Earle— between living and thinking— was one which James spent a good 
deal of his life (or should we say 'thought'?) trying to integrate.
Now, almost a century later, we continue to stare blankly into the face 
of this bifurcation, wondering whether the debate is a matter of seman­
tics or fundamental ontology. In spite of this discomforting dichotomy 
however, the substance of Earle's warning must be acknowledged. William 
James did, after all, offer the philosophical community of his time a 
system and he defended his system with philosophical arguments/ Both 
his system and arguments were, in fact, more or less continuous with pre­
vious philosophical thought; even his unique contributions can only be 
recognized as such from within the context of nineteenth century philo­
sophy. Earle's contention is simply that James's thought ought to be 
considered in its philosophical context, regardless of the seductiveness 
of the biographical details of his life.
As a whole then, this study must be able to stand up to Earle's 
remarks. James's psychology, like his philosophy, must stand on its own 
since it is— in some sense at least— independent of his life. At the 
same time however, this is an historical study and we therefore have the 
responsibility of situating James's ideas within the context of his life 
and times. In this chapter we hope to do just that. This chapter will 
cover the years between 1861 and 1884, with the focus on the last decade 
of that period. In biographical terms, this period spans the nineteenth 
through forty-second years of William James's life. These were James's 
formative years, our subject is a classic example of the late-bloomer.
In terms of his professional development, we shall open the chapter as 
James enters Harvard College and close it as he begins teaching there, at 
the mid-point of a twelve-year project which culminated in the Principles
10
of Psychology. In terms of personal development, we shall follow the 
young philosopher-psychologist through a state of confusion, hopelessness 
and psychic paralysis to a state of willful activity and optimism. Most 
importantly however, we shall attempt to articulate a number of inchoate 
themes of a philosophy which sought to integrate the fundamental con­
flicts which racked the nineteenth century in general and William James 
in particular.
This chapter will focus on a series of 'philosophical1 essays 
which James wrote between 1877 and 1884. The strategy of approaching 
James's psychology through his early philosophical thought holds a number 
of unique advantages. It directly challenges, for example, the commonly- 
held opinion that there was a neat chronological progression in James's
4
intellectual development— from physiology to psychology to philosophy.
In fact, James was in print as a philosopher before he published as a 
psychologist and he continued to write philosophical essays during the 
twelve-year period (1878-1890) when he was writing the Principles.^
This approach will also bring the unified nature of James's psychological 
and philosophical thought to the foreground.
3
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1890; reprint ed., New York: Dover Publishing Co., 
1950). Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
4
For a work based on this assumption see Patrick K. Dooley, 
Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy of William James (Chicago: Nelson- 
Hall Inc., 1974). For a critique of this approach see Richard High, 
review of Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy of William James, by 
Patrick K. Dooley, in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 
12 (1976):190-192.
~*The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott (New York: 
Random House, 1967), p. 817. This collection contains an invaluable 
annotated bibliography of James's entire works, including a large number 
of anonymous book reviews and notices he wrote before 1880. Anonymous 
or unsigned materials by James cited in this study are identified by 
McDermott.
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This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section 
we shall examine the conflict James experienced as a philosophically- 
minded scientist and the solution he offered in the late 1860's. In the 
second section we shall find James refining this solution and offering 
it as a general account of the nature of philosophical and scientific 
activity. The third section will consider James's defense of human free­
dom and in the last section we shall briefly look into the problems this 
position created for his program of a scientific psychology.
Early Misgivings about Mechanical Science 
and Moral Philosophy
However wanting by contemporary standards, James's education was 
the best that a young and well-to-do American could enjoy in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. After studying at Harvard's newly founded 
Lawrence Scientific School (1861-1864), James matriculated at Harvard 
Medical School between 1864 and 1869. He was more interested in physi­
ology and anatomy than medicine per se during these years and he never 
seriously considered practicing medicine. Like many young scholars of 
his day (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Helmholtz, Hermann Lotze and 
Sigmund Freud), a medical education was, for James, a way of receiving 
training in the natural sciences. It held the additional advantage of 
providing the graduate with a ready-made and possibly lucrative pro­
fession if times became hard or academic positions were unavailable. 
James's academic work during these years was supplemented by an expedi­
tion to the Amazon in 1865 with Louis Agassiz, a year of somewhat erratic
^Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:202-273. Hereafter 
cited as Perry, William James.
12
study in Europe during 1867 and a good deal of independent reading in 
physiology, psychology and philosophy.7
In terms of James's later work, his Harvard years proved to be 
most important. In this first decade after the publication of Darwin's 
Origin of Species the Cambridge campus became the focal point of the 
American response to the question of 'transmutation.' In fact, even 
before James's arrival in Cambridge the scientific and religious impli­
cations of Darwin's theory had been debated by members of Harvard's
g
faculty. The names of Asa Gray, Louis Agassiz, Francis Bowen and 
Jeffries Wyman stand out in this respect.
Gray and Agassiz were the acknowledged titans of American bio­
logical thought in the middle of the nineteenth century; both held senior 
editorial positions on the prestigious American Journal of Science and 
each had made contributions to their respective fields of speciality. 
Agassiz, a European-trained naturalist of Cuvier's school, had presented
his formulation of the fixity of species in his Essay on Classification 
9
in 1855. Having viewed nature through the eyes of a 'special creationist' 
for over thirty years, Agassiz found little to praise in Darwin's work 
and he feared the religious and moral implications of the concept of chance 
and the principle of natural selection. In his review of the Origins in 
the American Journal of Science, Agassiz dismissed the work as "a sci­
entific mistake, untrue in its facts, unscientific in its method and
7Ibid., pp. 202-235.
g
E. J. Pfeifer, "United States," in The Comparative Reception of 
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9
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mischievous in its tendency.From Agassiz's perspective, a perspec­
tive which mixed biology and theology inextricably, the classification 
of species represented an attempt to reconstruct the plan of Divine Will. 
Spurred by a theistic idealism which was rooted in the Naturphilosophie 
of his mentor Schelllng, America's most respected naturalist became 
Darwin's most obstinate and vocal American critic.
Gray's review of the Origins. which appeared in the same journal 
in 1860, pitted editor against editor. In marked contrast to the conde­
scending tone of Agassiz's review, Gray was supportive and even concil­
iatory in that he emphasized that natural selection was no more intrin-
12sically atheistic than Newton's universal gravitation. Both laws,
wrote Harvard's eminent botanist, were formulated in terms of 'efficient'
causes and neither excluded God as a 'final' cause. Gray had been in
correspondence with Darwin since the mid-1850's and his work on the
geographic distribution of flora in Japan was used by Darwin to support
his argument for evolution. Gray followed his review with a series of
popular essays through the 1860's and 1870's which sought to reconcile
natural selection and Design. The Harvard anatomist, Jeffries Wyman,
and Francis Bowen, the moral philosopher, also assumed active, though
less luminous, roles in the debate over evolution at the meetings of
13the Academy for the Advancement of Science during the I860's.
^Louis Agassiz, "Professor Agassiz on the Origin of Species," 
American Journal of Science, 2nd series, 30 (1860):142-154, p. 154.
**See Edward Lurie, Louis Agassiz; A Life in Science (Chicago: 
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Agassiz and Wyman were James's teachers and men such as Gray and 
Bowen could not have gone unnoticed by a student of science with philo­
sophical Inclinations. In such an atmosphere James became aware of the 
arguments advanced by both parties, and though awed by the aura of 
Agassiz's character, he lined up behind the cause of evolution and 
science. James's early alliance with evolution— and science in general—  
is evidenced in his correspondence during his 1867-1868 European tour. 
Guided by the spirit of evolution, we find James demanding a mechanistic 
explanation for any topic under consideration, but the young scientist 
was concerned about how such an attitude might effect his future in the 
academic world. Writing to Oliver Wendell Holmes, the future Chief 
Justice of the United States, James intimated that he would continue 
studying psychology and try teaching moral philosophy "in some western
academy, but I have no idea how such things are attainable, nor if they
14are attainable at all to men of a non-spiritualistic mould."
James's misgivings about the reality of the spiritual world are 
most clearly evidenced in an exchange of letters with his father during 
this stay in Europe. Henry James Sr. had sent his son-the-scientist an 
essay he had published in 1867 entitled "Swedenborg's O n t o l o g y . I n  
this essay the elder James described the gradual unification of the 
individual's consciousness with the Creator when selfish, earthly striv­
ings were overcome. Yet these selfish motives, which Swedenborg and 
Henry Sr. were only too willing to overcome, stood at the very center
14The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James III, 2 vols. 
(Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 1:276.
^Henry James Sr., "Swedenborg's Ontology," North American 
Review 105(1867):89-123.
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of what Darwin had called the 'struggle for existence'. But Henry Sr.
was not merely arguing for the reality of a spiritual realm alongside
of the material universe. Instead, he sought to demonstrate that all
reality Is, by its very nature, spiritual! After reading the article
William respectfully remarked that he could not help Interpreting his
father's description in terms of the "natural constitution of things . . .
in its mechanical s e n s e . T o  this reply William's father retorted that
. . .  it is very evident to me that your trouble in under­
standing . . . arises mainly from the purely scientific cast 
of your mind just at the present time.17
His father went on to say that for him, as a spiritualist and free-thinker:
"Nature . . .  is void of absoluteness, or has no being in se but only in
18the exigencies of our carnal understanding." For nearly a decade how­
ever, William had been nurtured on a mechanistic interpretation of the 
universe and taught to trust 'empirical evidence' as the ultimate arbiter 
for truth. If the younger James was to approach the phenomena which his 
father wrote about, he would need concrete evidence rather than the per­
sonal testimony and metaphysical assumptions of his father, Agassiz or 
Swedenborg.
What can be abstracted from this early correspondence is that 
while William was a scientist by training, he was unabashedly philosoph­
ical by temperament. Describing him in this manner means simply that 
while he respected the power and rigor of science, he was impatient with 
the partial answers which science was structured to provide. Thus even




during the 1860’s we find James going beyond the 'factual data’ in search
of philosophical implications. The system of thought called science, for
example, which William employed to interpret his father's spiritualistic
writings, meant more than a mass of laboratory results. At its core,
science for James was a set of assumptions— a mechanistic philosophy—
and such a philosophy had unambiguous personal implications. Thus we
find the philosopher by temperament, scientist by training, writing to
Thomas Ward that he was "poisoned with Utilitarian venom . . . ," but
19that his "only ideal is a scientific life." In the same letter to this
college friend James brings us to the crux of the problem:
Ah! Tom, Tom, you well-constructed whelps who travel on their 
free-will and moral responsibility are more to be envied than 
anyone in the world . . . .  They [the believers in human free­
dom] are a superb form of animal, and beat the cows of whom you 
speak . . . beat 'em hollow, on their very own track of finite
absoluteness.20
And writing to Ward again, a year later, the brooding young scientist
openly complained that he was
. . . swamped with an empirical philosophy. I feel that 
we are Nature through and through, that we are wholly condi­
tioned, that not a wiggle of our will happens save as a result 
of physical laws.21
This is the same message which James expressed to his father two years
earlier but the tone of these letters has changed significantly. The
rebellious certainty which pervaded his reply to his father's article
has melted away into dissatisfaction and diffidence. These letters are
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philosophical conflict which plagued James throughout his early life, 
i.e., the tension between the mechanistic goal of scientific knowledge 
and the moral tone which seemed to pervade experience. The contradic­
tory nature of James's letters during the late 1860's is best understood 
as a reflection of the profound ambivalence which he felt between a 
mechanistic philosophy of science and his own moralistic cast of mind.
To speak in terms which he would later make popular, the 'tough-minded' 
James was devoted to an empirical philosophy, as he respected the pre­
cision and concrete utility of scientific knowledge. For these reasons 
a spiritualistic idealism like his father's seemed vapid, however much 
he sympathized with its aims and ideals. At the same time, however, 
the 'tender-minded' James disdained the moral, or more precisely, the 
amoral implications of a mechanistic philosophy.
This conflict reached its emotional crescendo in the late 1860's
when James was continually harassed by psychosomatic disorders and
bouts of severe depression. Relief from these ailments came slowly
through the 1870's but the first signs of improvement coincided with
his solution to the problem of human freedom. In the spring of 1870
James made the following entry in his diary:
I think yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished reading 
the first part of Renouvier's second 'Essais' and see no reason 
why his definition of Free Will— 'the sustaining of a thought 
because I choose to when I might have other thoughts'— need be 
the definition of an illusion. . . .  My first act of free will 
shall be to believe in free will . . . .  Hitherto, when I have 
felt like taking a free initiative, . . . suicide seemed the 
most manly form to put my daring into; now I will go a step 
further with my will not only act with it, but believe as well; 
believe in my individual reality and creative power.22
This passage is often quoted but is rarely given the kind of analysis
22
James, Letters of William James, 1:147-148.
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it deserves. Most commentators offer it as an example of James's concern
over the problem of free will and then move on to his defense of human 
23
freedom in 1884. Murphy, for example, described James as a person sick
with the disease of indecision: "There he lay, a sick man, wretched soul,
24unable to move. Renouvier . . . told him to march. And he marched."
Murphy is surely correct, as far as he goes. What must not be overlooked 
in this seductive biographical event however, is that Renouvier told 
James more than that he could march, he also told him what marching in­
volved. That is, a psychological model underlies James's affirmation 
of human freedom, a model which made belief a central element in human 
experience. This basic model extended beyond James's defense of human 
freedom and pervaded his psychological as well as philosophical thought.
Thus it is important to recognize exactly what James's declaration 
of freedom entailed and note how it influenced his early philosophical 
and psychological thought. Philosophically, James is stating more in 
this passage than 'man is free1 in the theological or metaphysical sense in 
which the American moral philosophers or his father chose to deal with 
the question. For James, human freedom was reformulated as a continuous 
process rather than a potential given in or with the faculty of will.
From the latter part of the passage especially, it is clear that James 
recognized that the process of becoming free involves a subjective voli­
tional act, an act of faith or belief in himself in a moment of decision.
23
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This brings us to the impact of this passage on James's psychology, spe­
cifically on the role of belief in the higher mental processes. For James, 
in this declaration of freedom in 1870, makes believing an essential 
aspect of volition and action. As he said, "I will go a step further 
with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my 
individual reality and creative power." As we shall see in chapter three, 
belief, an emotional response of the whole person, plays a central role 
in James's treatment of the higher mental processes in the Principles.
Let us return now to the philosophical level and note that James 
in this passage is bringing the metaphysical question of freedom— his 
freedom— into the realm of concrete, lived experience. This is a meth­
odologically unique philosophical perspective which culminated in James's 
pragmatic philosophy. Within such a perspective, the question of freedom 
is tom from the strictly logical level of abstract discussion and tied 
irrevocably to experience and action. James's justification for this 
move is that the problematical nature of what philosophers had called the 
problem of freedom is only experienced in action, when freedom is a 
living alternative. To treat this question as an abstraction means, 
ipso facto, to take it out of the situation which creates the problem.
Thus in spite of its circularity and irrationality, James suggested that 
a person becomes free by willfully choosing to believe in the reality of 
his freedom and then acting on that belief. In justifying such a position
James, as early as 1877, pointed to the practical effects of such a stance,
25"the result substantiates my belief, verifies it." This represents
25
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James's early attempt to reconcile science and the moral universe, a posl-
26tion which was later expanded and called 'pragmatism' in 1898. Our 
concern however, is not with pragmatism per se but the impact of James's 
early philosophical thought on his psychology. We must then leave James's 
early formulation of pragmatism and turn to another, related theme in his 
early philosophical thought— the concept of 'subjective interests'.
James's Early Critique of Science and the 
Concept of Subjective Interests
James's solution to the problem of freedom by means of a subjec­
tive act of belief— or, in psychological terms, an act of willful atten­
tion— set the stage for his early philosophical and psychological thought. 
In this section we shall follow the philosophical development of this
theme from a number of early book reviews in the mid-1870's to its cul-
27mination in a trilogy of essays he wrote in the late 1870's. Specif­
ically, it will be argued that the subjectivism of Renouvier's formula­
tion of freedom, divorced from the problem of freedom per se, formed the 
conceptual basis for James's critique of nineteenth century positivistic 
science. That is, having recognized the importance of subjective factors—  
beliefs— in his affirmation of freedom, James argued that the adoption of 
any philosophical system— including science— entailed a subjective act of 
faith. It should also be noted that while Renouvier, in France, was
26
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building a philosophy around a 'subjective act', Hodgson, in England, was 
constructing a psychology around the concept of 'attention'. In a very 
real sense, James's pre-1900 thought can be viewed as an attempt to inte­
grate these systems.
In a relatively short period of time the mechanistic program of 
science had gained many successes on issues which philosophers had been 
verbally dissecting for centuries, i.e., the electrical nature of the 
nerve impulse, the origin of life from lower forms and even the inter­
convertibility of forces such as heat, motion and sound. These were 
brilliant and powerful discoveries. Emboldened by these successes how­
ever, a number of scientists turned to more clearly speculative and 
complex issues, most conspicuously, the nature of life and mind. Of 
course, mechanistic formulations of these topics can be found throughout 
history but Helmholtz's law of the conservation of energy and Darwin's 
theory of evolution gave the new mechanistic formulations a credibility 
they had never before possessed. In terms of Its impact on the study of
human experience, John Tyndall's Belfast Address of 1874 can serve as a
28valuable illustration of this trend.
The Belfast Address was prototypical of the science vs. philosophy 
controversy in a number of respects. First, it was delivered by a re­
spected physicist as the presidential address to the prestigious British 
Association for the Advancement of Science. Secondly, after delivering 
his speech Tyndall staunchly defended his position against the arguments 
of dissenters. Lastly, on hearing Tyndall's speech a Presbyterian
28
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minister offered to deliver a paper to the Biological section of the 
Association which attempted to reconcile science and religion. The Asso­
ciation's refusal on the grounds that such a topic was unscientific
embittered many since Tyndall had admittedly gone beyond the boundaries
29
of scientific evidence. The controversy which ensued was followed in 
the pages of the popular magazines and did much to polarize all parties 
involved. Those members of both the religious and scientific communi­
ties who had remained diplomatically neutral to the question of materi­
alism found it increasingly difficult to maintain such a position.
Tyndall, it seemed, had explicitly challenged the authority of anything 
that did not contain the stamp of science. The response in the American 
press, for Tyndall had recently completed a lecture-tour of the United 
States, came fast and was generally negative. It was written in Nation
magazine that Tyndall's performance was the "sort of propaganda not much
30superior in method to that of theological missionaries."
The substantive issue involved Tyndall's formulation of a mecha­
nistic materialism, with the physicist 'confessing' that he 'discerned
31in matter the promise and potency of every form of life'. The impli­
cation was clear to a generation sensitized by fifteen years of contro­
versy over evolution. The study of man, whose consciousness to many 
signified a uniquely spiritual nature, could now be approached within 
the mechanistic framework of science. Within this framework conscious­
ness was reduced to epiphenomenal status and man's image to that of what
29
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32
Thomas Huxley called a 'conscious automaton'. In his essay "Are We
33Automata?," James offered an alternative to Tyndall's materialism.
He entered the 1874 controversy in the form of a letter to the editor 
of Nation, where he responded to Tyndall's suggestion that scientists, 
as scientists, are fully justified in metaphysical speculations. This
was a loaded remark. Behind it stood the thesis of what Maurice Mandel-
baum has called 'systematic positivism', "that the adequacy of our knowl­
edge increases as it approximates the forms of explanation which have
34been achieved by most of the natural sciences." To Tyndall's claim
James wrote that:
As men, of course, they have! . . . only when this exhila­
rated . . . mood is upon them let it be distinctly recognized
for what it is— the Mood of Faith, not Science.35
The question that arises is whether the 'Mood of Faith' of the specula­
tive scientist is essentially the same as the subjective act by which 
James affirmed his own freedom in 1870?
James wrote a notice for Nation magazine in 1873 which provides
36support for this interpretation. In this short acknowledgement James 
applauded the newly founded journal of Renouvier and Pillon, La Critique 
Philosophique, and took the opportunity to contrast their philosophy with
32
Thomas Huxley, "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and 
its History," Fortnightly Review (1874); reprinted in Collected Essays,
9 vols. (01ms: Hildesheim, 1970), 1:199-250.
"^William James, "Are We Automata?," Mind 4 (1879):1-22.
34
Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man and Reason: A Study in Nine­
teenth-Century Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971),
pp. 10-20.
35
William James, "Letter to the editor," Nation 19 (1873):437.
36
William James, "Notice for La Critique Philosophique," Nation 
16 (1873):94.
24
37scientific positivism. Not surprisingly, James noted that the primary
difference between these schools of thought is that Renouvier1s system
leaves room for the possibility of "absolute beginnings," i.e., human
freedom. James concluded this short notice by noting that within
Renouvier’s system one has "an act enthroned in the heart of philosophic 
38
thought." The act which James refers to here is clearly subjective
but our interpretation would be more clearly supported by a more general
statement, one in which James explicitly postulates that all speculation
necessarily contains a subjective act of faith. Such a statement was
fully articulated in James’s essay "The Sentiment of Rationality," but
his message to the speculative scientists is sufficiently clear in an
1875 review of The Unseen Universe; or Physical Speculations on a Future
State. Here he wrote that
. . . the author's belief in the 'bettemess of the other [mecha­
nistic] world' which he constructs for us demands from him at the 
end of his mechanical gyrations . . . the same simple act of tele- 
ological trust, the same faith that the end will crown the work . . . 
as does the most narrow-minded old woman [who] so quickly envelops 
her briefly-recited cosmogony."39
What James seems to have extracted from Renouvier's demand that the indi­
vidual take an active role in determining his fate was that all specula­
tion necessarily involves an emotionally based act of faith. For if the 
whole person of William James contributes to his affirmation of a philos­
ophy which embraces human freedom, then the emotional interests of a
37La Critique Philosophique (1872-1889) continued the first series 
of Annee Philosophique (1867-1869) and was superceded by Annee Philoso­
phique (1890-1913).
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Spencer, Tyndall, Hodgson or Huxley must also be involved in their adoption 
of a philosophy which denies the reality of freedom. It is imperative to 
note that whether such a choice is itself determined is not the central 
issue here. James’s major point is that a scientist’s affirmation of his 
philosophy— his working assumptions— is not a scientific decision. Like 
religion and art, science necessarily involves a subjective commitment 
which is rooted in the emotional interests of the scientist. This posi­
tion lent itself to cries of 'anti-intellectualism' and ’subjectivism’ 
by members of the philosophical and scientific communities. That James 
was aware of this difficulty is evidenced by his remark in an 1886 essay:
I know very well that in talking of dislikes to those who never 
mention them, I am doing a very coarse thing, and making a sort of 
intellectual Orson of myself. But, for the life of me, I cannot 
help it, because I feel sure that likes and dislikes must be among 
the ultimate factors of their philosophy as well as mine. Would 
they but admit it! How sweetly we then could hold converse to­
gether !^ 0
James was addressing the then emerging Hegelian philosophies of T. H.
Green and F. H. Bradley in this essay but his thesis— that personal likes 
and dislikes are essential aspects of philosophical belief— had been 
placed in a more general framework seven years earlier. It received its 
most detailed consideration in James's 1879 essay, "The Sentiment of 
Rationality.
In that essay James explicitly posited that an emotionally based 
act is an essential, though often unnoticed, aspect of the affirmation 
of any philosophical system. Not only Hegelian rationalism but the em­
piricism of J. S. Mill and Alexander Bain and positivistic science find
40
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their way into James's discussion. James's working assumption in this 
essay is that there is a fundamental ambiguity in experience, i.e., that 
when all the evidence is collected there still remains a degree of opaque­
ness and thus room for alternative interpretations. James was fond of 
making reference to the one-fluid and two-fluid theories of electricity 
as an example of this ambiguity since both theories were scientific and 
could account for the data equally well. Given this ambiguity, James 
argued that the particular interpretation which one adopts is an expres­
sion or fulfillment of the 'subjective interests' which one holds to be 
most valuable. His thesis is more general and ambitious here, he is 
concerned with the 'psychology' underlying philosophical affiliation as 
a human activity.
The title of the essay— "The Sentiment of Rationality"— tells much 
of the story. This essay is aimed at the many faceted and pompously 
fragile balloons of rationality which existed in the late nineteenth 
century. For however much science, British empiricism and Hegelian ra­
tionalism differed as systems, they shared one fundamental similarity.
The end of each, as a system of thought, was a unified and abstract 
account of the universe. In different ways, each sought to show that 
the world really was, in fact, a 'uni' rather than a 'multi'-verse. In 
moving toward this end, each of these systems conceived of the particu­
lars of individual experience as a kind of messy afterthought to be sub­
sumed under abstract laws. Given this analysis, we find James in the 
role of the gadfly, suggesting that 'rationality' itself is an individual 
'feeling' whose distinctive marks are necessarily 'subjective'. What 
James was groping for here was the recognition of those fleeting feelings 
by which the thinker himself recognizes that his search for a rational
27
answer is complete. James's answer was that this experience consisted of:
A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest . . . .  The transition from 
a state of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full 
of lively relief and pleasure . . . .  Shall we then say that the 
feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence of any 
feeling of irrationality? I think there are very good grounds for 
upholding such a view.42
Later in the essay James put his thesis more succinctly, "to think with
43perfect fluency, the thing we think of seems to us pro tanto rational."
Within this formulation of rationality the thinker himself, his 
entire personality, becomes an essential part of his system of thought, 
for only the person doing the thinking can feel the 'perfect fluency' 
which to him signifies a rational answer. James thought that this simple 
observation— which brings the whole person back into the process of philo­
sophical belief and inquiry— provided the psychological basis for the 
diversity of philosophical opinion. The problem comes into clear focus 
when it is recognized, as James did, that different people may hold 
fundamentally different subjective criteria which their systems must 
fulfill. James delineated what he called two "sister passions"— the
passion for parsimony and the passion for particulars— which he saw as
44the conflicting ideals which philosophical systems seek to satisfy.
In calling them passions, James sought to make clear the emotional basis 
of these subjective interests. He saw the passion for parsimony as the 
common psychological motive which the systems Hegelian rationalism,
British empiricism and science in general were responding to. Their 
ideal is to explicate the fundamental unity of the universe, to demon­
strate, through different methods, the uniformity and homogeneity which 
underlies the multiplicity and heterogeneity of experience. Their primary
42 43 44
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methodological tool is causal analysis, "which is often given," James
45wrote, "as the definition of rational knowledge." The power and esteem 
of these systems lie in their power to explain, to subsume the particulars 
of experience under a minimum of general laws. This is the passion for 
abstract simplicity most clearly evidenced in the theory-builder. James 
wrote that abstraction, classification and conceptual knowledge are the 
ideals of this enterprise. This tradition— this way of looking at reality—  
can be traced back to Plato; it is the tradition of Reason and the Intel­
lect which science took over from rationalistic philosophy.
James’s most important contribution to this analysis however, was 
the recognition that each of these parsimonious ideals was a double-edged 
sword, that other motives also operate in determining philosophical 
opinion. For in abstracting and explaining and articulating the higher- 
order uniformities, one necessarily loses contact with the richness and 
felt reality of the phenomena under study. Hence, alongside the passion 
for parsimony lies its rival, the passion for a clear understanding of 
the particulars of experience. Of this passion, this subjective interest, 
James wrote that:
It loves to recognize particulars in their full completeness, and 
the more it can carry the happier it is. It prefers any amount 
of incoherence, abruptness and fragmentariness (so long as the 
literal details of the separate facts are saved) to an abstract 
way of conceiving things that . . . dissolves away at the same 
time their concrete fullness. Clearness and simplicity thus set 
up rival claims and make a real dilemma for the thinker.
The dilemma to which James is referring here can be seen in the specula­
tions of the nineteenth century systematic positivists, e.g., J. S. Mill, 
Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte. Having forsakened the richness and
45 46
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complexity of individual experience for theoretical simplicity and unity, 
they created systems of thought that failed to do justice to the creative 
power of the individual. Individuals came to be conceived as pawns in 
a cosmic interchange of mechanical forces. This conception of the indi­
vidual seemed the epitome of ’empty barrenness’ to James. What James 
argued for was a bit of humility on the part of the speculative positivists,
the recognition that the "interest of theoretical rationality . . .  is
47but one of a thousand human purposes." Thus while he defended the sci­
entific ideal as a valuable way of conceiving of the universe, he refused—  
unlike the systematic positivists— to acknowledge that scientific abstrac­
tion was the only justifiable perspective.
What we have in this early essay, which Perry noted was written in
1877, is the rudiments of James's pluralism, a theme which plays a central
48role in both his psychology and mature philosophical thought. The
fundamental thesis of pluralism is that reality can be viewed from a
number of different perspectives— that there are multiple rather than
one fundamental Reality. Another form which James's early pluralism took
was his attempt to reconcile religious belief and science in the late
1870's. James took up this topic in an essay he published in 1879,
"Rationality, Activity and Faith," and again in an 1881 essay, "Reflex 
49Action and Theism." Though our primary concern is James's early cri­
tique of positivistic science, it might be noted that James's defense of
47 48
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religious belief took the same form as his defense of human freedom— in 
both cases the belief is justified by its practical consequences. In the 
late nineteenth century, science argued against both of these issues but 
James recognized different problems demanded different perspectives and 
that their answers were perspective dependent. As we shall see in the 
third chapter, James's pluralism appears in his psychology in his formu­
lation of the various sub-universes of reality in which thinking takes 
place.
Returning to James's early thought, it must be acknowledged that 
the demand for objectivity, uniformity and verifiability were associated 
with the ascendency of the natural sciences. James feared however, and 
with some justification, that the proponents of Tyndall and Huxley were 
exploiting the authority of science when they ventured into the specula­
tive realm. Their exploitation took the form of speaking as though their 
scientific formulations of metaphysical questions were the only reason­
able alternatives, that they had an unequivocal basis of support. In 
short, positivistic speculation was presented as dogma. At the same time, 
they strongly implied that other interpretations were merely 'subjective', 
or worse yet, 'theological'. Their mistake, as James saw it, was that 
their zealous proselytizing of science allowed them to forget that they 
themselves were engaging in a thoroughly subjective and speculative enter­
prise. Thus James was upset that Huxley could suggest that faith in an
unproven religious doctrine was the 'lowest depth of immorality' while
50righteously maintaining that man is a 'conscious automaton'. The sci­
entific evidence supporting Huxley's conception of consciousness was, in
50
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James's eyes, open to alternative Interpretation. In his essay "Are We 
Automata," James drew upon the most successful scientific achievement of 
his age— evolutionary theory— to support his contention that conscious­
ness is more than epiphenomenal.'** In brief, he argued that since con­
sciousness has 'survived' phylogenetically it must have adaptive value 
and therefore must effect action, i.e., it must function to guide man’s 
adaptation under some circumstances. This proposition, coupled with 
evidence from phenomenal experience and a practical justification for
the efficacy of belief, allowed James to present an at least plausible
52argument for psycho-physical interactlonism.
In summary, by postulating that all speculation contains a sub­
jective element, James sought to make clear that the presumed objectivity 
of the scientific conception of human nature was illusory, that the 
content of their speculative systems was dictated by the values which 
they held dearest. For this reason James's invitation to the specula­
tive realm contained a noteworthy qualification:
By all means let every man who has a stomach for the fray be
admitted to the speculative realm. But let it be on equal footing 
with all comers, all to wear the speculative colors, no odds given, 
no favors shown. And may the critics help fair play by pointing 
out to the . . . public that this wild-eyed champion who is now
seen throwing in his hat . . . was no other than the laborious and
accurate physicist, chemist, or physiologist Blank, who, having 
. . . tired . . .  of the laboratory's confinement, now appears in 
his new and brilliant role of Blank, the Audacious and Ingenious 
Speculative Philosopher.53
Let us take one example— the scientist's rejection of the reality of
human freedom— and see how it could be understood within James's account
of philosophical belief. The scientist enters the philosophical realm
51 52
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seeking universal lawfulness and simplicity and, because of these sub­
jective ideals— which have been valuable guides in his scientific work—  
he opts for a strict determinism. The possibility of 'absolute beginnings' 
is, to the scientist, an unthinkable anomaly, a blatent contradiction of 
everything that he has learned to cherish. In contrast, in defending 
human freedom the free-willist is responding to his passion for an accu­
rate description of the particulars of phenomenal experience. The 
scientist's abstract determinism leaves him cold, it simply does not 
address itself to the richness and moral Intensity which he is seeking 
to understand. How can moral righteousness be reduced to the interplay 
of neural connections asks the person who believes in human freedom.
James's fundamental postulate is evidenced in the belief of both the 
scientist and free-willist; the individual contributes something—  
replaces factual ambiguity with emotional conviction— based on his 
previously established subjects interests.
James's Philosophical Defense of Human Freedom
We have encountered James's belief in human freedom from two 
perspectives; first as a personal dilemma which he overcame and second 
in terms of his formulation of the nature of philosophical belief.
This is unavoidable since this theme literally pervades James's early 
writings. Instead of continuing to approach this theme obliquely how­
ever, we shall examine it explicitly in this section. With this accom­
plished, we shall attempt to show the continuity between James's inter- 
actionistic conception of man in his philosophical and psychological 
thought.
Although James's formal statement on human freedom did not appear 
until his 1884 essay "The Dilemma of Determinism," the essentials of his
33
formulation can again be seen emerging in his book reviews and writings 
54of the 1870's. While we shall deal primarily with his more elaborate 
statement, a number of his early works will be cited to anchor his 
thought chronologically. The relationship between his defense of human 
freedom, psycho-physical interactionism and his critique of nineteenth 
century science should also be made explicit. If his philosophical and 
psychological work before 1884 is considered as an integrated whole, it 
can be seen to contain both critical and constructive aspects. At the 
philosophical level, he was critical of the ostensibly objective scien­
tific formulation of man. On the positive side, his early philosophical 
work culminated with pragmatically based argument for human freedom.
At the psychological level James criticized the scientific formulation 
of mind, mounted a scientific argument in support of psycho-physical 
interactionism and presented a formulation of volition which could accom­
modate human freedom.
It should not be surprising to learn that James's argument for 
human freedom centered around the subjective affirmation of the "moral 
order in the universe.Formulated in terms of the behavioral effects 
of a person believing in his freedom or determination, his argument is 
the practical embodiment of Victorian moralism.
James fully realized, in considering the topic of human freedom, 
that he was dealing with a metaphysical postulate which could not be 
verified in a scientific fashion. His argument therefore consisted of 
an explication of the real life implications, the 'practical effects'
54See especially William James, "German Pessimism," Nation 
21 (1875):233-234.
55Ibid., p. 234.
of believing In a thoroughly determined universe. According to James, 
the dilemma of determinism is that its affirmation ipso facto repudiates 
the reality of the moral world and creates a universe in which 'what 
ought to be' is impossible or morally meaningless. That is, James 
argued that since determinism postulates that all behavior is decreed 
(caused) by a set of antecedent events, 'what ought to be' is impossible 
unless, per chance, 'what ought to be' is decreed to be. The problem, 
for the moralist, is that with either alternative 'what ought to be' is 
beyond human control and therefore devoid of moral responsibility.
James analyzes the case of murder in the following fashion.
According to the determinist, the act of murder was the only possible
outcome of the given set of antecedent conditions. Would the determinist, 
James asked, regret the murder? Possibly, but if so, he should surely 
regret all the other evils in the world. The result of these feelings of
regret in a world which is beyond our control, James argued, would be the
development of an attitude of 'deterministic pessimism'. James saw such 
pessimism evidenced in the German philosophies of von Hartmann and 
Schopenhauer. It also follows that 'what ought to be' is impossible 
since the possibility of non-murder under the given conditions is non­
sensical to the determinist. The only escape for the determinist, thought 
James, was the adoption of a Rousseau-like attitude of 'deterministic 
optimism', i.e., a philosophy of life which maintains that 'whatever 
happens is for the best in the long run'. The problem here is that the 
determinist must forever renounce his feelings of regret and the moral 
universe as either unreal or pathological."^ James concluded his discussion
James, Will to Believe, p. 163. "^Ibid., pp. 162-167.
of a deterministic philosophy of life by suggesting that it
. . . fosters the fatalistic mood of mind. It makes those 
who are already too inert more passive still; it renders wholly 
reckless those whose energy is already in excess.58
The moralistic and interactionistic conception of James's argument
against determinism is clear In this passage, as well as an earlier
59essay published in Renouvier's journal. The problem of evil was a 
very real problem within James's moral universe. It could neither be 
denied nor explained away in the name of science. From James's point 
of view, the only viable strategy was to acknowledge its existence and 
actively strive to overpower it through willful effort. His formula­
tion of human freedom was fully compatible with such a melioristic con­
ception of the world.
James's interactionism is evidenced by his suggestion that If a 
person believes his efforts are ineffectual— that whatever will be will 
be— then he would be less likely to expend the effort necessary to do 
what ought to be done. In contrast, believing in his own freedom and 
creativity would act to reinforce the expenditure of additional voli­
tional effort. This argument in terms of the 'practical effects' of a 
belief in freedom provided the concrete justification which his father's 
or Agassiz's idealism lacked. The psychological tone of this philo­
sophical argument should also be made explicit. James Is saying, in 
effect, that a belief in one's helplessness contributes to a person being 
and acting helpless while a belief in freedom can contribute to a stren­
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It should also be noted how closely James's argument for freedom
is tied to his own crisis over the problem of freedom in the late I860's.
Remember the importance of belief in Renouvier's formulation of free
will, and James's proclamation in 1870 that:
Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative . . . 
suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into; now,
I will go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but 
believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative 
power. My belief . . . can't be optimistic— but I will posit 
life (the good, the real) in the self-governing resistance of the 
ego to the world.60
Thus an interactionistic conception of self— an actively choosing fighter
for ends— stood at the very center of James's personal and philosophical
conception of human freedom. Without exaggeration, believing provided
James with an alternative to thoughts of suicide, and after 1870 he never
again, seriously questioned the reality of his freedom. It should not be-
surprising then, that James's early philosophical works represent the
foundation of a system which sought to accommodate human freedom, a system
in which the individual was an actively choosing and creative part of
reality.
Human Freedom and a Scientific Psychology 
During the years between 1875 and 1884 however, James was begin­
ning to formulate the central principles of his scientific psychology 
and his personal and philosophical affirmation of freedom created enor­
mous difficulties for this task. For if volitional effort does effect 
action, if mind does effect body, an alternative to the then popular 
psycho-physical parallelism would have to be supplied. In fact, if 
James's psychology was to be consistent with his moral philosophy, it
^Henry James, Letters of William James, 1:148. (Italics mine.)
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could be nothing less than a psycho-physical interactionism— a psychology 
In which an efficacious and mentallstic self traversed the unfathomable 
Cartesian chasm. Surely his moral philosophy demanded only a limited 
interactionism but, as we have seen, nineteenth century scientific deter­
minism required that psychology adopt a strict psycho-physical parallel­
ism. The Principles reveals that James felt this conflict intensely.
The Principles was, after all, a scientific text and, in hopes of avoid­
ing metaphysical polemics, James empllcitly postulated a complete paral­
lelism, "the blank unmediated correspondence, term for term, of the states 
of consciousness with the total brain p r o c e s s . F o r  the most part he 
was able to stay within the boundaries of this formulation. But despite 
the author's intent to maintain the collaterality of mind and body, James's 
parallelism leaks— from the mental to the physical— in precisely those
areas which his moral philosophy demands that it leak, viz., in his for-
62mulation of will and related topics.
James's conception of consciousness as an efficacious cognitive-
emotive process can be seen emerging in his 1878 critique of Spencer's
63definition of mind. Spencer, in his own Principles of Psychology, had 
postulated that the entire process of mental evolution could be conceived 
as "the continuous adjustment of internal mental relations to external
James, Principles, 1:182.
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64environmental relations." According to this correspondence theory of 
mind, mind passively registers those actually experienced relations and 
events which make survival more probable. This formulation is the evolu­
tionary embodiment of an empirical philosophy. The motivational principle 
is pleasure and pain and ultimately the survival of the organism. James 
thought this characterization was a gross oversimplification— another 
instance of the positivistic pseudo-scientist losing sight of the obvious 
in the glare of cosmic speculation. The poverty of such a formulation 
is that it concealed the complexity and teleology inherent in experience, 
the teleology which James had argued is central to both scientific and 
philosophical inquiry. Beyond passively registering the events and rela­
tions of the external world, James suggested that consciousness
. . . seems to supply the means and the standard by which the 
[objects] are measured. It not only serves a final purpose, but 
it brings a final purpose— posits, declares it, this purpose is 
not a mere hypothesis . . . but an imperative decree; Survival 
shall occur, and, therefore, brain must so perform.65
In this passage we find James describing two qualitatively different forms 
of conscious activity. The first is strictly psychological and relates to 
the use of the concept of subjective interests as a psychological construct, 
i.e., the subjective interests embedded in consciousness seem "to supply 
the means and the standard" by which objects are measured. Thus experi­
ence seems to be pervaded by what we shall call in the third chapter a 
transient teleology through which some objects and relations are judged 
valuable and true while others are declared trivial and misleading or 
simply ignored. In this same passage however, we find James making reference
64
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to a qualitatively different form of conscious activity. Thus he wrote 
that some subjective interests take on the status of "imperative decrees;" 
and survival, or some other subjective ideal, "shall occur, and, there­
fore, brain must so perform." Such imperative decrees are the fundamental 
beliefs of the knower— which we shall call the fundamental teleology in 
James's psychological thought. Not surprisingly this form of conscious 
activity represents a clear and explicit 'leak' from the mental to the 
physical and this is a source of inconsistency and confusion in James's 
psychology. In this section we shall begin to trace the development and 
implications of both forms of conscious activity in James's psychological 
thought. But it must be repeated that this is just the beginning; this 
task will not be completed until we examine his formulation of belief in 
the third chapter and directly confront the relation between his early 
philosophical thought and his psychology of the higher mental processes. 
James's debt to Renouvier might also be noted, for while the French phi­
losopher put an act by the individual in the heart of his philosophical 
thought, James placed an act by the individual in the heart of his psycho­
logical thought.
At the strictly psychological level, the means which James makes 
reference to in the above passage are the mental representations of the 
various possibilities of action. These mental representations are the 
cognitive portions of consciousness, as stored in memory. By defining 
mind almost exclusively in terms of the passive registration of relations 
experienced in the environment, Spencer's formulation emphasized this 
cognitive aspect of mind. But James recognized that an equally important 
aspect of mind is that it supplies its own standard through which reality 
is judged. With this idiosyncratic standard, consciousness becomes an
40
active participant in a person's construction of reality— much like the 
subjective ideals of the person play an essential part in James's analysis 
of philosophical belief. For example, given the same mass of sensory 
input— a northern New Hampshire landscape— the painter, the real estate 
developer and the geologist see different worlds based on their divergent 
interests. Within James's psychology, subjective interests draw an indi­
vidual's attention to different aspects of the same mass of sensory experi­
ence. They influence action by determining exactly what a person perceives. 
In this respect they represent a deterministic and potentially scientific 
construct. Of equal importance to James however, is that subjective 
interests represent the dynamic-motivational aspect of all conscious
activity, "the real a priori element in cognition which precedes the
66outer relations noticed." He described this dynamic aspect as "an 
immense number of emotional judgements, judgements of the ideal, judge­
ments that things should be thus and s o . T h i s  transient, dynamic and 
frightfully complex network of ideal, mental relations develops gradually 
in time and becomes the cognitive-emotive rules which a person brings 
into the game of experiencing reality. They can be understood as mental 
constructions which result from the interaction of a person's network of 
ideal relations with what is actually experienced in the world. Most 
importantly, they need not correspond to anything that actually has been 
experienced in the real world. With the concept of subjective interests 
the content of consciousness is forever embedded, in James's psychology, 
in a dynamic act.
Given this formulation, the terms pleasure and pain beg the moti­
vational question since only by knowing a person's ideals— his unique
66Ibid., p. 6. 67Ibid., p. 3.
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structure of interests— can one define what is pleasureful or painful.
Thus with the concept of subjective interests James obtained a construct—
however evasive— through which a person could transcend objectively defined
pleasures and pains as well as the actually experienced relations given in 
68
the world. And that at least some people can make such a transcendence,
69
James wrote, is evidenced by phenomenal experience.
Though it received little attention from psychologists at the time, 
the concept of subjective interests is central to James's mature psycho­
logical as well as philosophical thought. Perhaps its explicitly teleo- 
logical and idiographic character made nineteenth century experimental 
psychologists wary of its utility as a scientific construct. Whatever the 
reasons, however, it is certainly the most pervasive theme in James's pre- 
1890 essays and it appears in the Principles in the most distinctively 
Jamesian chapters, i.e.."Automaton Theory," "The Consciousness of Self," 
"The Stream of Thought," "Reasoning," "Association" and "The Perception 
of Reality." We can turn to the Principles to solidify this point. In 
his treatment of self, James makes the dynamic-motivational character of 
subjective interests explicit.
Our interest in things means the attention and emotion which the 
thought of them will excite, and the actions which their presence 
will evoke . . .  my social self-love, my interest in the images 
other men have framed of me, is . . .an interest in a set of 
objects external to my thought.70
And in his treatment of attention we find a passage that goes to the heart 
68
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of James's critique of classical associationism. Here he writes that
Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses 
which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because 
they are of no interest to me . . .  . Only those items which 
I notice shape my mind— without selective Interest, experience 
is utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light 
and shade, background and foreground— intelligent perspective, 
in a word.71
For our last example we shall turn to James's most distinctive psycholog­
ical concept, the stream of thought. Again, the notion of interest is a 
central aspect of this formulation.
Relation . . . to . . . interest is constantly felt in the fringe, 
and particularly the relation of harmony and discord. . . . any 
thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all 
right' is an acceptable member of our thinking. . . . Provided we 
only feel it to have a place in a scheme of relations in which 
the interesting topic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make 
it a relevant and appropriate portion of the train of ideas.72
Thus subjective interests transform consciousness, for James, from a
passive register to an essentially active, selective process which is
antithetical to Spencer's definition of mind. Furthermore, the subjec-
tivistic and idiographic tone of the concept of subjective interests set
the foundation upon which the formulation of the stream of thought was
constructed. Its intimate relationship to James's early philosophical
thought should also be noted. Implicit in his affirmation of freedom,
his early book reviews and his essays on the motives of philosophical
belief is a recognition that the person selects one aspect of experience
to be his reality, whether that reality be a scientific theory or some
concrete perceptual object.
Let us now return to the second form of conscious activity contained 
in James's critique of Spencer's definition of mind, the imperative decree
^*Tbid., p. 402. (Italics mine.)
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which we have called the fundamental teleology in James's psychology.
Here we find James describing what must be called an essentially inter-
actionistic and indeterministic form of conscious activity. "Survival
73shall occur," he wrote, and, therefore, brain must so perform." This 
willful command represents an unequivocal 'leak' from the mental to the 
physical and, once acknowledged, any hope of a complete psycho-physical 
parallelism is shattered. The philosophical postulate which stands in 
the not too distant background of this sentence is, of course, human 
freedom. This imperative decree which James tells us is characteristic 
of volitional activity is essentially the same as Renouvier's formula­
tion of freedom which James alluded to in 1870, i.e., "the sustaining
74of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts."
The sustaining of a particular thought involves attending to that 
thought and voluntary attention, according to James, is the essence 
of will.^ In both cases a subjective volitional act brings one of 
any number of possible actions into reality.
In his first full-length treatment of volition, James stated 
that the question of human freedom reduced to whether or not the amount 
of volitional effort expended was fully determined by antecedent events.^ 
The scientist explicitly postulates that the amount of effort jLs fully 
determined and states, in effect, that the line of least resistance is
73
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always followed. Anything short of such a postulate would be the tacit 
affirmation of mental efficacy. James noted, however, that such a posi­
tion is not supported by phenomenal experience in those cases in which 
a more altruistic idea is chosen. He symbolized such an instance as,
(1) M per se < S
(2) M + E > S
where S is the more forceful or instinctual idea, M is the less force­
fully felt or altruistic idea and E is the amount of volitional effort 
expended in attending to the idea.^ According to James, in the second 
equation volitional effort seems to be added ole novo to the rather weak, 
altruistic idea and the path of greater resistance becomes a reality.
Of course, the determinist would posit that this experience is an illu­
sion but James took pains to point out that such a statement is an 
assumption rather than an empirical fact. Of course, James's position 
is also assumptive rather than factual but his assumption does not do 
violence to phenomenal experience. Rather than being a fixed resultant
of a set of antecedent events, volitional effort, for James, "is a
psychic or moral fact pure and simple," which
. . . appears adventitious and indeterminate in advance.
We can make more or less of it as we please, and if we make g^ 
enough we can convert the greatest resistance into the least.
It is obvious but important to recognize that within this formulation
of volition, James is going beyond his own deterministic construct of
subjective interests and entering the realm of the metaphysics of human
freedom. He is therefore constructing a formulation of volition within
which a person can transcend not only pleasure and pain, but also his
subjective interests, through willful effort. This type of conscious
77 7
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control, which James called the 'fiat' of the will, represents a clear
departure from the strictly psychological form of selectivity contained
in the concept of subjective interests.
James used a number of phrases to communicate the full meaning of
the fiat. In his earliest publication on volition he called it the
79"mental click of resolve." In a later article he described it as a
80"genuine and sincere mental consent." And in the Principles the fiat
81is simply a "volitional mandate" or an "act of mental consent." In
all usages, however, he describes the fiat as a mental process by which
"we keep affirming and adopting a state of mind of which disagreeable-
82ness is an integral factor." And whenever James employs the term it 
is clearly mentalistic, implicates a psycho-physical interactionism and 
is potentially indeterministic. I say potentially indeterministic 
because James knew full-well that he was injecting metaphysics into 
his psychology of volition. In fact, it might be more accurate to say 
that James's formulation of volition was offered with human freedom in 
mind rather than to imply that his formulation stands or falls with 
the resolution to the question of free will.
In any case, James is obviously troubled and torn over the impli­
cations of human freedom for scientific psychology and vice versa. And 
it should not be surprising that he openly discards his proposed paral­
lelism in his chapters on Attention, Will and Automaton Theory. That
79Ibid., p. 22.
80
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he had free will in mind when he broke his parallelism in these chapters 
is evidenced by his 1879 letter to Shadworth Hodgson. Here he wrote 
that:
. . .  so obscure are still the relations of the individual 
consciousness to the universal thought . . . that I can't help 
hoping . . . that some way will be found by which causality may 
still be ascribed to individual volitions and reactions of 
attention. My article in Mind was written against the swaggering 
dogmatism of certain medical materialists. . . .  I wanted to 
show them how many empirical facts have been overlooked.83
The very language which James uses in this excerpt— "the relations of 
the individual consciousness to the universal thought"— is reminiscent 
of his father's discussion of Swedenborg's ontology. But while father 
and son may have shared the same ideals, William truly was a scientist 
and needed empirical facts to support his contention. The article in 
Mind which he alludes to in this letter is his essay, "Are We Automata?," 
which first appeared in 1879 and was later incorporated into the 
Principles. It also becomes clear from this letter that James's cri­
tique of nineteenth century positivistic science and his formulation 
of volition were both motivated by a desire to defend— or at least 
leave open— the possibility of human freedom.
The Jamesian circle is now complete and above the abstract theo­
retical inconsistencies there appears a fundamental personal consistency 
in James's early philosophical and psychological thought. A phenomenon 
which James— the man— discovered in personal experience was later affirmed 
by James— the moral philosopher— in the metaphysical realm and still 
later presented by James— the empirical psychologist— as an integral part 
of his scientific psychology. If James— the psychologist— is considered
83
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in isolation, the traces of interactionism and indeterminism in the 
Principles become aberrations and the inconsistencies of that work be­
come incomprehensible or, worse yet, naive. But if James is recognized 
as a man who was vitally concerned with moral issues which centered 
around the problem of human freedom, these inconsistencies can be seen 
as necessary, and, in fact, essential parts of his attempt to create a 
science of psychology. Of course, such a recognition does not make the 
theoretical and metaphysical inconsistencies disappear but one wonders 
whether the inconsistencies are rooted in the emotional sentiments of 
William James or the equally emotional sentiments of those who wish to 
legislate jex cathedra the contents and methods of a scientific psychology. 
For James, the scientist by training, philosopher by temperament, a 
scientific psychology
. . . means . . . not a sort of psychology that stands on 
solid ground. It means a psychology particularly fragile, and 
into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every 
joint.
A hundred years after the birth of William James, Gordon Allport exam­
ined what he called the 'productive paradoxes' of James's psychology.
We shall close our chapter with Allport's description of his mentor's 
message to contemporary psychology.
Narrow consistency can neither bring salvation to your science 
nor help mankind. Let your approaches be diverse, but let 
them in aggregate do full justice to the heroic qualities of 
man. If you find youselves tangled in paradoxes, what of 
that? Who can say that the universe shall not contain para­
doxes simply because he himself finds them unpalatable? To 
accommodate the whole of human experience keep layers of space 
and air and vision in your scientific formulations.
William James, Psychology: A Briefer Course, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1892; reprint ed., New York: Harper, 1961), p. 334.
Gordon Allport, "The Productive Paradoxes of William James," 
Psychological Review 50 (1943):95-127, pp. 126-127.
CHAPTER 2
SHADWORTH HODGSON AND JAMES'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
He [Hodgson] rejected what passed in his day for empiricism . . . 
because . . . it was infected with Hume's sensationalistic atom- 
ism . . . .  It is as an exponent of the experiential theory of 
being . . . that Hodgson was James' master. . . . But while James . . . 
cites Hodgson as an exponent of empiricism in general, and names 
him with Charles Pierce as one of the two sources of his pragmatism, 
the influence of Hodgson is most evident in matters of detail. He 
helped James to bridge the chasms created both by traditional dual­
ism and by Hume's sensationalistic atomism.1
This passage, from Perry's The Thought and Character of William 
James, is both remarkable and confusing. On the one hand, Perry clearly 
acknowledges James's indebtedness to what he called Hodgson's experien­
tial theory of being, i.e., Hodgson's description of experience as a 
stream and his unequivocal rejection of Hume's atomism. What is remark­
able about this observation is that while James's formulation of the 
stream of thought is generally recognized as a seminal theme of the 
Principles, no one— not even Perry— has provided a systematic examina­
tion of the influence of Hodgson on James's psychology. This omission 
becomes especially conspicuous— and in need of clarification— in the 
light of the recent phenomenological interpretations of the Principles. 
These writers have considered the notion of the stream of thought in 
detail but have, for the most part, ignored Hodgson. Instead they have 
chosen to look to German sources for the roots of James's phenomenological
Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:612-613. (Italics 
mine.) Hereafter cited as Perry, William James.
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2
conception of thought as a stream. While their efforts provide us with 
a clean and ostensibly reasonable historical interpretation— phenome­
nology did, after all, emerge as a distinct philosophical movement in 
Germany— a discemably w.higgish strain in this interpretation appears 
when James's debt to Hodgson, an English empirical philosopher, is ex­
amined.
What is confusing in Perry's treatment of the Hodgson-James rela­
tionship comes into clear focus when two parts of the above excerpt are 
juxtaposed. We are told that Hodgson "helped James to bridge the chasms 
created both by traditional dualism and Hume's sensationalistic atomism" 
but them, in the same breath, that "the influence of Hodgson is most 
evident in matters of detail." The problem is that dualism and sensa­
tionalistic atomism were not details of nineteenth century philosophy 
and psychology but rather fundamental and long-entrenched assumptions 
which served as the conceptual foundation of these disciplines. Another 
interpretation of Perry might be that he meant to relegate Hodgson's
See, for example, Hans Linschoten's On the Way Toward a Phenom­
enological Psychology: The Psychology of William James (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1968), pp. 150-160; Aron Gurwitsch's The 
Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), 
pp. 307-365; James Edie's "William James and Phenomenology," Review of 
Metaphysics. 23 (1970):485-490. Hodgson is sometimes mentioned in 
passing by recent phenomenological commentators as one of those who 
supported the automaton theory conception of consciousness, e.g., see 
John Wild's William James' Radical Empiricism (New York: Doubleday,
1969), p. 12. James's indebtedness to Hodgson has been noted in passing 
by Andrew Rack, "Epistemology in William James' Principles of Psychology," 
Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 22 (1972):88-89; John Passmore, A Hundred 
Years of Philosophy (London: Duckworth and Co., 1957), p. 107; and Aron 
Gurwitsch, "William James' Theory of the 'Transitive Parts' of the 
Stream of Consciousness," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3 
(1943):453. The most extensive treatment of the James-Hodgson rela­
tionship is provided in Perry's William James, (1:611-653), but a sys­
tematic examination of Hodgson's impact on James's psychology has yet 
to be undertaken.
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influence to matters of detail only with respect of James's philosophy 
of pragmatism. While this seems more reasonable, we are still left with 
an incomplete account of the sources of James's philosophical psychology 
in the Principles— a lacuna which contemporary phenomenologists are 
quickly filling with remnants of the proto-phenomenological systems of 
late nineteenth century Germans. There are a number of problems with 
a phenomenological interpretation of the Principles but perhaps the most 
devastating is the effect that it has on'contemporary psychologists—  
i.e., James's psychology comes to be viewed as removed from the concerns 
of contemporary psychology and his system becomes unintelligible.
In this chapter it will be argued that a complex of related phil­
osophical insights from Hodgson's system formed, not the details, but 
the assumptive core of James's philosophical psychology in the Principles. 
Specifically, it will be argued that a number of phenomenological themes 
were clearly present in Hodgson's works as early as 1865 and, given 
this, that these themes influenced James's formulations of: (1) the 
psychologists' fallacy, (2) the distinction between knowledge by ac­
quaintance and knowledge about and (3) the nature of the distinction 
between subject and object. At the same time that Hodgson embraced 
these phenomenological themes however, we shall show that he also re­
tained the ideal of creating a scientific psychology. Before approach­
ing these issues, however, some introductory remarks must be made con­
cerning the domain of philosophical psychology, the approach taken in 
this chapter and Hodgson's relationship to James.
The province of philosophical psychology is by no means self- 
evident. Our first task, then, is to circumscribe the boundaries of 
that discipline as it applies to the Principles. Following the lead
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of Andrew Reck, this chapter will consider the fundamental assumptions,
methodological orientation and the metaphysical implications of James's 
3
psychology. Philosophical psychology in general seeks to explicate 
the fundamental concepts which psychologists employ as working assump­
tions. To the extent that these assumptions implicate fundamental world­
views, philosophical psychology makes contact with the metaphysical 
realm. Conversely, to the extent that these assumptions guide and 
direct the day to day activities of working psychologists, it considers 
the fundamental concepts and methods of psychology. In trying to do 
justice to both these strains, philosophical psychology seeks to make 
explicit what may only be implicit in a particular system of psycho­
logical thought. As stated, it should be apparent that philosophical 
psychology is a hybrid discipline which lies in the area which bridges 
metaphysics and the natural sciences— a kind of never-never-land within 
which neither philosophers nor scientists are safe from molestation by 
the other.
Though we shall be dealing with philosophical issues throughout 
this chapter, the method employed is primarily historical. This is an 
important consideration because the last fifteen years has witnessed a 
renaissance of scholarly activity on James's psychology from a phenom­
enological frame of reference, e.g., Linschoten, Gurwitsch, Wilshire.^
3
Andrew Reck, "The Philosophical Psychology of William James," 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1971):293-312.
4
Linschoten, Psychology of William James; Gurwitsch, Field of 
Consciousness; Wild, Radical Empiricism of William James; Bruce Wilshire, 
William James and Phenomenology; A Study of "The Principles of Psychology" 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968); Richard Stevens, James 
and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1974).
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Edie has summarized the fundamental goal of this literature by stating 
that it seeks to uncover "the intrinsic and logically necessary conver- 
gencies with James' philosophical discoveries and those of the phenom- 
enologists.Although this body of literature is valuable in a number 
of respects, it has been hampered by: (1) a tendency to tear James out 
of his historical context and interpret the Principles as a primarily 
philosophical rather than scientific treatise and (2) an impoverished 
conception of the British empiricist tradition— a conception which por­
trays that school as a monolithic ideas-are-atom-like-mental-things 
movement. As we shall try to show in this chapter, these shortcomings 
do justice to neither Hodgson, James nor the empirical tradition.
Shadworth Hodgson
Shadworth Holloway Hodgson (1832—1912) was first and foremost 
a metaphysical system-builder whose system followed him into the grave. 
He was remembered by his contemporaries as a gracious and contemplative 
person who turned to metaphysics after the early deaths of his wife and 
child. ^ Although he never held an academic position, he remained an 
integral part of nineteenth century British philosophy from his home in 
London. He was the joint founder of a British philosophical club— the
"*Edie, "William James and Phenomenology," p. 486.
^Secondary accounts of Hodgson's thought are infrequent but see 
Rudolf Merz's A Hundred Years of British Philosophy (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1930), pp. 479-494. Obituaries also consider 
Hodgson's system, see G. D. Hicks, "Shadworth Holloway Hodgson," Pro­
ceedings of the British Academy, 6 (1913):508-516; William Carr, 
Shadworth Holloway Hodgson," Mind, New Series, 21 (1912):473-485. Also 
see G. E. Davie, "Shadworth Hodgson," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
8 vols., ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), 
4:47-48 and George F. Stout, "The Philosophy of Shadworth Hodgson," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2 (1892-1893):107-119.
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Aristotelian societv--and was its first and longest president (1880-1894). 
He was also a frequent contributor to the journal Mind, and his systema­
tic works— Time and Space (1865), The Theory of Practice (1870), The 
Philosophy of Reflection (1878) and The Metaphysics of Experience (1898)—  
are testimony to his productivity, breadth and sheer persistence as a 
philosopher.^
Hodgson's metaphysics is almost impossible to categorize in terms 
of nineteenth century philosophical systems. On one hand, he felt that 
the only true metaphysics was being written from within the German tradi­
tion and he was continuously critical of the attempt by empiricism to 
reduce metaphysics to psychology, i.e., the psychologism of that school.
A contemporary noted that the Kantian tendency was especially evident in 
his early works, which James encountered well before he began work on
g
the Principles in 1878. At the same time, however, Hodgson was critical 
of the a priori conclusions of the Kantian tradition and wrote in 1876 
that a
. . . greater and more comprehensive philosophy can arise in 
the line of Locke that can ever arise in the line of Leibniz; 
but only on the condition of replacing our narrow psychological 
horizon by an horizon of true philosophical range.°
Merz created a new category in calling Hodgson's metaphysics a 'critical
empiricism' to emphasize the Kantian and Lockean strains of his thought.
Shadworth H. Hodgson, Time and Space: A Metaphysical Essay (London: 
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865); Idem, The Theory of 
Practice. 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1870); Idem, The Phi­
losophy of Reflection, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1878); Idem, 
The Metaphysics of Experience, 4 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898),
g
Carr, "Shadworth Hodgson," p. 475.
9
Shadworth Hodgson, "Philosophy and Science," Mind, 1 (1876):235.
^Merz, British Philosophy, p. 481.
54
Hodgson himself called his philosophy an 'experientialism' in hopes of 
distinguishing it from both the atomistic assumptions of the empirical 
tradition and the a priori assumptions of the rational0tradition. What­
ever label one chooses, however, the synthetic and critical nature of 
Hodgson's thought must be emphasized— along with his insistence that the 
distinctive feature of philosophy is its method which involves an 
assumptionless description of what is given in experience.
James's contact with Hodgson and his philosophy is easy to docu­
ment, as a good deal of Perry's three chapters on the James-Hodgson 
relationship consists of their correspondence and archival materials. 
While the reader is encouraged to go directly to Perry, a brief outline 
of his chapters will suffice for our purposes.^
Perry states that James's copy of Hodgson's Time and Space is 
12dated "December, 1875" and James's first published reference to
13Hodgson appears in a July, 1875 book review. In a footnote in the
Principles, however, James makes reference to an article he tried writing
in 1869 in response to those philosophers who tacitly assumed that con-
14sciousness affects brain-processes. While the article was never com­
pleted, James lists Hodgson's Time and Space first in a list of authors 
he sought to challenge. That James had read Hodgson's works this early 
in his career— at least five years before the publication of Brentano's 
or Wundt's classic psychological treatises and at least nine years
^Perry, William James, 1:611-653.
12Ibid., p. 612.
13
William James, "Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Gruridzllge dei physio- 
logischen Psychologie," North American Review, 12] (1875):201.
14
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1890; reprint ed. New York: Dover Publishing Co., 
1950), 1:130-131. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
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before he was contracted to write a psychology text— is an important 
point to keep in mind.
The James-Hodgson correspondence begins in 1879, became most heavy
during the decade of the 1880's and gradually dwindled until James's
death in 1910. The tone of the early correspondence shows clearly that
Hodgson was the established philosopher and James was the struggling and
diffident student. They first met in 1880 and James visited Hodgson on
a number of his European tours during the 1880's. James's own estimate
of the importance of Hodgson can be seen in a letter dated March 11, 1879,
when he wrote to Hodgson that,
I regard [your books] as the greatest mine of philosophical 
wealth now extant, though I find it hard to re-think your 
thought— every sentence, yea, every clause being original.
I think some disciples must come and retail you in small change 
before your influence becomes what it should be.15
This letter makes clear that James, in fact, labored over Hodgson's works 
and found in them what he considered to be first-rate philosophical in­
sights. In the remainder of this chapter I hope to show that James's 
personal assessment of Hodgson's philosophy was well-founded and that it 
served as the foundation of his philosohpical psychology in the Principles.
James's Notion of the Psychologists' Fallacy
The first topic we shall consider— the psychologists' fallacy— is 
methodological. A number of recent commentators on James have described 
this principle as a phenomenological insight of James's psychology, one 
which pointed toward the importance of assumptionless description for 
psychology.^ None of these writers, however, have considered the importance
^Perry, William James, 1:681.
^See Gurwitsch, Field of Consciousness, pp. 233-234; p. 243, and 
Wild, Radical Empiricism, pp. 31-49.
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of Hodgson's thought in their examinations of James's notion of the psy­
chologists' fallacy.
What James called the psychologists' fallacy lies at the heart of 
his philosophical psychology for two reasons. First, within it is con­
tained the germ of a fundamental methodological insight which guided his 
critique of previous philosophical formulations of the nature of mental 
processes. It was this realization that made the elements of empiricism 
and the transcendental ego of rationalism unnecessary encumbrances for 
James's psychology. Second, this insight also set the conceptual founda­
tion for James's own formulation of the nature of mental processes in 
the Principles. After explicating James's distinction between the two 
versions of the fallacy, it will be shown that: (1) a critical interpre­
tation of the history of philosophy underlies this methodological prin­
ciple, (2) it implicates a further distinction between perceptual and 
conceptual knowledge and (3) James was indebted to Hodgson for both of 
the above insights.
James introduces the notion of the psychologists' fallacy in chap­
ter VII of the Principles, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology." This 
short chapter, together with chapter VIII— "The Relations of Minds to 
Other Things"— can be viewed as a methodological introduction to James's 
descriptive analyses of the stream of thought and the self, which follow 
in chapters IX and X. This statement can be justified historically by 
noting that the kernal elements of chapters VII and VIII appeared as 
introductory remarks to James's 1884 essay, "On Some Omissions of Intro­
spective Psychology."^ It was in this article that James presented his
^William James, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology," 
Mind. 9 (1884):1-22.
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formulation of the stream of thought and his distinction between the 
transitive and substantive portions of the stream and thus broke clearly 
from the elementistic tradition of British empiricism.
In chapter VII James examines the experimental, comparative and, 
most importantly, introspection as the three methods available to sci­
entific psychologists. His treatment of the first two is cursory and 
skeptical at this juncture of the Principles. This skepticism, however, 
is not with experimentation per se, whether it be with humans or animals. 
Instead, James's hesitancy stems from the fundamental assumptions which 
direct the activities of the evolutionary biologists and the 'new prism, 
pendulum and chronograph philosophers'. Thus James wrote that the prob­
lem with the new psychology is not its 'brass instruments' but the fact 
that the people who wield these instruments seem so "bent on studying 
the elements of mental life, dissecting them out from the gross results
in which they are embedded, and . . . reducing them to a quantitative 
18scale." But James's observations on the comparative and experimental
methods are closer to passing comments than careful analyses. His real
concern in chapter VII is introspection, which, for scientific psychology,
19James wrote, "is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always."
James first considers the extreme formulations of introspection—  
that introspection is not humanly possible or, if it is, that it is not 
possible to make a mistake introspecting. Comte held the former position 
and questioned the very possibility of introspection with the classic 
argument that in reflecting on a passing thought or feeling we necessarily 
distort and even destroy the experience. Imagine reflecting on the
18
James, Principles, 1:192. (James's italics.)
19
Ibid., p. 185. (James's italics.)
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feeling of anger! James cited Ueberweg and Brentano as representing the
opposite extreme, those who deny that a feeling of 'inner perception'
could be anything except what it appears to be.
A more moderate and representative view of introspection had been
20presented by Sully in his Illusions: A Psychological Study. Sully's
formulation is important since it represents the position of traditional
British empiricism and because James tells us that his 1884 article was
written "to supplement Mr. Sully's chapter on the Illusions of Intro- 
21spection." In that chapter Sullv distinguishes introspection from 
perception and memory and confines it to the process of reflecting on 
the 'contents of mind' in the time immediately after the moment some­
thing has been experienced. According to Sully, the most persistent 
problem in this process is the confusion of what is actually present to 
mind with some inference which is based on past experience. While 
Sully's statement, taken out of context, might sound like the notion of 
the psychologists' fallacy, the examples Sully uses and his continual 
reference to the 'elements' and 'components' of a complex feeling are 
testimony to his tacit acceptance of the mental synthesis approach which 
the psychologists' fallacy sought to refute.
Taken narrowly, the psychologists' fallacy is concerned with the 
pitfalls of the introspective method. In considering the difficulties 
of this method, James tells us that the psychologists' fallacy has been
committed when the introspecting psychologist confuses "his own stand-
22point with that of the mental fact of which he is making a report."
20
James Sully, Illusions: A Psychological Study (New York: 
Appleton, 1881).
21
James, "On Some Omissions," p. 2.
22
James, Principles, 1:196. (James's italics.)
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As defined, the psychologists' fallacy is little more than a restatement 
of Sully's admonishment. It is what James does with this methodological 
principle that makes it a central feature of his philosophical psychology 
and an important anticipation of the phenomenological method. That is, 
with the psychologists' fallacy James pointed out that the elements 
which nineteenth century empiricism found in experience, and upon which 
they constructed their psychology, were little more than the expression 
of their tacitly held assumption that experience really is composed of 
discrete sensational elements. Then came Kant and the rationalists who, 
instead of questioning the reality of Hume's sensational elements, 
presented a non-experiential transcendental ego to unite the discrete 
elements which were, in the first place, created by Hume's unwarranted 
assumption.
Taken in this broader, philosophical sense, the implications of 
the psychologists' fallacy are far more pervasive than some of the more 
mundane errors of introspection. This is so because, as James recog­
nized, in committing the psychologists' fallacy the psychologist (or 
philosopher) creates and discloses the fundamental constituents of his 
psychological system. It is for this reason that James was less con­
cerned with the particular experiments of the 'brass instrument' phi­
losophers than he was with the elementistic assumptions which gave rise 
to these experiments. For if they assumed that experience is composite 
in nature, the design, results and theories which emerged from their 
experiments could do little to challenge that belief. It is for this
reason that James stated unequivocally that the psychologists' fallacy
it 23is "the great snare of the psychologist." Once committed, it becomes
23
Ibid., p. 196. (James's italics.)
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self-perpetuating, self-justifying and self-fulfilling.
James distinguished between two forms of the psychologists'
24fallacy, which we shall call the empiricist and rationalist versions.
In the empiricist version the psychologist mistakenly assumes that his
thought about the thought under study is the same as the thought itself.
As he never tired of reminding the introspecting psychologist, the
"psychologist . . . stands outside of the mental state he speaks of.
25Both itself [the thought] and its object are objects for him." The
problem arises from the fact that while the particular thought knows
its object from its own unique frame of reference, the psychologist,
. . . knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily 
led to suppose that the thought, which is jof it, knows it in the 
same way in which he knows it, although this is very often far 
from being the case.26
Let us attempt to clarify this methodological principle with an example
27
which Wild employed. Imagine the psychologist trying to describe a 
child's experience of a patch of woods in which he or she has recently 
been frightened. Of course, the psychologist knows a great deal about 
the woods (e.g., the types of trees that are found there, how they grow, 
that it is a relaxing place to take a walk through, etc.), but this 
adult conceptual knowledge is more of a hindrance than an advantage in 
his attempt to describe the child's experience of the woods. If his goal 
is description from the point of view of the child, then he must be
24
Wild, in his Radical Empiricism, has also called attention to 
the two versions of the psychologists' fallacy, which he called the 





Wild, Radical Empiricism, pp. 36-37.
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careful to bracket his adult knowledge about the woods and keep to the 
child’s understanding of the woods. If our hypothetical psychologist 
imposes his own knowledge about the woods onto his description of the 
child's experience of the woods, then he is committing the empiricist 
version of the psychologists’ fallacy.
We shall now turn to the historical context which surrounded 
James's psychology and show that this type of fallacy stands at the foun­
dation of the elementistic program of nineteenth century empiricism.
The problem, according to James, is rooted in a linguistic confusion—
the unguarded transference of our everyday use of words to the province
28of psychological description. James examines the empiricist descrip-
29
tion of the thought of a-pack-of-cards-on-the-table. Within this tradi­
tion this complex idea was thought to be composed of the simpler ideas 
of the individual cards in the deck plus the four legs and horizontal 
plane of a table etc., etc. That is, each element of the object was 
thought to be represented in the idea of the object. This mode of descrip­
tion, and the explanatory model which emerged from it, is patently absurd 
for James, a fallacy which has little support in experience. The result 
for psychological description is that
. . . the continuous flow of the mental stream is sacrificed, 
and in its place an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, is 
preached for the existence of which no good introspective grounds 
can be brought forward . . . .  30
James saw that such a description is the product of the failure to main­
tain the distinction between the way an object appears in thought and 




Ibid., pp. 278-279. Ibid., p. 196.
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objects in the world. One important feature of physical objects is that 
they are composed of parts. But just because we know that objects in 
the world are composed of parts or elements we have no right to assume 
that a thought of any object is composed of a corresponding set of ele­
ments. Such an assumed correspondence is the empiricist version of the 
psychologists' fallacy and it leads to insurmountable problems for a 
psychology. It tacitly denies, for example, that thought can be sym­
bolic in nature.
This version is distinctively empirical in the sense that the 
empiricist school looked to the objective world, the worlds of objects, 
to find the source and descriptive model for ideas. If percepts are 
passively impressed on a tabula rasa, what else could an idea be except 
a mirror-like image which corresponded to the object in the world? Even 
Locke's classic metaphor of a blank tablet discloses a passive, repre­
sentational view of mental life; a perspective in which ideas are mental 
copies of some assumed reality.
James described the rationalist version of the psychologists'
fallacy as the "assumption that the mental state under study must be
31conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it." Like 
the empiricist, the rationalist fails to adopt the point of view of the 
thought itself. In both versions, James said, a 'wanton assumption' about 
what the thought is composed of (for the empiricist) or conscious of 
(for the rationalist) is imposed onto the description of the thought.
James was less anxious about the seductiveness of the rationalist version 
than he was of the empiricist; the experimental psychology of his time
31Ibid., p. 197.
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was, after all, dominated by the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition.
And while allusions to the rationalist version are less frequent in the 
Principles, he makes clear in his treatment of the stream of thought 
that the distinction between the thinker and the object thought of is 
not a necessary part of the process of knowing. "Many philosophers," 
he wrote,
. . . hold that the reflective consciousness of the self is 
essential to the cognitive function of thought. They hold that a 
thought, in order to know a thing at all, must expressly distinguish 
between the thing and its own self. . . . They know the object to 
be one thing and the thought another; and they forthwith foist 
their own knowledge into that of the thought of which they pretend 
to give a true account.32
James pointed to Kant as the originator of the philosophical tradition 
which was founded on the rationalist version of the psychologists' fal­
lacy. This fallacy is essentially rationalistic in the sense that it 
assumes that the source of knowledge is contained in the a priori cate­
gories of the knowing subject rather than the objects in the world.
Both the empiricist and rationalist versions share one important 
methodological error, as well as an important metaphysical assumption. 
Methodologically, both versions impose the observer's common-sense 
knowledge about the world of subjects and objects onto their descrip­
tions of thought. Furthermore, at a deeper, assumptive level, both 
philosophical traditions tacitly agree that there are two metaphysically 
distinct substances in the universe— matter and mind (or subject and 
object). They differ only in their selection of the more fundamental 
substance. In the rationalist tradition the knower or self is the more 
basic substance in the process of knowing. In contrast, the empiricist 
tradition looked to objects in the world for their fundamental model of 




assumed that epistemological questions were to be posed within a dualistic 
framework and answered in terms of this fundamental dichotomy. As we 
shall see later, one of the primary aims of Hodgson's philosophy was to 
challenge this metaphysical dualism.
The Hodgson-James Critique of Rationalism 
and the Need for Distinguishing between 
Two Types of Knowledge
James unambiguously rejected the rationalist version of the psy­
chologists' fallacy in his chapter on "The Stream of Thought" in the 
Principles. Then, in a footnote, James listed a number of British ration­
alists who had adopted Kant's position with regard to the nature of 
knowledge. James Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic is among those 
which James referred to and he quoted what that philosopher called the 
First Proposition— "Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must,
as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some knowledge of 
33itself." James's selection of Ferrier is significant because the
latter was Hodgson's mentor and Hodgson examined the problems with
Ferrier's First Proposition at length in his Time and Space and The
Philosophy of Reflection. Remember that it was these treatises which
34James called "the greatest mine of philosophical wealth now extant."
In his Time and Space Hodgson was critical of Ferrier's proposi­
tion because he felt it contained an unwarranted assumption and an 
implicit and unjustified commitment to metaphysical dualism. It tacitly 
assumed, wrote Hodgson, that every feeling ever experienced is composed
33Ibid., p. 274.
34Perry, William James, 1:681. For his critique of Ferrier's 
First Proposition see Hodgson's Time and Space, pp. 45-52 and his 
Philosophy of Reflection, 1:109-114.
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of, and therefore can be analyzed into, subjective and objective elements. 
Such an assumption means that the distinction between subject and object 
(self and not-self) is a fundamental and universal element or category 
of experience. According to Hodgson, the difficulty with this formula­
tion is that the distinction between self and not-self is itself a pro­
duct of experience, i.e., derived from experience. That is, the child 
at birth does not see a world of objects and a subject distinct from 
these objects but some such proposition is contained in Ferrier's First 
Proposition. In his Philosophy of Reflection, Hodgson called the child's 
pre-reflective experience primary consciousness, and described it as
"no more than a series of feelings and thoughts per se, unreferred (by
35their subject) either to objects or to self." In Hodgson's philosophy, 
this world of pure or unreferred experience is developmentally prior to 
our common-sense world of subjects and objects which only arises after 
the child realizes that one particular object, the self, persists among 
the flux of other objects in experience. In making this distinction 
the child enters what Hodgson called the world of direct consciousness.
The important point for Hodgson, however, was that the distinction 
between the subjective and objective orders was itself discovered in 
rather than given in primary consciousness. And once discovered, this 
distinction becomes an essential part of the child's everyday world.
This world of direct consciousness becomes elaborated into the world of 
the common-sense adult and it stands at the foundation of science, which 
attempts to formalize and make rigorous what might appear chaotic and 
unconnected. Hodgson's reason for distinguishing between primary and 
direct consciousness was that he saw that subject matter of philosophy
35
Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, 1:109.
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being contaminated by the assumptions of direct consciousness. For 
Hodgson, the subject matter of philosophy was experience as it is given. 
Within this frame of reference, which Hodgson called reflective con­
sciousness, one seeks an assumptionless description of experience and
this goal entails a voluntary exclusion of our everyday and/or scientific
36assumptions from our descriptions. From this frame of reference,
Hodgson argued that Ferrier became unphilosophical by imposing his 
everyday knowledge that the world is composed of subjects and objects 
onto his description of what is given in experience. Ferrier, in effect, 
sought to institutionalize the common-sense distinction between self and 
not-self.
The precision of Hodgson's criticism of Ferrier can be seen more
clearly by introducing a distinction that played an integral part in his
philosophical system. This distinction is worth considering at length
because it also played an important role in James's psychological thought.
In Hodgson's system the distinction is between what he called first
37intention and second intention statements. First intention statements
are assumptionless descriptions of what is given in perception, or,
what would be called phenomenological descriptions of perceptual experi-
38ence in contemporary terms. In recognizing the importance of this
36
Ibid., pp. 9-13. Also see Hodgson, Time and Space, pp. 33-45.
Hodgson clearly recognized both the importance and uniqueness of his
distinction between first and second intention statements. Its impor­
tance arises from the fact that it forms the basis for his distinction
between science and philosophy, a distinction which he stated is predi­
cated on methodological grounds, i.e., the subject matter of philosophy 
is composed of first intention descriptions while science deals with 
second intention descriptions.
37Hodgson, Time and Space, pp. 33-45.
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type of description, Hodgson— as well as James after him— sought to
undercut Kant's dictum that 'percepts without concepts are blind'. 'Blind
percepts' may well be unimportant in the world of ordinary experience
but they play an essential role in the process of knowing and they are
part of the subject matter of philosophical inquiry. For Hodgson, first
intention statements are descriptions of objects as they are given in
experience. In his words,
. . . when we perceive an object as a man would perceive it 
who saw in it an object for the first time, or when we voluntarily 
abstract from a perceived object all that is imported into it by 
our perceptions of other relations and objects, in both of these ^9 
cases I call it having before us an object in its first intention.
What Hodgson is formulating here is a method of description within which
our conceptual knowledge is voluntarily abstracted; a return to what he
called primary consciousness. This method— which Hodgson called the
method of reflection— becomes a necessary prerequisite for philosophical
analysis because without it our conceptual understandings confound our
descriptions. Stuart Spicker has recently shown that Hodgson's method
of reflection influenced Husserl's formulation of the phenomenological 
40
method. This is an exciting and valuable line of research— a pre- 
Husserl phenomenologist working from within the British empirical tradition!
39
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This interpretation also provides a basis for understanding why there 
are a number of fundamental similarities between Husserl and James.
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which parallels our study of Hodgson's impact on James's philosophical 
psychology.
Hodgson contrasted first intention statements with those of the 
second intention. And while the former take the percept in isolation 
from others in consciousness, the latter are concerned with the object 
of perception in relation to other objects in consciousness. Put simply, 
second intention statements are made from within some assumptive frame 
of reference. They may be causal, practical, genetic or ethical and 
they may assume, for example, that the world is composed of subjects 
distinct from objects. As such, second intention statements are state­
ments in which inferences about the objects of perception are mixed with 
what is given in perception. To use another set of Hodgson's terminology, 
first intention statements are addressed to the purely descriptive ques­
tion— 'What is it?'— while second intention statements seek to answer
41the explanatory or functional query— 'How comes it?'. In making this 
distinction Hodgson sought to provide a methodological distinction 
between science and philosophy.
Hodgson thought that the failure to make and keep this distinction 
had resulted in a great deal of intellectual wheel-spinning in the his­
tory of philosophy. He employed this distinction, which is the fore­
runner of James's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowl­
edge about, to point out the contradiction in Ferrier's First Proposition. 
To Hodgson, Ferrier's proposition represented a classic example of the 
unconscious insertion of second intention— conceptual— knowledge into
41
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formulation of the methodological basis of his philosophy; the phenom­
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what was intended to be a first intention description. In his Philosophy
of Reflection, he states that Ferrier's First Proposition contains what
42he called the fallacy of incidental circumstance. That is, in his 
supposedly first intention description of the knowing process (i.e., 
what is given in that process), Ferrier inserts the concept of self, 
which is itself an inference based on experience. Since our knowledge 
of self is an essentially second intention statement it has no place 
in a description of what is given in experience. Rather than staying 
within the philosophical realm of what is given in experience, Ferrier 
imposes his knowledge about the cognitive relation onto his description 
of that relation.
The important point to recognize is that the rationalist version 
of James's psychologists' fallacy is methodologically and conceptually 
identical to the criticism of rationalism contained in Hodgson's fallacy 
of incidental circumstance. In a narrow sense, both are concerned with 
a fallacy of introspection, a fallacy rooted in the common-sense use of 
words to describe the flow of experience. In a broader sense, both 
criticisms point toward the importance of an assumptionless description 
of experience, which Hodgson presented formally as the method of reflec­
tion. This method, however, is tied to and based on a further distinc­
tion, a distinction between what is given in experience (first intention 
statements) and what is imposed onto experience (second intention state­
ments). Furthermore, at the foundation of each is a skepticism of the 
traditional forms of metaphysical dualism.
The problem of dualism will be considered in a later section.
Let us now solidify the relationship between James's distinction between
42
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knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about and Hodgson's distinction 
between first and second intention statements. With this completed we 
shall return to the empiricist version of the psychologists' fallacy and 
Hodgson's critique of traditional empiricism.
James introduced the distinction between knowledge by acquaint-
43ance and knowledge about in an 1885 essay, "On the Function of Cognition."
In spite of its title, this essay is a work in critical philosophical
analysis and it is best viewed as a companion to his 1884 essay, "On
44Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology." His primary task in each 
of these essays is a precise and unadultered description of mental life, 
a description free of the paralyzing assumptions which had misled the 
traditional schools of philosophical thought. It is interesting to 
note that these essays complement one another in one important respect.
In the 1884 essay James argued against the empiricists' assumption that 
percepts and thoughts are distinct entities composed of separate ele­
ments. He countered this position by pointing to the inarticulate 
'fringes' which surround, suffuse and give meaning to the more stable 
images of thought. Then, in his 1885 essay, James turned his descrip­
tive skills to two omissions of the rationalists' conception of mind:
43
William James, "On the Function of Cognition," Mind, 10 (1885): 
27-44. It should be noted that Jaems quotes John Grote in giving voice 
to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about. 
My reasons for ignoring Grote and giving precedence to Hodgson's formu­
lation of the distinction are twofold. First, Hodgson's general 
influence on James and his acknowledgement of this influence were 
considered. Second, and more importantly, is that Hodgson's distinc­
tion is an integral part of a complex of related philosophical in­
sights which appear in the Principles but are clearly absent in Grote. 
Perhaps I am doing Grote an injustice, but I think not. In spite of 
my belief, however, I would welcome a well-documented examination of 
the Grote-James relationship.
James, "On Some Omissions."
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(1) the assumption that a self is a sine qua non of knowledge and
(2) the assumption that immediate, relationless feelings are unimpor­
tant to the process of knowing. If the themes of these two essays are 
taken together we are provided a bird's-eye view of James's critique
of nineteenth century philosophy. As such, we have a unique and valuable 
perspective on James's position on a number of philosophical issues 
which stand at the foundation of the Principles. And while James went 
beyond Hodgson in a number of ways (e.g., in positing that relations 
are themselves given in experience), his debt to that English philos­
opher is significant and unmistakable.
We know that James was aware of the similarity between his con­
cept of knowledge by acquaintance and Hodgson's first intention descrip­
tions because he used the terms interchangeably in his 1885 essay, as
45well as in the Principles and his Psychology: A Briefer Course. In 
the Principles he states that knowledge by acquaintance is provided by 
the senses and is intimately related to bodily feelings. He gives us 
a number of examples of knowledge of this sort— the color of blue, the
46taste of a pear, the feeling of an inch or the feeling of a toothache. 
James was fully aware that language was working against him in describing 
the essence of this type of knowledge. Cognizant of this difficulty, he 
analyzes the types of knowledge that are contained in an ordinary sen­
tence. Take the example of the phrase, "the taste of a pear." The 
grammatical subject of the phrase (i.e., the taste, or better yet, simply 
that taste) is the blind object of acquaintance while the prepositional
45
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phrase (i.e., of the pear) adds knowledge about that dumb little unnamed
47and unclassified feeling. It is simply that taste, taken as a feeling 
grounded in bodily experience and incommunicable to a person who has 
never actually tasted that class of fruit, which James is referring to 
as knowledge of the acquaintance type. His genius was in recognizing 
that this level of knowledge stood at the foundation of all our concep­
tual knowledge. As he said,
All the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera, 
the simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the kinds 
of relation that subsist between them, must not be known at all 
or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without knowledge 
about.48
That is, any knowledge, however abstract, is grounded in bodily feeling. 
James transformed Hodgson's concept of first intention descriptions in 
at least one important respect in bringing it into the psychological 
realm. That is, Hodgson's first intention descriptions are held to be 
absolutely distinct from second intention descriptions in the sense 
that they are intended to be absolutely pure or assumptionless. In 
contrast, James uses the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance/ 
knowledge about as a way of indicating opposite extremes of a continuum 
rather than an iron-clad dichotomy. Thus he wrote that
. . .  in general, the less we analyze a thing, and the fewer of 
its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more 
our knowledge is of the acquaintance type. The two kinds of knowl­
edge are, therefore, as the mind practically exerts them, relative 
terms.49
By relativizing and softening Hodgson's distinction James could point to 
the importance of this level of experience without having to defend the 
position that an absolutely assumptionless description of experience is 
possible.
47Ibid., p. 186. 48Ibid., p. 222. 49Ibid., p. 221.
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The relation between James's knowledge about or conceptual knowl­
edge and Hodgson's second intention statements is less important and 
distinctive. Almost every nineteenth century philosopher recognized 
that the data of sense is in some way transformed by our conceptual under­
standings, and Hodgson and James are no exception. For Hodgson, this is 
the second intention knowledge of ordinary thinking and science, where 
statements are made from some assumptive frame of reference. Similarly, 
knowledge about for James is a
. . . result of the thoughts' operating on the data of sense . . . 
to transform the order in which experience comes, into an entirely 
different order, that of the conceived world.
The Hodgson-James Critique of Empiricism: 
the Empiricist Version of the 
Psychologists' Fallacy
Thus far we have considered the importance of Hodgson for James's 
formulation of the rationalist version of the psychologists' fallacy as 
well as the related distinction between knowledge by acquaintance/ 
knowledge about. While acknowledging these similarities, the critical 
reader will demand more. Hume, as well as Sully, saw the difficulty 
with positing a substantial self, which is the thrust of the rationalist 
version of the psychologists' fallacy. The point is well taken, for 
Hodgson, as a member of the empirical tradition, was certainly not alone 
in recognizing the difficulty with the rationalists' formulation of 
knowledge, i.e., that they implicitly assume the self, which they had 
originally set out to prove. This argument against a substantial self 
or soul was part of the standard polemics of the empiricist school.
My retort to the critical reader is that Hodgson, unlike any empiricist
50Ibid., p. 482.
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before him, also applied his distinction between first and second inten­
tion statements to the fundamental tenets of the empiricist tradition. 
This is why Hodgson's formalization of this distinction into a philo­
sophical method which could be applied to any philosophical system is 
so important. The result was that he unambiguously rejected the ele- 
mentistic and atomistic conception of mind which he found in the empir­
icist tradition. In the process, Hodgson set the foundation for James's 
empiricist version of the psychologists' fallacy and his formulation of 
the stream of thought.
Linschoten has written that James's formulation of the stream 
of thought "is the most fundamental notion in James' psychology.""^
From a descriptive point of view, this statement is incontestable. 
Linschoten goes on to write, however, speaking of Brentano's chapter 
on the "Unity of Consciousness," that
. . . although James does not say so, that chapter is the 
foundation on which he [James] established his theory of the 
stream of experience, his theory of the Self and of the perception 
of time.52
Although Brentano's Psychology of 1874 may well have been important in 
James's treatments of these topics, Linschoten's failure to even mention 
Hodgson with regard to these topics has a distorting effect that is 
characteristic of recent phenomenological interpretations of James. In 
fact, there are historical as well as conceptual reasons which suggest 
that Hodgson rather than Brentano was more important in James's formu­
lation of the stream of thought. We have already noted that James had 
read Hodgson's Time and Space at least five years before Brentano's
^Linschoten, The Psychology of James, p. 62.
52Ibid., p. 144.
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masterpiece was published. The core of Hodgson's criticism of Hume's
sensationalistic atomism, as well as his description of experience as a
53stream are contained in Time and Space. More convincing, however, is 
the fact that the methodological distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance/knowledge about underlies James's notion of the stream of 
thought and this distinction is contained in Hodgson's pre-1874 works 
but absent in Brentano's Psychology. In fact, we find James criticizing 
Brentano's method of introspection in an 1884 essay precisely because 
it does not contain the distinction between the "immediate feltness" of 
experience and one's "reflection on" this experience.^ Thus, while 
James shared Brentano's aversion to the elementism and discontinuity of 
the empiricist conception of mind, his book did not, in James's eyes, 
present a method which supported the notion that the empiricists' ele­
ments were supercilious to the science of psychology.
In introducing Hodgson we quoted him stating that a "greater and 
more comprehensive philosophy can arise in the line of Locke than . . . 
Leibniz.This makes clear that Hodgson was more sympathetic to the 
empiricist tradition. In stating this, however, it must be made clear 
that he was critical of a number of the fundamental tenets of the 
empiricist tradition. In the foreground of these criticisms is Hodgson's 
early (beginning in 1865) and continual (spanning his entire philosophi­
cal career) rejection of the psychologism and elementism of the British 
tradition. These criticisms were rooted in what he saw as the empiri­
cists' failure to adopt the method of reflection, i.e., an assumptionless
53
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description of experience.
In his first excursion into philosophy in 1865 Hodgson made clear 
that for him, metaphysics is a logical or static discipline while psy­
chology is essentially dynamic. The subject matter of both is conscious­
ness but, according to Hodgson, the methods and goals of metaphysics and 
psychology are fundamentally different. Psychology, as a dynamic and 
empirical science, studies "consciousness in relation to [the] bodily 
organs which are its seat.""*^  It is concerned with finding the physical 
correlates of mental processes and the means by which the objects of 
perception are produced. In contrast, metaphysics studies "consciousness 
in relation to its objects," i.e., the relation between the knower and 
the known.^ In fulfilling its goal metaphysics must approach its sub­
ject matter without assumptions while psychology, as an empirical science, 
must assume that there are physical correlates of consciousness in the 
brain as well as in the world. And while Hodgson stated that the goal 
of metaphysics is "to analyze the structure of objects . . . and to 
resolve them into elements," he added that
. . .  it does not pretend to determine whether the elements 
which it reaches in its analysis existed prior to the whole or 
empirical objects which are their synthesis. . . . Such a problem 
would be of a dynamic nature. There is no reason in metaphysics 
for supposing that historically, in the order of nature, the 
simple existed before the compounds.58
The issue which Hodgson is addressing here is the psychologism, and its 
concomitant elementism and mental synthesis, which characterized nine­
teenth century empirical psychology. That is, in analyzing an object 
of perception it is natural to assume that the object under consideration
56
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became an object through the same stages which are uncovered in the
reflective analysis of the object. In other words, that the elements of
analysis are psychologically real. This is the tacit assumption upon
which the entire tradition of British empiricism rested, i.e., that
reflective analysis of an object or idea produced an exact simulation
of the means by which the idea was produced. In the process, philosophy
was reduced to psychology. In Hodgson's language, the empiricists found
distinguishable parts of the flow of experience and wrongly assumed that
what is distinguishable must also be given separately and distinctly.
59Hodgson rejected this formulation whole-heartedly. The importance of 
Hodgson's argument was acknowledged by James in the Principles when he 
said that the space perception theories of Lipps, Spencer and Bain "seem 
guilty of that confusion which Mr. Shadworth Hodgson has done so much 
to clear away, viz., the confounding the analysis of an idea with the 
means of its production.James wrote that such an assumption is an 
example of the psychologists' fallacy. But this is not the rationalist
The basis of Hodgson's rejection of the psychological elementism 
of British empiricism can be seen in his Time and Space, (pp. 87-115), 
in sections entitled "The Unity of Phenomena in Space" and "The Unity of 
Phenomena in Time." Hodgson's rejection of elementism can also be seen 
in his critical examination of the laws of associationism in that work, 
(pp. 256-294). Although this topic deserves to be considered at length, 
one passage will make clear that Hodgson was dealing with a conception 
of mind which was temporally interconnected and united and thus funda­
mentally different from the traditional empiricist description. Hodgson 
wrote that
". . . when once the conception arose of consciousness being one 
connected series, lengthening itself each moment, and growing out 
of its former self and out of its previous content, as a plant of 
its seed, so that the moments of consciousness are not separate ob­
jects . . . but organic parts of one living whole . . . then the 
inquiry was directed into its proper channel." [pp. 263-264]





version of that fallacy. Here James is concerned with the empiricist 
version, when the psychologists' conceptual knowledge of objects in the 
world confounds their description of what is given in experience. The 
fallacious nature of this assumption is most clearly seen in James's 
unequivocal and continual rejection of the elementism and mental syn­
thesis of the empiricist tradition throughout the Principles.*^
In an 1876 article in Mind Hodgson made clear that he agreed with 
Locke's dictum, Nihil ist in intellectu quod non prius in sensu. In
Hodgson's eyes, the problem with the empirical tradition is that it had
62not yet come to grips with the question of what is given in sensu!
Are the isolated sensational elements of the empirical school given as
distinct impressions? According to Wundt's GrUndzuge, which Hodgson
quotes at length in his Philosophy of Reflection,
Pure sensation (Empfindung) is an abstraction which never comes 
forward in our consciousness. Consciousness possesses only per­
ceptions (Vorstellungen): the sensations are in it always 
arranged according to the general forms of intuition, time and 
space. Nevertheless we are compelled by an overwhelming number 
of psychological facts . . . to suppose the existence of pure 
sensation, and to assume that perceptions everywhere form them­
selves, by a psychological synthesis, out of sensations.63
In being compelled to posit the existence of pure sensations and to
assume that percepts are formed by a psychological synthesis of those
sensations, Wundt was following in the venerable tradition of John
Stuart Mill's mental chemistry approach to psychology. Hodgson's retort
to Wundt's formulation was,
I am not convinced of the necessity [i.e., to posit pure sensations 
and a psychological synthesis] because I find sensations always
61Ibid., 1:161.
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combined with rudiments of time or of time and space, which I 
call the formal element. These rudiments it is from which they 
are never found pure. A state previous to perception, in which 
sensations are pure, is a fiction.64
Wundt's method of introspection, which Hodgson analyzes in his Philo­
sophy of Reflection, demanded that the description of experience be
reduced to the purely contentual or material properties of sensations,
65intensity and quality. Thus for Wundt, any part of experience could 
be fully described in terms of its particular sensory qualities (e.g., 
colors, sounds, etc.) of a given intensity or magnitude. The properties 
of intensity and quality are logically distinguishable but empirically 
inseparable since any particular sensory quality must have some magni­
tude to be experienced. The problem with this method, wrote Hodgson, 
was that it tacitly assumed that all that is given in experience could, 
in fact, be fully and accurately described in terms of these two con­
tentual properties. This method was literally founded upon the assump­
tion that what is given in experience could be accurately described in 
terms of the contentual properties Which are directly dependent upon 
objects in the world. That is, Wundt's method of introspection assumed, 
following the tradition of Locke and Hume, that what is given in sensu 
is a mere reflection of the properties of objects, which happen to be 
discrete and separate in the world. Thus Wundt, like Ferrier, imposes 
his conceptual knowledge onto his description. According to Hodgson, 
the elementism of the empiricist tradition arose from their unwarranted 
and unrecognized exclusion of the formal element of time from what is 
given in sensu. That is, in failing to recognize the givenness of the 
temporal element, empiricism divested experience of the unity and
64Ibid., pp. 260-261. 65Ibid., pp. 248-272.
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continuity which this formal element provides and which is felt in experi­
ence.
Once this atemporal and elementistic assumption was introduced 
two paths seemed open to philosophers. Hume's path involved making dis­
continuity an essential, though unnoticed, feature of his system. Then 
Kant, seeing the need for unifying experience, made space and time a priori 
forms which give unity and continuity to the chaos of sensory elements.
The problem is that Kant made these formal elements logically prior to 
experience. Hodgson rejected both alternatives and argued that time- 
duration is an inseparable element that is given, along with the conten­
tual qualities of objects, in experience. That is, any object appearing
in experience must appear in some moment of time as well as have the
66properties of quality and intensity. As Spicker tells us, Hodgson's
recognition that time-duration is an inseparable element of experience
gives his philosophy a "nexus between all former and latter moments,
6 7and makes experience a continuous process." And, within the context 
of the history of philosophy, this continuity was obtained without re­
course to Kant's a priori forms of intuition or Wundt's mysterious psy­
chological synthesis. Thus for Hodgson, the lowest empirical unit of 
experience, what he called the 'minimum of consciousness', contained 
feelings (contents) which appear in time (process). Therefore, in the 
place of pure sensations, Hodgson argued for the recognition of the 
intrinsically temporal (process-content) nature of experience.
Hodgson was also aware that the root of the empiricists' elementism
66Ibid., pp. 259-264.
6 7
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was their failure to approach the description of experience without assump­
tions. As he wrote,
. . . the true objection to Hume should have run somewhat as 
follows: You are really including an orderliness in your terms 
experience, and you are assuming that it is a contingent orderli­
ness ad extra though you think you are making no assumption at 
all. You are only entitled to assume experience, undetermined as 
to whether it is chaotic or orderly. . . . You must analyze experi­
ence without assuming orderliness or an original chaos, and then 
you will possibly see in what its orderliness consists.68
In Hodgson's eyes, empiricism, beginning with Hume, had unconsciously
imposed our knowledge about objects onto a supposedly assumptionless
description of experience.
My task at this juncture is not to analyze the impact of Hodgson's 
treatment of time on James's psychology but to show how Hodgson's critique 
of empiricism formed the basis of James's notion of the empiricist no­
tion of the psychologists' fallacy and the stream of thought. What 
must not be overlooked, however, is that both James's and Hodgson's 
criticisms of empiricism are rooted in their recognition of the empiri­
cists' failure to consider the temporal element as given along with any 
object in experience. Thus James's notion of the stream of thought is 
intimately tied to his treatment of time. If this is true, and James 
was indebted to Hodgson for his temporalism, it should not be surprising 
that he provides the reader with lengthly passages from Hodgson in his 
chapters on "The Stream of Thought" and "The Perception of Time."^
And it should not be surprising that Hodgson's lowest empirical unit of 
experience, the 'minimum of consciousness', becomes the 'specious present' 
in James's treatment of time and the 'passing thought' in his treatment
68
Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, 1:11.
69
James, Principles, 1:230; 607-608.
82
of self. Also, it was James's recognition of the importance of the tem­
poral aspect which moved him to argue that an essential characteristic of 
the stream of thought is that it is "sensibly continuous;" that thought, 
as it appears immediately, is felt as temporally inter-penetrated.
Into the awareness of the thunder itself the awareness of the 
previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when 
the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking- 
upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.70
The intimate relationship between James's temporalism and critique 
of empiricism can be seen in his lengthly argument that exactly the same 
feeling or idea can never be experienced twice. The proposition seems 
almost trivial at some level but James reminds the reader that it "is 
more important theoretically than it at first sight seems." This is the 
case because it
. . . makes it already impossible for us to follow obediently 
in the footprints of either the Lockean or Herbartian school. . . .
A permanently existing [and thus atemporal] 'idea' or 'Vorstellung' 
which makes its appearance before the footlights of consciousness 
at periodical intervals, is as mythological an entity as the Jack 
of Spades.71
We quoted James earlier as describing the empiricist version of the psy­
chologists' fallacy as "the confusion . . . between the thoughts them­
selves, taken as subjective facts, and the things of which they are 
aware." It was this confusion, he argues, that led Hume to describe 
experience as a discontinuous train and Wundt to posit the need for a 
psychological synthesis. That a temporalism stands at the foundation of 
this fallacy can be seen in the following interpretation. James admits 
that objects in the world can be conceived objectively and thus as tem­
porally distinct, i.e., as "discrete and discontinuous; they do pass before
7°Ibid., p. 240. 71Ibid., pp. 235-236.
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us in a train or chain, making explosive appearances and rending each 
72
other in the twain." But when these objects are considered sub.jec-
tively, as part of the stream of thought, they appear as a segment of
an essentially continuous temporal process. Thus the absolute separation
of successive objects is fundamentally different from the melting-together
and inter-penetrating character of those objects considered as subjective
facts. And that this melting-togetherness is a product of the temporal
nature of experience can be seen in James's suggestion that
The thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence; 
but the feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as 
just gone; and it would be difficult to find in the actual concrete 
consciousness of a man a feeling so limited to the present as not 
to have an inkling of anything that went before.73
That is, at times it is valuable to conceive of thunder objectively, as 
a timeless conceptual entity that is isolated from the flux of experi­
ence. But if the thunder is taken subjectively, we must attempt to 
describe it as it appears, as a sound embedded in and conditioned by 
what immediately preceded and follows it. It is this before-and-after 
that feeds into and helps create the peculiar experience of a particular 
experience. Thus, it is a temporalistic argument that stands at the 
foundation of James's denial of the possibility of a part-for-part cor­
respondence between what we know about objects and the way they appear 
in experience. And it is this distinction we have tried to show, that 
James obtained from Hodgson's distinction between first and second in­
tention descriptions. Similarly, it is because of the essentially tem­
poral nature of mental life that James argues that objects, as they appear 
in the world, must be kept at least methodologically distinct from the 
objects of thought.
72lbid., p. 240. 73Ibid., p. 241.
Hodgson and the Dualisms of James's 
Psychological Thought
The qualifier 'at least methodologically distinct' is an important 
one in terms of James's treatment of dualism before 1892. We have pre­
viously argued that his critique of introspection emerged from the unam­
biguously monistic strain in Hodgson's philosophy. We shall now approach 
James's treatment of the mind/body problem directly.
The position which James adopted on the mind/body problem in the 
Principles has itself been an object of debate since 1890. John Dewey 
and G. Stanley Hall, for example, who insisted that a scientific psychol­
ogy must renounce Cartesian dualism, were quick to point out that James's
proposed psycho-physical dualism crumbles into an interactionism in his
74treatments of will, automaton theory and attention. And it seems that 
George T. Ladd had the mind/body problem in mind when he spoke dispar­
agingly of the
. . . great difficulty the critical reader will find in ascer­
taining just what is Professor James' latest, not to say, his final 
view upon several difficult and disputed questions.75
Such criticisms by his American contemporaries makes clear that the 
author of the Principles failed to offer an integrated or consistent 
program for a scientific psychology. In fact, the Principles reads, at 
times, like a kaleidoscope of divergent opinions— where one formulation 
of dualism transforms itself without warning into another, seemingly con­
tradictory, position.
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The literature which has accumulated on James's treatment of dual­
ism in the Principles seems as contradictory and confusing as the Prin­
ciples itself. Almost fifty years after his initial criticism, for 
example, Dewey returned to the Principles in his "The Vanishing Subject 
in the Psychology of James."7^  In that essay he maintained that there
are two incompatible strains in the Principles; one which is an "official 
acceptance of epistemological dualism" and another in which "subject and 
object do not stand for separate orders or kinds of existence but at 
most for certain distinctions made for a definite purpose within experi­
ence."^ Dewey argued, at the height of the attempt in American philos­
ophy to overcome dualism, that James's later philosophy was an elabora­
tion of the second, 'objectivistic' or 'behavioral' formulation of 
knowledge. This thesis was challenged brilliantly by Capek, who showed 
that a subjective strain continued throughout James's later philosophi- 
j cal work.7** The debate did not stop however. Wilshire's 1968 monograph,
written when phenomenology began making inroads into the American scene,
seeks to show that the psycho-physical parallelism of the Principles
breaks down and a distinctively anti-dualistic (i.e., phenomenological) 
79strain emerges. From Wilshire's perspective, the problem with James 
is that he does not carry this phenomenological strain far enough to 
escape the inconsistencies inherent in dualism. Then, independent of
7**John Dewey, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of William 
James," Journal of Philosophy, 37 (1940):589-599.
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Wilshire, Morris argued that the dualism of the Principles is a methodo-
80logical postulate rather than a metaphysical position. This interpreta­
tion, which becomes plausible in light of James's later rejection of 
dualism, was recently challenged in a important article by Andrew Reck.
Reek's paper sought to "correct any hasty inference that James 
was always anti-dualistic and to reveal . . . just how entrenched dual-
cyv 81
ism was, even in the mind of one of its leading adversaries." It is
Reek's thesis that calling James's dualism methodological obscures both
the "complexity and depth of James' dualism at the time he wrote the 
82Principles." He supported his position by attempting to show that 
James was entrenched in both a psycho-physical and epistemological dual­
ism throughout the Principles. This distinction is central to our expo­
sition and thus deserves to be made explicit. By psycho-physical dualism 
Reck means the classical position that there are two fundamentally dis­
tinct processes in the universe, body and mind. By epistemological
dualism he means that the knowing process consists of relations between
83two irreducible terms, the knower and the known.
Before presenting yet another interpretation, a number of circum­
stances which have clouded the debate ought to be noted. First, and most 
importantly, James's treatment of dualism in the Principles really is 
ambiguous. Second, in an article written in 1904 James publically
abandoned dualism in favor of a monism of pure experience.^ Third,
80
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in that article he stated that he had 'mistrusted' the formulation of
85"consciousness as an entity" for "twenty years." This would bring us 
back to 1884, the period in which James was writing the Principles.
Thus this large body of literature can be viewed as a search for, or 
denial of, 'anticipations' in James's psychological thought of the monism 
which he opted for in his later philosophical thought. One way of 
approaching this issue is to attempt to articulate the logical parallels 
between James's post-1900 monism and aspects of his pre-1900 work in 
psychology. The problem with this strategy is that parts of the Prin­
ciples really are ambiguous and contradictory and thus open to a number 
of interpretations.
One way of resolving ambiguity is to uncover the context within 
which an event took place. Commentators on James have sought to do just 
this by considering his statements on dualism in the context of either 
the Principles as a whole or his later thought. Neither approach has 
brought clarity to our ambiguous stimulus, i.e., James's treatment of 
dualism in the Principles. One context which this literature has ignored, 
however, is the historical context, the accumulated frame of reference 
from which he approached the problem of dualism in the Principles. More 
specifically, none of these writers have looked to Hodgson to shed light 
on James's treatment of dualism.
In this section it will be argued that the epistemological dualism 
°f the Principles is most accurately viewed as a methodological postulate 
rather than a commitment to a metaphysical distinction between the sub­




suggestion that James was entrenched in an epistemological dualism in the
Principles. At the same time, however, it must be admitted that James
does seem to be entrenched in a psycho-physical dualism and this strain
86of his psychology reveals a commitment to a metaphysical dualism.
While this combination of positions is contradictory at one level, it 
is fully compatible with the interpretation offered in the last chapter—  
that James's moral philosophy demands an interactionism between mind 
and body. This interpretation will be supported by first examining 
Hodgson's justification for maintaining both an epistemological and 
psycho-physical dualism for scientific psychology while positing an 
experiential monism for philosophy. With this historical context artic­
ulated, James's treatment of dualism will be examined as it evolved with 
the help of, and in opposition to, Hodgson's thought between 1884 and 
1892.
Hodgson's unequivocal endorsement of psycho-physical dualism for
87scientific psychology came as early as 1870, in his Theory of Practice.
This position appears frequently in Hodgson's works and is succinctly
formulated in his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in
1886. In distinguishing the new physiological psychology from the old
faculty approach, he wrote that
The principle upon which the new school of psychology is founded . . . 
is, first to examine, analyze and classify, the content of con­
sciousness as a conditionate . . . and the structure, organiza­
tion and functioning, of the nerve-organism as its condition and 
then in the second place to apply the one analysis to the other, 
and to determine what organs, what processes, what interactions 
of parts and processes, in the organism, are devoted to the
86
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production and maintaining of what modes and processes of con­
sciousness and conscious action . . . .  88
The principle which Hodgson is offering here became known as epiphenom- 
enalism. According to this doctrine, mental states are wholly dependent 
upon and conditioned by physical (i.e., brain) states. Epiphenomenalism 
envisioned an interaction from the physical to the mental and stated 
explicitly that mental states must not be conceived as causing either 
other mental states or brain states. In the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century epiphenomenalism was synonymous with the automaton theorists 
William K. Clifford,Thomas H. Huxley and John Tyndall. As we have seen 
in the first chapter, James argued against this formulation in the 
Principles, thus committing himself to a dualistic interactionism. And 
while Huxley labeled this position epiphenomenalism in 1874, James recog­
nized that Hodgson had presented the earliest and most rigorous formu-
89lation of this doctrine.
Hodgson also recognized that a scientific psychology must also 
assume an epistemological dualism. Writing of psychology's search for 
lawful relationships, he stated that
. . . this search . . .  is at once guided by facts to the 
objective aspect of states of consciousness, excluding their 
subjective aspect. It is 'things' outside the body which appear 
to cause 'subjective states' within the body. The search for 
laws of dependency forces us . . .  to separate states of subjective
88
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aspects from their objective aspect, that is, to separate Subjects 
generally from Objects generally.90
Before considering Hodgson's distinction between the objective and sub­
jective aspects of experience, it should be noted that Hodgson was clear 
on why psychology, as a science, must assume such a dualism between 
subject and object. This assumption is necessary, wrote Hodgson,
• • • ^or the relations of dependency have in all other 
sciences been found to exist only where the thing from which 
the dependence moved, that is, the condition of cause, was of 
a solid and material nature, a substance. . . . Psychology 
therefore, in seeking the conditions existendi of subjective 
states, seeks them in the laws or in the nature of substances.
Thus for Hodgson, both epistemological and psycho-physical dualisms were, 
in Morris's phrase, 'methodological postulates'; working assumptions 
which psychology as a scientific discipline must adopt. That such assump­
tions do not entail a commitment to any form of metaphysical dualism can 
be seen from Hodgson's formulation of the distinction between science 
and philosophy.
Hodgson's distinction between the objective and subjective aspects 
of phenomena stands at the core of the experiential monism of his philo­
sophical thought. As such, it is intimately related to both his phenom­
enological method, the method of reflection, and his distinction between 
philosophy and the natural sciences. In other words, his monism was the 
product of his method of reflection, which sought an assumptionless 
description of experience; and in adopting this method, philosophy be­
comes distinguished from the natural sciences, which must adopt some 
assumptions to carry out its task.
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As we have seen, any state of consciousness in Hodgson’s system 
could be viewed as either an 'object of consciousness alone' (i.e., in 
its first intention) or as a 'real existence' (i.e., in its second inten­
tion) . In adopting a method of assumptionless description philosophy 
deals with phenomena from a purely subjective point of view and seeks to 
reduce such phenomena to their metaphysical or logical elements.
Hodgson contended that two metaphysical elements, the formal (time and 
space) and the material (feeling), could be distinguished in the first
intention description of phenomena, although he took pains to note that
92these elements are inseparable as they are given in experience. An 
essential and historically unique feature of Hodgson's analysis is that 
the distinction between subject and object does not appear as metaphys­
ical elements. Instead, Hodgson argued that the subject-object dis­
tinction is derived from experience (i.e., has only second intention 
status) and thus has no place in metaphysics. Thus, in looking to 
experience without assumptions Hodgson founded an experiential monism; 
with the method of reflection he saw simply 'a sequence of different 
feelings' unreferred to either the subjective or objective orders. For 
Hodgson, the subject-object distinction appears only when the phenomena 
of experience are viewed from an objective point of view, i.e., as 
second intention objects. This objective aspect of phenomena is the
perspective of common sense and science, what Husserl later called the 
i 93natural standpoint'. The system which emerged from this series of 
distinctions could be called a dual-element (form and matter), dual-aspect
92
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(subjective and objective) monism, which Hodgson represented with the
diagram below:
Hodgson's methodological distinction between science and philosophy can 
be formulated within the terms presented in this diagram.
Philosophy deals with phenomena taken from a subjective point of 
view, as first intention objects, and seeks to analyze phenomena into 
their metaphysical elements. In contrast, the natural sciences deal 
with phenomena from an objective point of view and in doing so must make 
assumptions which the philosopher has no right to make. The terms, methods 
and goals of the natural sciences literally demand that the scientist 
make assumptions about his subject matter. The physicist, for example, 
must assume that physical objects exist in the world and that they are 
causally inter-connected. Without such assumptions the search for mate­
rial causes and general laws is impossible. And as a scientist, the 
physicist need not concern himself with justifying the existence of the 
real objects of his science or with his use of the notion of cause.
These are philosophical rather than scientific questions. Similarly,
Hodgson saw that the psychologist must assume the subject matter of his 
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an object of scientific inquiry). From this point of view, Hodgson argued 
that consciousness is considered as an object of investigation that is 
related to other assumed objects in a twofold sense. First, conscious­
ness must be assumed to be related to other objects in the world which 
psychology, as well as physics, must assume. This epistemological dual­
ism is, for Hodgson, a general characteristic of science and is a direct 
result of the fact that science considers only the objective aspect of 
phenomena. Secondly, scientific psychology assumes that consciousness 
is related to physical states (i.e., bodily or brain states) which are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of its appearance. This psycho­
physical dualism is a distinctive characteristic of the science of 
psychology, since its subject matter is consciousness. Thus Hodgson 
found no alternative to maintaining an experiential monism in philosophy 
along with both an epistemological and psycho-physical dualism in sci­
entific psychology.
This distinction is important because Reck argues that the methods
of James's psychology (i.e., introspection, as well as the comparative
and experimental methods) and his critical analysis of introspection
(what we have called the psychologists' fallacy) provide evidence of
95James's entrenchment in a metaphysical dualism. Reek's thesis seems 
to be based on the hasty and, given Hodgson's precedent, faulty assump­
tion that a person's assumptions for a scientific psychology are accurate 
representations of his metaphysics. The example of Hodgson should make 
abundantly clear that positing an epistemological and psycho-physical 
dualism for a scientific discipline does not preclude the adoption of 
a philosophical monism! Instead, in Hodgson's system we find dualisms
95
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being offered as 'methodological postulates' which are subordinate to
the monism of his philosophy.
Let us now return to James's psychological writings between 1884
and 1892 to see whether Hodgson's system influenced James's position on
epistemology. These years span his career as a psychologist, ending in
96the year of the publication of his Psychology: A Briefer Course. It is 
also important to note that proclaiming either form of dualism for sci­
entific psychology can not, in and of itself, be taken as evidence of his 
commitment to any form of metaphysical dualism.
What we find in James's writings during these years is a clear 
movement away from epistemological dualism. The first clear-cut sign of
such a movement can be seen in his 1884 essay, "On Some Omissions of
97Introspective Psychology." Not surprisingly, this is also the first 
time one finds unequivocal signs of his adoption of Hodgson's methodo­
logical distinction between first and second intention statements, as 
well as his critical interpretation of rationalism and empiricism.
James's goal in this essay is a description of what he called the "im­
mediate feltness of a mental state," i.e., the stream-like quality of 
98experience. Neither the Kantian nor Humean traditions had done full 
justice to this level of experience. The important issue for our pur­
pose, however, is whether James, in adopting the method of Hodgson, finds 
the same epistemological monism which the British philosopher found 
through this method. An interesting and revealing footnote suggests 
that James had, in fact, abandoned the metaphysical distinction between
^James, Psychology.
97James, "On Some Omissions."
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subject and object and the alternative he formulates reveals his indebt­
edness to Hodgson. In the context of criticizing the epistemological 
dualism of rationalism, which separates the ’act' from the sensory 'con­
tent' of consciousness, James wrote that the
. . . contrast is really between two aspects, in which all 
mental facts without exception may be taken; their structural 
aspect, as being subjective, and their functional aspect, as being 
cognitions. In the former aspect, the highest as well as the 
lowest is a feeling, a peculiarly tinged segment of the stream.
This tinging [sic] is its sensitive body, the wie ihm zu Muthe 
ist, the way it feels whilst passing. In the latter aspect, the 
lowest mental fact as well as the highest grasps some bit of 
universal truth as its contents. . . . From the cognitive point 
of view, all mental facts are intellections. From the subjective 
point of view all are feelings.^
The distinction which we find James making here, between the subjective
and cognitive or functional aspects, parallels Hodgson's distinction
between the subjective and objective aspects of phenomena. It seems that
James learned from Hodgson that one can, and, in fact, must, posit a
thorough-going epistemological dualism for scientific psychology— but
that such a position need not entail a commitment to a metaphysical
distinction between subject and object. But a problem which surfaces
in the Principles is that James never explicitly makes the distinction
between philosophy and science on methodological grounds, as Hodgson
did. The result is that James leaves himself open for misinterpretation.
One such area of confusion can be seen by noting that his 1884 
distinction between the two aspects of mental states allows him to employ 
the word feeling in two fundamentally different senses. That is, feeling 
can be employed as a philosophical (or phenomenological) description of 
any particular segment of the stream of experience taken in its subjec­
tive aspect. In this sense, James could write, as he did in 1884, that
99
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"from the subjective point of view all [mental facts] are feelings;" 
meaning that a portion of the stream is being taken as it immediately 
appears, without reference to its relation to its object or subject.
In fact, there are places in the Principles where he seems to be using 
the word feeling in this monistic sense. For the most part, however, 
he used the word feeling in the Principles in what he called the psy­
chological or cognitive sense as a synonym for knowledge by acquaintance. 
In this sense, feeling refers to a primitive type of sense data and, as 
such, it is an essentially dualistic concept.
James's failure to make clear the two senses of the word feeling,
and hold to it, has resulted in a confusion among a number of commenta­
tors. Linschoten, for example, states that 'thought1, for James, is an
103essentially dualistic concept while 'feeling' is essentially monistic.
But this characterization ignores large tracts of the Principles in 
which James uses feeling or knowledge by acquaintance in an explicitly 
dualistic sense. Given this initial confusion, Linschoten, in consider­
ing James's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge 
about, came to the inelegant conclusion that James is "simply contradict­
ing himself but this is not to be wondered at if we remember how unsys­
tematic James is."^^ Rather than contradicting himself, it seems more 
accurate to say that James, at times, adopts a method of describing 
experience that is reminiscent of Hodgson's method of reflection in the 
Principles. And in carrying out this method James too reveals his dis­
satisfaction with metaphysical dualism and his movement toward a monism
^^Ibid., p. 19. ^^James, Principles, 1:163.
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of pure experience. By not recognizing this strain of the Principles,
Reck set forth the untenable thesis that James is entrenched in an epis-
temologically dualistic metaphysics in the Principles.
That James did adopt an epistemological dualism for scientific
psychology in the Principles is incontestable. He tells us in the preface,
for example, in language reminiscent of Hodgson, that
Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and 
declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' 
obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on.105
Then in summarizing his chapter on the "Methods and Snares of Psychology"
he writes that "psychology assumes that thoughts successively occur, and
106that they know objects in the world." His epistemological dualism is
clear in this passage, but in the next passage he states clearly that
such a dualism is not incompatible with a monistic philosophy,
. . . the dualism of Object and Subject and their pre- 
established harmony are what the psychologist as such must assume, 
whatever ulterior monistic philosophy he may, as a metaphysician 
have in reserve.1®^
James's repeated reference to the fact that a scientific psychology must 
assume its subject matter and their causes is important in light of 
Hodgson's distinction between philosophy and the natural sciences. With­
in Hodgson's system, the distinction between these disciplines is that 
science, but not philosophy, has the right to make a series of methodo­
logical assumptions. And for both James and Hodgson, an epistemological 
dualism is part and parcel of these assumptions.
The important question for Reek's thesis is whether this methodo­
logical assumption is symptomatic of James's entrenchment in a deeper,
^James, Principles, l:v-vi. (Italics mine.)
^^Ibid., p. 197. ^^Ibid., p. 220. (Italics mine.)
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metaphysical distinction between subject and object. The passage from
his 1884 essay would lead us to be skeptical of such a position. This
skepticism is reinforced by one of James's fleeting excursions into the
metaphysical realm in his chapter on "The Stream of Thought." His
answer, which is presented in the section entitled 'Human thought appears
to deal with objects independent of itself', leaves no doubt that he had
overcome a dualistic metaphysics by the time of the Principles. In
considering an altogether unprecedented experience, a "new taste in the
throat," he asks a question which goes to the heart of the metaphysical
status of the distinction between subject and object— "Is it [the new
taste] a subjective quality of feeling, or an objective quality felt?"
His answer is uncharacteristically clear.
You do not even ask the question at this point. It is simply 
that taste. But if a doctor hears you describe it, and says:
'Ha! Now you know what heartburn is', then it becomes a quality 
already existent extra mentem tuam. . . . The first spaces, 
times, things and qualities experienced by the child probably 
appear, like this heartburn, as simple beings, neither in nor 
out of thought.
Dewey recognized the similarity of this passage to James's later monism 
of pure experience, where the subject-object distinction was conceived 
of as a functional distinction made for a specific purpose within experi­
ence. What Dewey did not recognize, however, was the similarity between 
the metaphysics which underlies this passage and Hodgson's monistic 
metaphysics.
With regard to this passage, it is also interesting to note that 
James saw himself adopting a philosophical point of view in this descrip­
tion, one which abstracted away the epistemological dualism of adult 
common-sense. In terms of the language he used in 1884, he is describing
108
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a feeling here from a purely subjective point of view. Thus, after offer­
ing a monistic conception of experience, he retreats into the psychologi­
cal point of view
But later, having other thoughts than this present one, and 
making repeated judgements of sameness among their objects, 
he [the child] corroborates in himself the notion of reali­
ties. . . . This . . .  is the psychological point of view, 
the relatively non-critical point of view of all natural sci­
ences, beyond which this book cannot go.109
The most glaring signs of James's disenchantment with epistemo­
logical dualism can be seen by examining the differences between his 
treatments of the flow of experience in the Principles and his Psychology 
of 1892. In the two years which separated these works James saw the 
need for two important changes in his characterization of experience; 
both of which seem compatible with the interpretation that James was 
moving away from the metaphysical distinction between subject and object. 
In fact, both these changes suggest that by 1892 the movement had cul­
minated and James had done away with any remnants of a metaphysical 
dualism. First, in the Principles James diffidently offered the fact 
that "thought seems to deal with objects independent of itself" as one 
of the five essential characteristics and its dualistic nature is the 
feature which James omitted. Second, the title of the chapter in 
Psychology called "The Stream of Consciousness," changed from "The 
Stream of Thought" in the Principles. These changes are obviously 
related; if the subject-object distinction is not an essential charac­
teristic of the stream then the word thought must be dropped since 
thought, for James, had clearly dualistic connotations. As he wrote in 
the Principles, thought "suggests the . . . reference to an object
109Ibid., pp. 296-297.
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other than the mental state itself.11 Given this, James's choice of 
the word consciousness in 1892 can be taken as a sign of his desire to 
employ an epistemologically neutral term to describe the flow of experi­
ence. Neither of these changes could be made by a person entrenched in 
a dualistic metaphysics. Instead, these revisions are those of a skep­
tic, whose epistemological heresies were nurtured by the philosophy of 
Shadworth Hodgson.
Thus, in examining James's treatment of epistemological dualism 
between 1884 and 1892 we have found evidence of a psychologist-philoso- 
pher in the process of transition. That is, we have seen James question­
ing the ultimateness of the distinction between subject and object as 
early as 1884, offering an alternative in 1890 and finally putting 
epistemological dualism aside in 1892. Thus James does not seem to have 
been entrenched in the metaphysical distinction between subject and 
object in the period he was writing the Principles, as Reck has argued. 
This can be said in spite of the fact that he retained an epistemologi­
cal dualism as a methodological postulate for scientific psychology.
In this important respect we have shown that James was following Hodgson's 
distinction between philosophy and science.
We have presented a rather detailed argument for the importance 
of Hodgson's system on James's philosophical psychology but the agreement 
in detail can itself be taken as support for the interpretation. Things 
become even more complicated, and confusing, when it is recognized that 
the monistic strain of the Principles is in conflict with James's argu­
ment for the efficacy of consciousness in the Principles. This is the 
case because the efficacy of consciousness does, in fact, implicate a
110Ibid., p. 186.
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dualism between rnlnd and body, I.e., a psycho-physical interactlonlsm.
In this respect, James was In fundamental disagreement with Hodgson and 
was, as Reck argued, entrenched in a dualistic metaphysics. What must 
be made clear, however, as we have sought to do in the first chapter, is 
that James defended the efficacy of consciousness for moral reasons— to 
challenge what he saw as the presumptious speculation of materialistic 
scientists.
CHAPTER 3
ASSOCIATION, REASONING AND THE A PRIORI:
THE TELEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF JAMES'S 
PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING
Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when 
we form our philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste 
and passion cooperate just as they do in parctical affairs, 
and lucky it is if the passion be not something as petty as 
a love of personal conquest over the philosopher across the 
way. . . . It is almost impossible that men who are themselves 
working philosophers should pretend that any philosophy can 
be, or ever has been, constructed without the help of personal 
preference, belief, or divination.1
This is an excerpt from an essay which James wrote in the late 
1870's and published in 1882 under the title "Rationality, Activity and 
Faith." Thematically, this article is intimately related to his "Senti­
ment of Rationality," which we examined in some detail in the first 
chapter. Both analyzed the motives of philosophical belief, seeking to 
make clear to an age which was dominated by a scientific credo that the 
subjective ideals of the thinker play an essential role in determining 
the contents of his system.
Let us turn now to the concluding chapter of the Principles, to
James's response to Helmholtz's observation that, as scientists, we must
assume that the "phenomena of nature must be reduced to motions of mate-
2
rial points with inalterable motor forces acting." To this proposition
^William James, "Rationality, Activity and Faith," Princeton 
Review 2 (1882):58-86, p. 74.
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The subjective interest leading to the assumption could not be 
more candidly expressed. What makes the assumption 'scientific' 
and not merely poetic, what makes Helmholtz and his kin dis­
coverers, is that the things of Nature turn out to act as if 
they were of the kind assumed. They behave as . . . mere draw­
ing and driving atoms would behave . . . . ^
James is obviously excited by the proclamation of the great German physio­
logical psychologist, he saw it as a confirmation of the formulation of 
the motives of philosophical belief which he offered in the late 1870's. 
Subjective ideals are expressed in the fundamental assumptions of one's 
system and these assumptions, in turn, structure the contents of a given 
system. But James is not writing as a philosopher in this section of 
the Principles. Instead, he is a psychologist offering his concluding 
remarks on the psychology of thinking. Within this context, too, however, 
Helmholtz's statement confirms James's fundamental thesis, for a teleology 
pervades Helmholtz's proposition. Assumptions are acts of faith which 
are rooted in the emotional commitments of the thinker; thus a teleologi- 
cal commitment underlies the thought of even the most rigorously mechanis­
tic thinkers.
There is, therefore, a fundamental continuity in the development 
of James's thought from the late 1870's to 1890, from his analysis of the 
motives of philosophical belief to his psychology of human thinking. This 
continuity is rooted in a commitment to a teleological conception of the 
higher mental processes. This chapter will examine the origins, develop­
ment and essential features of James's formulation of the higher mental 
processes in the Principles. To the extent that a teleology pervades
Henry Holt and Co., 1890; reprint ed. New York: Dover Publishing Co.,
1950), 2:688. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
3Ibid.
104
this formulation, this chapter might be viewed as a continuation of the 
first chapter of this study. This chapter goes beyond the first chapter, 
however, by examining the details of James's psychology of the higher 
mental processes in the Principles.
This chapter is divided into three sections. We shall first 
examine the impact of Hodgson's thought on James's reformulation of the 
laws of association. We shall argue that the central feature of James's 
Interpretation of association is that the knower is conceived as actively 
selecting those aspects of experience which are important and interesting 
for him. In the second section we shall examine James's formulation of 
human reasoning, a formulation which emphasizes the interested, teleo- 
logical nature of thinking. In this section we shall also find James 
going beyond Hodgson in his biological interpretation of the a priori.
In the third section we shall examine the relationship between believing 
and thinking in the Principles, attempting to articulate the sense in 
which James conceived of thinking as embedded in and conditioned by the 
emotional and aesthetic ideals of the thinker. In doing so, James's 
psychology of thinking will be presented as an extension and elaboration 
of the model he first presented in his early essays on the motives of 
philosophical belief. The value of this interpretation is that it inte­
grates the descriptive and explanatory aspects of James's system.
A Dynamic Interpretation of Association
In the first chapter we saw that the notion of subjective interests 
pervaded James's early work on the motives of philosophical belief. The 
chronological, as well as conceptual, priority of this theme in James's 
psychological thought can be seen by turning to his review of Wilhelm Wundt's
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GrundzUge der physiologlschen Psychologie. This work is generally recog­
nized as the first systematic experimental treatise in psychology. It 
is significant to note that James chose to describe Wundt's work on selec­
tive attention in some detail in this 1875 review. Given his own inclina­
tions toward an empirical philosophy, his intention is clear. He wanted 
to emphasize the importance of the activity of the knower, a phenomenon 
which had long been overlooked in the British school of empiricism. Thus 
he wrote that
. . . these acts [selective attention and recognition] postu­
late interests on the part of the subject— interests which, as 
ends or purposes set the emotional constitution, keep interfering 
the pure flow of impressions and their associations. . . .  It is 
amusing to see how Spencer shrinks from explicit recognition of 
this law . . . Mr. Bain, in principle, admits it, but does not 
work it out . . .  .5
Since James's aim was to reform British empiricism, it is important that 
he could contrast the crude empiricism of Herbert Spencer with the more 
progressive empiricism of Alexander Bain. With Spencer, the importance 
of subjective interests is lost in the midst of assiciationistic reduc­
tions. His definition of mind as the 'correspondence of inner to outer 
relations' minimizes, if not wholly ignores, the role of the subject in 
the process of knowing. In Bain's Emotions and Will, however, James
found the hegemony of British associationism cracking in a number of 
6
areas. In describing Bain in this review, James probably had the last 
chapter of Emotions and Will in mind. There Bain reluctantly admits that
^[William James], review of GrundzUge der physiologlschen Psy­
chologie. by Wilhelm Wundt, in North American Review, 121 (1874):195-201.
5Ibid., p. 201.
^Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (London: J. W. Parker 
and Son, 1859). Bain broke with traditional philosophical association­
ism by bringing the motor aspect into the foreground of his psychology.
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the emotional interests of the knower can affect his beliefs by directing 
his attention selectively.^ But Bain's acknowledgement is guarded and 
heavily qualified. More importantly, he fails to recognize that his 
acknowledgement, however qualified, has important implications for his 
interpretation of the laws of association. But while James saw a hesi­
tant recognition of the importance of subjective interests in empiricism, 
the position he opted for in the Principles was far more radical than 
either Wundt or Bain. There he argued that the interests of the knower 
are an essential ingredient in all levels of experience. Such a position 
made a passive interpretation of the laws of association untenable, it 
demanded an interpretation which placed selective attention on an equal 
theoretical footing with associative relations. It is just such an 
interpretation which James offered in the Principles.
James's "Association" chapter is an elaboration of an essay he
g
published in 1880. This chapter is remarkable in a number of respects.
First, it provides the reader with a succinct illustration of the con-
trasting-bordering-on-contradictory tendencies of the Principles.
Second, James gives Hodgson the highest of compliments in the historical
section of the chapter, writing that: "Dr. Hodgson's account of associa-
9
tionism is by all odds the best yet propounded in English." Beyond these,
I^bid., pp. 599-641. Bain wrote, for example, that:
11. . .different minds have a different motive of selection out 
of the countless multitude of impressions that we all alike open 
to. It is, therefore, a material consideration of the problem 
of knowledge, to ascertain what are the motives to the special­
ized consciousness, or the forces governing attention, as something 
over and above disinterested and equal sensation." p. 637.
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however, there is a fundamental conceptual reason which makes this chap­
ter an ideal gateway to James's treatment of the higher mental processes. 
That is, the laws of association stood at the foundation of empiricism's 
account of thinking. If that tradition was to be reformed, the laws of 
association would first have to be reformulated.
The curiously ambivalent tone of this chapter is evidenced by 
James's reduction of the laws of association to a neural mechanism,
. . . the psychological law of association . . . would 
thus be an effect, within the mind, of the physical fact that 
nerve-currents propagate themselves easiest through those 
[brain] tracts . . . which have been already most in use.10
This is nothing more than what was then called the law of neural habit 
or law of least resistance, a principle which any automaton theorist 
would have whole-heartedly endorsed. This law seeks to assign physical 
causes to the observation that thought Y succeeds thought X because it 
has been most frequently associated with X in the past. There is cer­
tainly nothing revolutionary in this principle.
But before we write James off as contradicting himself, two obser­
vations must be made. First, James's discussion of the laws of associa­
tion takes place within a very circumscribed region of experience, what 
he called the spontaneous or involuntary driftings of thought.These 
experiences are epitomized by what would be called thoughtless musings 
and reveries. Thus rather than positing that association could account 
for the highest forms of human thinking, James relegates it to a subor­
dinate role in his psychology. The second point is even more important, 
however, because it became the basis of his challenge to traditional 
associationism. This is James's claim that any particular association
10lbid. , p. 563. U Ibid., p. 567.
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presupposes a prior selection of the objects to be associated. In other
words, before two objects can be associated in experience they must be
attended to by the organism. And as we have seen, attention, for James,
implicates the subjective interests of the knower. In recognizing the
importance of selectivity and subjective interests, James inserted an
active subject into the most primitive levels of experience:
Just as in the original sensible experience our attention focal­
ized itself [sic] upon a few of the impressions of the scene 
before us, so here in the reproduction of those impressions an 
equal partiality is shown, and some parts are emphasized above 
the rest.^
Thus a distinctive conception of experience underlies James's treatment 
of association in the Principles. Subject and object are no longer dis­
tinct entities; the distinction between a tabula rasa, upon which objects 
are impressed, and external objects is collapsed into the interactive 
process of attention within a field of experience. For James, experience 
is given as a 'swarming continuum' which is fundamentally ambiguous and 
devoid of meaning. At the subject pole of this field James found a 
multitude of simultaneously existing subjective interests which are limited 
only by the knower's biological capacities, knowledge and ideals. At the 
object pole he found a corresponding diversity, in his words, a 'teeming 
multiplicity of objects and relations'. Given this description, the role 
of selective activity of the knower comes to the foreground. There are 
literally too many possibilities offered to assume that knowledge is a 
passive mirroring of the relations given in the external world.
Paradoxically, James's recognition of the importance of selective 
attention seems tied to a method which involves the voluntary suspension 
of attention. Although he uses this method rather unsystematically in
12Ibid., p. 572.
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the Principles, it is clearly related to what we called Hodgson's method
of reflection in the last chapter. James's description of experience
without normal attention is worth quoting at length:
We all know of this . . . state, even of its extreme degree.
Most people probably fall several times a day into a fit of 
something like this: the eyes are fixated on vacancy, the 
sounds of the world melt into a confused unity, the attention 
is so dispersed that the whole body is felt . . . at once, 
and the foreground of consciousness is filled, if by anything, 
by a solemn sense of surrender to the empty passing of time.
In the background of our mind we know meanwhile what we ought 
to be doing... . . Every moment we expect the spell to break.
. . . But it does continue, pulse after pulse . . . until . . . 
an energy is given, something . . . enables us to gather our­
selves together . . . .  13
James's description of visual and auditory experience when attention is 
dispersed is particularly important. Without an act of attention such 
experience is devoid of the structure and organization which character­
izes our normal state of mind— "the eyes are fixated on vacancy, the 
sounds of the world melt together into confused unity." This is the 
world of sensory experience. But when we attend to some particular 
portion of this original flux— "an energy is given"— the world of related 
objects reappears. Thus an act of attention becomes essential to our 
normal experience. Whole, related, stable objects are not impressed 
upon us from the outside world. Instead, James wrote that:
Out of what is in itself an undistinguished, swarming continuum, 
devoid of structure or emphasis, our senses make for us, by 
attending, a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of 
abrupt changes, of picturesque light and shade.14
It must be made clear that James's emphasis upon selective atten­
tion by no means commits him to the psycho-physical interactionism which 
we found evidenced in some parts of the Principles. In the first chapter
13
Ibid., p. 404. (Italics mine.)
14
Ibid., pp. 284-285. (Italics mine.)
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we took pains to distinguish two forms of selectivity in James*s early 
thought; one which is deterministic and another which is ambiguous but 
seems to imply some form of interactionism. In his formulation of asso­
ciation it is clear that he had the deterministic notion of selectivity 
in mind. In fact, he speculated, following Hodgson*s precedent, that 
subjective interests have a neurological basis in the prepotency of 
particular brain processes. This point is important because it clears 
the way for an examination of Hodgson's impact on James's formulation 
of association; for while Hodgson also steered clear of interactionism 
he, unlike other empiricists of his day, argued eloquently for the need 
to include the interests of the organism in an account of association.
In the process, he offered a devastating critique of associationism 
which had a clear impact on James.
The process of formulating a definitive list of associative laws 
is almost as ancient an enterprise as philosophy itself. Aristotle's 
list, which included contiguity, similarity and contrast, may well be 
the best known but different epochs gave more or less prominence to one 
or another of these laws. A representative list for the mid-nineteenth 
century might include contiguity, similarity, cause and effect and con­
trast. For Hodgson, the crucial characteristic of this, or any other, 
list of associative laws was that they tacitly assumed that mind passively 
mirrors the relations given in the external world. James Mill, for 
example, thought that belief could be fully explained in purely intel­
lectual terms, as a function of the frequency which a proposition's sub­
ject and predicate had been experienced together in the past. As George 
Brett wrote of Mill's system,
15Ibid., p. 572; p. 583.
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. . .  he thinks the sequence of ideas reproduce the sequence 
of sensations; [and] if we add vividness and frequency to explain 
the strength of association, the whole theory may be considered 
complete.16
If we insert a few biological terms into this description it would apply
equally well to Spencer's evolutionary associationism. Thus Hodgson was
providing an essentially accurate description of orthodox association-
Istic empiricism when he noted that it assumes that the
. . . mind in producing her images in association . . . was 
imitating and repeating . . . the operations of nature, making 
use of certain laws which she observed originally from the obser­
vations of the sequences and coexistences of external things.17
The selectivity of the subject is omitted in this formulation and imita­
tion becomes the modus operandi of the human mind. In the last chapter 
we examined Hodgson's critique of the empiricist notion of ideas. Now 
we shall turn to his critique of its intellectual counterpart, the laws 
of association.
Hodgson saw a twofold vagueness in the traditional formulation 
of the laws of association. First, a list of associative laws provides 
no explicit way of explaining why one particular relation (i.e., associa­
tive connection) takes precedence over another in a given situation.
That is, associationism never directly confronts the question of why 
object A is sometimes followed by object B, which has been experienced 
in spatial and temporal contiguity with A, but is at other times followed 
by object X, which resembles A. Why, for example, does an orange some­
times remind me of orange juice and other times of a baseball? While 
Thomas Brown introduced the secondary laws of association to account for
^R. S. Peters, Brett's History of Psychology (Boston: MIT Press, 
1965), p. 451.
^Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 263.
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this phenomenon, Hodgson approached this question in terns of the inter­
ests of the knower.
In his Philosophy of Reflection in 1878, Hodgson made clear that
he viewed the laws of association as empirical generalizations which de-
18
scribe the possible routes of the stream of thought. And while he 
recognized that such generalizations are essential to thought— they pro­
vide the basic materials of thought— Hodgson also recognized that they 
cannot, in and of themselves, explain the selection of the actual route 
taken. It was this shortcoming of William Hamilton's reduction of the 
laws of association to a general law of affinity which led Hodgson to 
write that:
If ... we distinguish this general law of affinity into classes 
of contrast, resemblance and contiguity . . . this gives us no 
law of preference of contrast to resemblance . . . or, in short, 
of the preference of any of these [associative relations] to any 
other of them.19
In Hodgson's view, an associational account of the sequence of thought
becomes plausible only if one ignores the fact that a particular object
of experience has been associated with a large number of different
objects through the various modes of associative connection. Put simply,
associationism tended to ignore the multiplicity of possible relations
which exist simultaneously in the stream of thought. For Hodgson, this
multiplicity is an essential feature of the stream:
Any object . . .  is connected by affinity [i.e., association] 
with all other objects whatever; and any object whatever stands 
in relation [of some sort] to any other object . . . and con­
sequently to point out that they stand in some one or more of 
these relations . . .  is no explanation at all . . .  no discovery 
of the link between objects in redintegration.20
18Ibid., pp. 265-266. 19Ibid., p. 258.
20
Ibid., p. 259. (Italics mine.)
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And this fact makes it necessary to make explicit reference to what Hodgson 
called the law of preference or Interest, that is, the emotional Interests 
of the knower.
Thus Hodgson objected to two complementary tendencies in orthodox 
associationism: (1) the over-emphasis of intellectual/associative factors 
and (2) the subsequent neglect of the dynamic, interested aspect of the 
stream of thought. Both features are manifest in the ad hoc nature of the 
associationist.'s explanation of particular sequences of thought. Within
■5
our example, the associatlonist might point out that orange juice had been 
experienced as an effect of operating on an orange in a particular way and 
therefore it is understandable that one should follow the other in thought. 
But such an explanation can be seen to be an oversimplification when it 
is recognized that the idea of an orange has also been experienced through 
a myriad of other associative relations with other objects. Why is it, 
Hodgson is asking, that the relation of cause and effect is selected?
Hodgson went on to argue that a complete explanation of the sequence in­
volves a consideration of the emotional interests of the knower. Let us 
approach this dynamic aspect of the stream, which loomed so large in 
James’s psychology, by examining the second sense which Hodgson thought 
the associationist account to be vague.
Imagine, for a moment, that associationism is able to provide a 
plausible theoretical basis— e.g., frequency— for the selection of one 
type of associative relation rather than another. In fact, frequency stood 
at the foundation of the systems of James Mill, Herbert Spencer and even 
Hodgson, who defined the interests of the organism in terms of frequency.
But even if the power of frequency is granted at the level of the selec­
tion between the types of associative relations, one is still left with
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explaining why one object, out of a multitude of possible objects in the 
stream, is attended to. Here again we find that one's description of 
experience has a tremendous impact on how one explains it. Orthodox asso­
ciationism tended to describe the movement of thought as a kind of 
linear sequence of objects held together by associative links. For if 
thought really is a 'train of ideas', where one whole object is displaced 
by another, then the sense of multiple possibilities— the spatial spread- 
outness— which appears at every pulse of experience is either considerably 
narrowed or simply absorbed by associative connections. But if thought 
is described as a stream of teeming possibilities, then the selection of 
some objects and the ignoring of others can be seen as an essential part 
of normal experience. Thus both Hodgson and James saw that distinctness
and clarity in thought is created by selecting one portion through an 
21
act of attention. And this attentional act is guided by the interests 
of the knower. Thus Hodgson did not merely deny the central tenet of 
associationism, i.e., the importance of habit or custom. His most im­
portant contribution was that he placed an act of interested attention 
alongside habit in explaining the direction of thought. The result for
psychology was that the stream came to be seen as a joint product of
22what Hodgson called "retentive" and "reactive" factors. The knower not 
only reproduced the past, he reacted to the present in a selective manner. 
In this sense, Hodgson made past experience (our accumulated habits) sub­
servient to the present interests of the knower.
It is important to note that for both Hodgson and James, the
21
See James, Principles, 1:461; Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, 
1:288-297.
22
Hodgson, Theory of Practice, 1:382.
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'reactive' or interested nature of experience made a passive formulation 
of the associative laws unacceptable. As Hodgson wrote in the Philosophy 
of Reflection;
Consciousness itself appears to involve some reaction on our 
part, on the part of the organism. . . .  To feel is to react.
Pure passivity is as impossible as pure activity.23
Dichotomizing between pure activity and pure passivity is, in truth, 
partly rhetorical but it is important in that both James and Hodgson 
hoped to integrate the two dominant philosophical traditions with a re­
vised formulation of activity. Each hoped to avoid the extremes of the 
Humean and Kantian traditions and emphasize the selective activity of 
the knower while rooting it in the brain.
In the Principles we find an explicit recognition of the reactive 
as well as the retentive nature of human experience. In fact, the three 
chapters which precede James's treatment of association— "Discrimination 
and Comparison," "Attention" and "Conception"— emphasize the reactive, 
interested aspect of experience. With such a preparation it is not sur­
prising that James also began his critique of orthodox associationism by 
describing the multiplicity and complexity of experience:
. . . the same outer object may suggest either of many re­
alities formerly associated with it . . . and a philosophy of 
association that should merely say that it will suggest one of 
these, or even the one of them which it has oftenest accompanied, 
would go but a very short way into the rationale of the subject.24
As we have noted earlier, Hodgson was willing to reduce interests to
frequency and thus remain, at least in spirit, within the association-
istic tradition. James, however, was unwilling to make such a reduction.
In his examination of the laws of association he mentioned recency,
23




vividness, congruity in emotional tone and chance as factors which are
not reducible to frequency. In terms of a full account of the higher
mental processes, however, James's unique formulation of the a priori
capacities of the human brain made his departure from the empiricist
tradition inevitable and absolute. We shall take up this topic in the
next section. For now it should be recognized that James too pointed
critically to the ad hoc nature of a purely associationistic explanation.
Granted an object A, they [the associationists] never tell us 
beforehand which of its associates it will suggest; their wisdom 
is limited to showing, after it has suggested a second object, 
that that object was once an associate725
But, as we have seen with Hodgson, since any object whatsoever has stood 
in any number of relations with any number of other objects in experience, 
merely pointing to that one object begs the question of why that particu­
lar object was, in fact, selected. The passive model of empiricistic 
associationism seems caught in a vicious explanatory circle when the rich­
ness and complexity of experience is articulated. And for Hodgson and 
James, an explicit recognition of the interests of the knowing subject 
was the only way out of this loop.
James's essentially active, dynamic reformulation of the laws of 
association becomes intelligible from this context. In the Principles 
he distinguishes three types of association which he arranges along a 
continuum of what might be called the specificity of interest. He took 
pains to root the concept of interests in neural terms, as the "difference
in the amount of that portion of the nerve tract . . . which is operative
26in calling up the thought which comes." Most importantly, however, the 
^Ibid. (Italics mine.) ^Ibid., pp. 572-573.
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emotional interests of the knower are now conceived as an essential as­
pect of the process of association. James called the first type "impar­
tial redintegration" [or association by contiguity]; here the interest 
seems diffuse and unfocused. This is the most concrete type of associ­
ative reproduction, where there is a detailed "reinstatement in thought
27of the entire content of large trains of past experience." The im­
portant point is that while he posited this as a theoretical extreme, 
he doubted that it ever actually appeared in its pure form in human 
experience. At the same time, however, he suggested that this mode was
"the usual state of brutes when [they] were not actively engaged in 
28some pursuit." In fact, he stated that this passive, non-selective
reproduction of the past is most nearly approximated in human experience
when a person consciously adopts an interest in such a reproduction.
The more usual state is what James called "ordinary or mixed associa- 
29
tion." Here some more or less clearly defined object is torn out of 
the stream and its associates gradually surround it until another, more 
interesting object appears and dominates. This form of experience is 
epitomized by the free-floating movement from object to object without 
ostensible direction. He offered the third type of association— associ­
ation by similarity— as one of the distinguishing characteristics of 
human, as opposed to non-human, mental life. For James, human thought 
is literally founded upon the continual surfacing of similarities which 
transgress the limitations of spatial and temporal contiguity. In asso­
ciation by similarity the interesting portion of the stream is very narrow 
and specific, as, for example, when a football gives way to the thought
27
Ibid., p. 570. Ibid., 2:353. *Ibid., pp. 571-572.
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of the moon because we momentarily focus on the rotund nature of the 
former. This form of association is the basis of creativity, the meta­
phor and the recognition of abstract similarities in the face of percep­
tual difference.
We can summarize James's indebtedness to Hodgson's treatment of 
the laws of association by pointing to a series of assumptive, critical 
and explanatory features which both their interpretations shared. At 
the assumptive level, both began with a conception of experience as a 
flowing stream of simultaneous possibilities rather than a linear 
sequence of discrete objects. From this shared perspective both were 
critical of what they saw as an essential vagueness in orthodox associ- 
ationism, a vagueness which: (1) acted to obscure the role of selection 
based on subjective interests and (2) made ad hoc explanation necessary. 
Cognizant of these shortcomings, both brought the notion of interests 
into the foreground of their psychologies and both rooted it in brain 
processes. In fact, a large part of the remainder of this chapter 
examines James's attempt to work out the implications of the notion of 
selectivity in his psychology of the higher mental processes.
Reasoning: James's Biological Interpretation 
of the A Priori
James's interpretation of the laws of association formed the 
foundation for his formulation of voluntary thought or reasoning. This 
formulation, however, does not appear self-contained in one chapter or 
even one section of the Principles. In fact, it is scattered through no 
less than ten chapters of that work. In this section we shall consider 
only three of those chapters in detail— "Reasoning," "Conception" and 
Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience." Our objectives are
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twofold. First, we shall attempt to sketch James’s basic model of reason­
ing. We shall then ask how it is that James thought that humans came to 
be able to think. In presenting his answer to this question, we shall 
find him going beyond both the letter and spirit of Hodgson, and empiri­
cism in general, and formulating a unique version of the a priori.
James opens his "Reasoning" chapter with a statement which reveals 
both the goal of his account of human thinking as well as the importance 
of his interpretation of association. In contrasting the mental activ­
ities of humans with animals he wrote that
. . .  it is by no means easy to decide just what is meant by 
reason, or how the peculiar thinking process called reasoning 
differs from other thought-sequences which may lead to similar 
results.30
This remark gives voice to one theme which pervades James's account of 
human thinking. That is, he is less concerned with the results of rea­
soning than he is with articulating the distinctive psychological pro­
cesses which humans employ in thinking. There are obvious historical 
reasons for James to have begun as he does. Evolutionary theory produced 
a mass of mostly anecdotal accounts of animal intelligence which tended 
to glorify the reasoning powers of animals. This approach seemed to 
assume that since animals, at times, perform remarkably intelligent 
feats, the processes through which these accomplishments are brought 
about must be similar to those evidenced in human thought. In essence, 
the pioneers of animal psychology either assumed or argued for a simi­
larity of processes from an occasional similarity of results. As we
shall see, James rejected this position and offered a formulation of human
31thinking which was fundamentally different from animal intelligence.
30
James, Principles, 2:325. (Italics mine.)
31Ibid., pp. 329-330.
120
Perhaps the best way to approach this fundamental distinction is
to first examine the one very general sense in which James acknowledged
a similarity between human and animal thought. This can be seen most
clearly in what James called "empirical thinking," the "simpler kind of
rational thinking which consists in the concrete objects of past experi-
32ence merely suggesting each other." The empirical thinker is the 
rule-of-thumb thinker, who reacts to the present by reproducing the past. 
The one similarity between animal and this crude form of human intelli­
gence is that both are bound to the repetition of the past. But as soon 
as we speak of the processes involved, a difference overrides even this 
general similarity. That is, James maintained throughout the Principles 
that even the most prosaic human mind has a larger number of interests 
than the most intelligent animal and his thought is dominated by associ­
ation by similarity rather than contiguity. Anyone who has heard a 
person free-associate can attest to the fact that the human mind moves 
between abstract categories rather than reproducing events which are 
contiguous with one another.
The distinctive processes of what James called "reasoning proper"
33are abstraction and analysis. First, rather than being bound to the 
concomitant or even similar associates of the whole object, the reasoner 
is able to select an abstract property of the object and substitute it 
for the whole object. That is, the reasoner is able to deal with objects 
in terms of their essential properties, to intend an object from an ab­
stract frame of reference. This is the case because abstraction brings 
the person into contact with conceptual networks which might have no
32Ibid., p. 329. 33Ibid., p. 330.
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Intrinsic spatio-temporal relation to the object as a whole. Thus, for 
example, both a dog and a human may approach a limping stranger but only 
the human knows the limp means that the person needs help. In fact, for 
James, abstraction is synonymous with the act of conception— "our atten­
tion singling out some part of the mass of matter for thought . . . and
holding fast to it, without confusion"— and both are intimately related
34to the interests of the knower. And every act of attention implicates
inattention and therefore in abstracting one aspect of the object we
'mutilate the fullness of reality'. That is, every time we conceive of
a thing in a particular way we classify it as an instance of a general
class of phenomena. In doing so we break up the stream of thought into
discrete, permanent conceptual units and ignore, for the moment, the
other possible relations. As James wrote:
Whichever one of these aspects of its being I temporarily class 
it under, makes me unjust to the other aspects. But as I al­
ways am classing it under one aspect or another, I am always 
unjust, always partial, always exclusive. My excuse is neces­
sity. . . .  My thinking is first and last and always for the 
sake of my doing.35
This observation is important from a number of perspectives. With regard 
to the thinker, the process of abstraction and classification has obvious 
advantages since an abstract attribute has fewer and more general prop­
erties than the object as a whole. With respect to James's theory of 
thinking, this brings the internal activity of the thinker to the fore­
ground; as we shall see, James posited that the processes of abstraction 
and classification must be a priori capacities of homo sapiens. Lastly, 
with respect to James's formulation of human thinking, the notion of 
breaking up the stream into discrete conceptual units makes clear that
34 35
Ibid., 1:461. James, Principles, 2:333.
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his description of thought as a stream is propaedeutic to, but not the
essence of, his psychology of thinking. In fact, it might be more
accurate to follow Linschoten and say that it is experience rather than
thought that James had in mind when he described it as a continuous 
36stream. In this way we can save the word thinking for the process of 
tearing out portions of the stream and intending its objects with spe­
cific interests in mind.
This leads us to the second process which characterizes reasoning, 
a process which, in fact, is continuous with abstraction. Once the 
thinker conceives of an object as a member of an abstract class, he 
searches and checks to see if the relations which hold for the class are 
applicable to the problem he is facing. Thus analysis follows abstrac­
tion and it involves a covert or overt testing of the alternatives sug­
gested. James understood, for example, that a cat could open a door by 
randomly stumbling upon the behavior of moving the latch. But this is 
a case of association by contiguity, not reasoning proper. That this is 
the case can be seen by examining what would happen if a door became 
jammed against the lintel on a humid day. Assuming it wanted to get out, 
the cat would remain at the mercy of chance. But the human would 
(1) search for and attend to the source of the problem, (2) after locating 
it at the top of the door he would classify it in terms of his knowledge 
about the characteristics of wood, resistence etc., and (3) assuming he
simply wanted to leave the room he would press down on the handle and 
37open the door. However trivial the example, it contains all the essen­
tial elements of James's formulation of reasoning. Thus reasoning is a
36




problem-solving situation, a search for the means for obtaining specific 
ends; and James thought that homo sapiens was uniquely equipped to 
handle such situations. Rather than being bound to reproducing the past, 
the reasoner can creatively apply his knowledge to problems that he is 
interested in solving.
James's conception of the subject-object relationship underlies 
his account of reasoning in an interesting fashion. Rather than conceiv­
ing of objects as discrete, clearly defined entities, James wrote that
objects are "well-springs of properties . . . .  Every reality has an
38infinity of aspects or properties." A relativism pervades his concep­
tion of objects.
There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing.
The same property which figures as the essence of a thing on ^  
one occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another.
His own italics make it clear that he sought to overcome the common-sense
notion that the essence of an object is fixed and resides in the object.
At the same time, however, his account of reasoning is founded upon the
proposition that people are able to deal with objects in terms of essences.
In the face of this paradox James maintained that the capacity to deal
with objects in terms of essences is an activity of the knower. Thus he
wrote that
. . . the only meaning of essence is teleological, and . . . 
classification and conception are purely teleological weapons 
of the mind. The essence of the thing is that one of its prop­
erties which is so important for my interests that in comparison 
with it I neglect the rest.40
Again, James's own italics reveal his fundamental contention. The thinker
G O  Q Q
Ibid., p. 332. Ibid., p. 333. (James's italics.)
40
Ibid., p. 335. (James's italics.)
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himself classes, names and conceives of an object in terms of the cate­
gories which he believes to be the most important or valuable. In other 
words, the interests, values and emotional beliefs of the knower cut 
through the relativism of objects and create worlds of truth. Thus 
Helmholtz’s mechanistic conception of science offers us one perspective, 
one version of the essence of objects. But James's point is that even 
the scientific conception of objects is grounded in a commitment to a set 
of passionately held values.
At first glance, James might be criticized for simply assuming that 
all conceptual activity is embedded value-laden emotional considerations; 
but his detailed analyses of the motives of philosophical belief make 
such a contention less powerful than it might be. If his account of 
thinking in the Principles begins with the proposition that thinking is 
inextricably inter-penetrated by value judgments, it must also be noted 
that this position was adopted only after a great deal of scrutiny of the 
most abstract forms of human thought. We shall return to this theme in 
the next section. At this juncture we must complete James's account of 
human thought by examining his formulation of the a priori.
Morton White has made a distinction between two closely related 
strains of James's formulation of the a priori in the Principles. At one 
level, James is concerned with the question of psychogenesis, the evolu­
tionary origin of the brain structures which make necessary or non-empir- 
ical truths possible.^ In addressing this question, however, White 
noted that James crosses over into the epistemological realm and considers 
the method of justifying necessary truths. The distinction between
41
Morton White, Science and Sentiment in America: Philosophical 
Thought From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1972), pp. 173-180.
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psychogenesis and epistemology is valuable for our discussion in two 
related respects. First, it serves to clarify the focus of our discus­
sion since the question of psychogenesis alone plays a central role in 
James's psychology of human thinking. Second, given this focus, it must 
be made clear at the outset that James, along with the vast majority of 
nineteenth century experimental psychologists, interpreted Kant's a priori 
in biological terms. Our goal, then, is simply to understand James's 
formulation of the -a priori, to attempt to integrate the role played by 
biologically-given brain structures with his psychology of human reason­
ing. This goal leads us to the question of psychogenesis.
James's formulation of the origin of biologically-given brain 
structures was offered as an alternative to what he saw as the seduc­
tively appealing but logically untenable "experience hypothesis" of 
Spencer. According to Spencer, a priori knowledge is the product of the 
accumulated experience of the race. Spencer's formulation is an exten­
sion of the Lamarckian position that the acquired knowledge of our an­
cestors is transmitted to successive generations until it becomes manifest 
as instinctual or biologically a priori reactions. The appeal of this 
formulation was rooted in its capacity to integrate seemingly contradic­
tory philosophical positions. Most importantly, Spencer's a priori 
allowed him to acknowledge Kant's contention that some aspects of cogni­
tion are prior to the individual's experience while retaining the funda­
mental tenet of empiricism, viz., that all knowledge is ultimately the 
product of experience. Of course, the notion of experience must be 
expanded to include the history of the race as well as the individual, 
but even this concession turned out to be an attractive feature of Spencer's 
interpretation. Evolutionary theory had made the genetic history of the
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organism an essential ingredient of the formation of distinct species 
and Spencer's position, at long last, brought attention to the biologi­
cally-given structures of the brain. Thus when he asked: "What is the 
meaning of the human brain?," his answer sought to integrate Kantian 
rationalism with evolutionary theory without sacrificing empiricism.
"It is," he wrote,
. . . that the many established relations among its [the 
brain's] parts, stand for many established relations among 
the psychical changes. Each of the constant connextions among 
the fibres of the cerebral masses, answers to some connextion 
of phenomena in the experiences of the race.42
Empiricism is upheld by the statement that the inherited brain structures 
of the individual are ultimately derived from his ancestor's adaptation 
to their environment. It might also be noted that this formulation is 
fully compatible with Spencer's definition of mind as the correspondence 
of inner relations to outer relations. As a complex of physical struc­
tures, Spencer conceived of the human brain as a continuously developing 
product of the history of an entire species.
James's argument against Spencer did not center around the exis­
tence of biologically-given brain structures, for both agreed that:
(1) Kant's a priori must be interpreted in evolutionary terms and (2) the 
human brain at birth possesses numerous instincts and capacities which 
distinguish humans from other species. What James challenged was Spencer's 
account of the mode of origin and nature of the innate structures of the 
human brain. That is, James rejected the notion that the mind (or brain) 
is wholly structured by phenomena of the external world. In other words, 
he rejected the fundamental tenet of Spencer's empiricism, viz., that
42
Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., (1855; 
reprint of second edition, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1896), 1:468.
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all knowledge can be conceived of as the product of the combined experi­
ence of the race and the individual. For James, there is something 
intrinsic to the human mind or brain which has absolutely no analogue 
or correspondent in the external world. And since this something can not 
be construed as the product of experience, it is itself in no way depen­
dent upon or conditioned by the actual sequences and coexistences ex­
perienced by the individual for its continued application. Furthermore, 
James argued that this something is responsible for the unique features 
of human cognition, viz., that the human is not bound, like brutes, to 
the repetition of past experience. Before examining the nature of 
James's a priori let us consider his argument against Spencer's formu­
lation of their mode of origin.
A strict Spencerian empiricism is committed to discovering the 
external relations which correspond to the internal relations exhibited 
by the organism. It is this feature of empiricism which James brought 
attention to when he wrote that:
Most psychologists nowadays believe that the objects first, in 
some natural way, engendered a brain from out of their midst, 
and then imprinted these various cognitive affections on it . . .  . 
it must then be fair to assume universally [they reasoned] that, 
with time enough given, the mere presence of the various 
ob.jects and relations to be known must end by bringing about 
the latter's cognition, and that in this way all mental structure 
was first to last evolved.43
This conception of Spencerian empiricism led James to make a distinction
which became the foundation of both his critique of Spencer and his own
formulation of psychogenesis. The distinction is between what he called
brain-born (or back-door) and experience-born (or front door) modes of
44origin of brain structures. If we restrict the word experience, as 
43
James, Principles, 2:629. (Italics mine.)
44Ibid., pp. 629-633.
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James did, to "processes which influence the mind by the front-door-way
of simple habits and association," then Spencer's formulation calls for
45an entirely experience-born genesis of brain structures. With this 
notion of experience, the distinction between the race and the individual 
is less important than the empiricist contention that all brain struc­
tures are ultimately the product of experience.
James rejected Spencer's empiricism unambiguously and maintained 
that the origin of the fundamental structures which underlie human thought 
are brain-born— arising from accidental variations in the molecular 
structure of the human. Thus James countered Spencer's Lamarckian notion 
with the Darwinian notion that internally generated chance variations
are inherited and come to characterize entire species by loading the evo-
46lutionary dice in favor of the lucky mutants. Thus, in describing his
position James wrote that:
The higher thought-processes owe their being to causes which 
correspond far more to the sourings and fermentations of 
dough . . . than to the manipulations by which [its] physical 
aggregates came to be compounded.47
If we can continue within the imagery of James's analogy, it might be said 
that he rejected the notion that the structure of the human brain is 
passively shaped by the poundings of external objects. Left to itself, 
James argued that transformations take place in the brain as they do in 
dough, and the results of these changes can not be conceived of as the 
product of external objects. Thus James conceived of the unique charac­
teristics of human thought as originating as "pure idiosyncrasies,
45Ibid., p. 628.
46White, Science and Sentiment, pp. 173-176.
47James, Principles, 2:638.
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spontaneous variations, fitted by good luck . . .  to the cognizance of 
objects . . . without being in any intelligible sense immediate deriva­
tives of them."^ And these "pure idiosyncrasies or spontaneous varia­
tions" produced the physical basis of the distinctive features of human 
experience. Thus he wrote that:
Our aesthetic, moral and intellectual life seems made up of 
affections of this collateral and incidental sort, which have 
entered the mind by the back stairs, as it were, or rather have 
not entered the mind at all, but got surreptitiously born in 
the house.49
While both accounts of the origin of a priori brain structures are 
speculative, Spencer's is riddled with a devastating logical problem. 
Spencer’s position holds that all a priori knowledge was originally ac­
quired during the lifetime of the organism's ancestors. This formulation 
seems immanently plausible when it is applied to particular, isolated 
relations between the organism and its environment. Thus that a bird of 
prey responds instinctively to its victim's movements is easily under­
standable within Spencer's account. In fact, it was instinctual responses 
and reflex actions which Spencer gave as examples when he presented his 
experience-hypothesis in his Principles of Psychology. B u t  James's 
formulation of the a priori in his Principles was not primarily concerned 
with isolated response dispositions. Instead he sought to explain the
origin of, in his words, the "theoretical part of our organic mental struc- 
51ture." The difference is of fundamental importance, as James sought to 
understand the origin of the basic capacities, activities and processes 
which distinguish human from non-human mentality. And in applying Spencer's
48 49
Ibid., p. 631. **Ibid., p. 627.
"^Spencer, Principles, 1:419-425; 458-460; 465-471.
■**James, Principles, 2:677-678.
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account to these general capacities, "the categories themselves," James 
called them, one arrives at a logical conumdrum. An example will make 
this clear.
One capacity which James said distinguishes human from non-human 
mental life is the reflective memory of homo sapiens, our ability to recall 
objects of thought as distinct from objects in the world. Can it be 
reasonably argued that our ancestors gradually increased their capacity 
to reflect on what had occurred in the past in a manner analogous to the 
way that the ancestors of hawks gradually increased their efficiency as 
field-mice hunters? This evolutionary scenario is logically impossible 
because any particular instance of reflective memory presupposes a capa­
city which makes this type of memory possible. That is, the capacity to 
reflectively remember, a biologically given brain structure, is logically 
prior to any particular string of human-like memories. And this capacity, 
James argued, must be construed as the result of spontaneous variations 
in the brains of the ancestors of humans. Spencer's account would lead 
one to the untenable position that an organism, in adapting to its environ­
ment, could— in principle— outstrip its biologically given brain structures. 
How else could novel characteristics of the brain emerge in the evolution 
of a species? This aspect of Spencer's formulation was an artifact of 
the dualistic teleology of Lamarck's formulation of the inheritance of
acquired characteristics— that the desire to perform some action creates,
52over a period of time, the ability to carry out that action. And while 
Spencer obscured this principle in his vague, systematic writings, James 
unearthed it and used it to refute Spencer's evolutionary empiricism.
52
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The form of James's argument against Spencer— that any particular 
instance of a given type of experience necessarily assumes the brain 
structures which make that type of experience possible— has a distinc­
tively Kantian flavor to it. James himself recognized the similarity;
but before we call him a disciple of the great German philosopher a number
53of fundamental differences must be acknowledged. First, as we have 
said, James offered a biological interpretation of the a priori and its 
mode of origin. A second and more radical difference revolves around 
James's conception of the nature of the a priori. That is, the processes 
which James had in mind when he spoke of a priori brain structures are 
quite different from those of Kant or Spencer. In a little-quoted but 
revealing footnote in the Principles he tells us why such a difference is 
necessary.
Kant . . . made a strange tactical blunder in his way of showing 
that the forms of our necessary thought are underived from ex­
perience. He insisted on thought-forms with which experience 
largely agrees, forgetting that the only forms which could not 
by any possibility be the results of experience would be such as 
experience violated. The first thing a Kantian ought to do is 
to discover forms of judgement to which no order in 'things' 
runs parallel . . . .  I myself have already to some extent 
proceeded, and in the pages which follow shall proceed still 
farther to show the originality of mind in this way.54
Footnotes are a historian's delight when they express, in a few sentences,
a person's general orientation toward an extremely complex topic. And
this is what we have here. James says that Kant's argument for an a priori
53James's adoption of a type of apiriorism is explicitly admitted 
in the Principles, 2:618.
54James, Principles, 2:664-665. (Italics mine.) This form of 
argument against Kant's formulation of the a priori is evidenced in Spencer's 
Principles, 1:467. James was obviously responding to the Spencerian argu­
ment when he offered a Darwinian interpretation of the a priori.
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element suffers from the fact that his categories are themselves frequently 
encountered in experience! Consider, for example, Kant's hypothetical 
form of judgment, which can be expressed as if A, then B. The question 
is whether this category is derived from or logically prior to experience. 
Given these alternatives, the empiricist could argue that the hypothetical 
form of judgment is merely a generalization from a person's experience 
of two external events— a and b— invariably following one another. Aware 
of this problem, James's search for the a priori centered around psycho­
logical processes which correspond to nothing in the external world.
If found, such processes would be more reasonable candidates for arguing 
for the "originality of the mind."
In carrying out this strategy, James effected an important change 
in the notion of the a priori. That is, the a priori was transformed from 
a fixed set of categories into the general capacities and processes which 
are built into the structure of the human brain. Psychologically, James's 
a priori amounts to a group of functional processes which are correlated 
with the unique structural features of the human brain. We have already 
examined one such process, the expanded memory of humans. We shall now 
turn to the process of conception.
The process responsible for the unique structure of human thinking
is conception and conception, for James, is founded upon the fact that
the "mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think the 
55Same." James called this the principle of constancy in the mind's 
meanings and it stands as the a priori foundation of human thinking. The 
a priori nature of this principle can be seen from two perspectives.
First, James emphasized that this sense of sameness is rooted in the
James, Principles, 1:459.
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"mind's structure a l o n e . T h a t  is, he is speaking of a psychological 
or subjective given rather than an objective sense of sameness— the mind 
imposes sameness on a world that may or may not be offering the same 
things. As he said: "Without the psychological sense of identity same­
ness might rain down upon us from the outer world for ever and we be none 
the wiser.Il"’7 But given this psychological capacity, the thinker approaches 
the world in terms of meanings which remain the same. The principle of 
constant meanings is also a priori in the sense that the meanings created 
are ideal concepts which are able to transcend the spatio-temporal rela­
tions given in experience. That is, in employing this principle the 
human mind is able to create ideal concepts which are more than mere copies 
of things or relations experienced. The concept of white, for example, 
can not be thought of as an image of some white object, as the nominalism 
of empiricism would lead you to believe. Instead, it must be construed 
as one abstract property of an object which a mind has choosen to attend 
to and intend as a conceptual ideal. "Thus," James wrote,
. . . amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the 
world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought about, 
stands stiff and immutable like Plato's Realm of Ideas.58
In other words, no matter how often white objects change into black objects,
or moving objects into stationary ones, what we mean by the concepts of
white and motion remains the same by virtue of the principle of constancy
in the mind's meanings. As concepts, white and motion are aspects of
the sensible flux which have been attended to and intended in a way that
is independent of the particulars of experience.
James effected the transition from isolated concepts to conceptual 
systems by positing another a priori capacity— comparison. For James,
56Ibid. 57Ibid., p. 460. 58Ibid., p. 462.
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comparison is actually a family of a priori activities through which people
judge things to be the same, different or similar. As he said:
In noticing the differences and resemblances of things and 
their degrees, the mind feels its own activity, and has given 
the name comparison thereto.59
In other words, in classifying things as instances of abstract kinds or 
categories, the human mind employs a capacity which is independent of 
experience in two senses. First, James argued that the process of classi­
fication is itself independent of the particulars of experience. Thus he 
wrote that classification into kinds
. . . has nothing to do with the particular order of experi­
ence, or the outer coexistences and sequences of terms. Were it 
a mere outgrowth of habit or association, we should be forced 
to regard it as having no universal validity; for every hour of 
the day we meet things we consider to be of this kind or that, 
but later we learn that they have none of the kind's properties.
. . . Instead, however, of correcting the principle by the cases, 
we correct the cases by the principle.60
That is, no matter how frequently we misclassify a thing as an instance
of an abstract category, we never, as a result of our errors, question
the process of classification itself. In this sense, classification is
a principle which structures, rather than is structured by, experience.
Classification also violates the order of experience in another sense.
In classifying things, the person is able to bring things together which
have never been experienced in close spatio-temporal contiguity.
James's formulation of the genesis of ideal conceptual systems is 
somewhat mysterious and entirely rational. Such systems are alleged to 
be the product of "our free mental play."^ What he seems to mean is 
that a mind gifted with the capacities to create concepts and compare
59Ibid., 2:643. 6°Ibid., pp. 649-650.
^ James, Principles, 2:638.
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them will eventually discover relations between concepts which are wholly
62dependent on the nature of the concepts compared. Thus, for example, 
once the person has learned to ignore the sensible differences between 
different objects and treat them in terms of their abstract numerical
quality, he will discover that "the same number, operated on . . .  in the
63same way will always give the same result." This relation between ideal 
numerical concepts is grounded in what we mean by the concepts rather 
than the actual relations experienced. Thus no matter how many times we 
add drops of water together and continue to obtain one as a result, the 
mathematical principle remains intact. The same basic framework holds 
for the creation of ethical or scientific systems— abstract concepts are 
created and then relations between the ideal concepts are discovered.
Thus there is a clearly rationalistic aspect of James's psychology of 
thinking, the origin, creation or discovery of conceptual systems is in­
dependent of the order of experience.
As we have seen a number of times already, however, James's psy­
chology is an attempt to integrate rationalism and empiricism, and his 
account of thinking is no exception to this rule. Thus he tempered even 
the most rationalistic element of his psychology of thinking with a dose 
of empiricism. The result is what John Wild has called the "testable" 
nature of James's formulation of the a priori.^ For Kant, the cate­
gories of thought are a priori and legislate the structure of all experi­
ence for all time. They are the conditions which the knower must impose 
on any particular thought and as such, they are not open to empirical 
verification. In contrast, James's a priori is, as we have said, a
62Ibid., p. 642. 63Ibid., p. 654.
64Wild, Radical Empiricism of William James, pp. 226-229.
136
general capacity of the human mind to create ideal conceptual systems.
And while the capacity is a priori, the ideal systems created through
its employment are neither universal nor ultimate. As James said:
They stand waiting in the mind, forming a beautiful ideal 
network; and the most we can say is that we hope to discover 
realities over which the network may be flung so that ideal 
and real may coincide.65
In a sense, then, James's a priori can be viewed as an epistemologically 
neutral potential of the human mind. Ideal meanings and comparison can 
be employed to construct any number of internally consistent conceptual 
systems. But there is no guarantee that any one of these systems un­
covers the real structure of reality. Any ideal system must therefore 
be viewed as tentative, an ideal construction which is subject to empiri­
cal verification.
Science, for example, offers us one way of looking at reality, one 
way of structuring and organizing sensible experience. Within the sci­
entific frame of reference, we have a world which is assumed to be in­
habited by ideal entities (e.g., atoms) and governed by ideal relations 
(e.g., mathematical laws). But any ideal system, however much it is 
dependent on a priori capacities for its origin, must, according to James, 
be verified in sensible experience to be recognized as true. Thus, while 
he argued forcefully for the need to posit an a priori element to explain 
scientific thinking, he clearly recognized that the power of science is 
rooted in its empirical nature, "the things of Nature turn out to act 
as if they were of the kind a s s u m e d . O f  course, other conceptual sys­
tems are possible, but they too must be verified in experience; they must 
demonstrate that the "ideal and real coincide."
^James, Principles, 2:665. (Italics mine.)
66Ibid., p. 668.
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James also mentions the systems of metaphysics and ethics as exam­
ples of ideal conceptual systems which, like science, are made possible 
by the a priori capacities of the human mind. These enterprises also 
share another fundamental characteristic with science. That is, science, 
ethics and metaphysics are each rooted in the teleological nature of 
human thought— each seeks to show that the ideals contained in its sys­
tem coincide with the real structure of the world. James stated that the 
areas of experience which metaphysics and ethics seek to systematize are 
less easily accessible to verification but he was unwilling to declare 
these systems barren on this basis alone. Metaphysical and ethical 
ideals serve as valuable guides to our systematic undertakings. The 
metaphysical notion that 'nothing can happen without a cause', for example, 
is a valuable aid to the scientist who continually acts as if this ideal 
were absolute truth. Similarly, the ethical principle that 'man is free' 
is valuable to the moralist who, in believing the principle, continually 
strives for a more just world. In both instances, faith in a contestable 
proposition helps create the world one posits to be real. Thus James's 
psychology of thinking offered a framework and world-view which left 
hope for the future reconciliation between the variety of seemingly con­
flicting conceptual systems.
It cannot be too often repeated that the triumphant application 
of any one of our ideal systems of rational relations to the 
real world justifies our hope that other systems may be found 
also applicable. Metaphysics should take heart from the example 
of physics, simply confessing that hers is a longer task.
Nature may be remodeled, nay, certainly will be remodeled, far 
beyond the point at present reached.67
Thus the ostensibly contradictory ideals of science and ethics may well
be integrated by an as yet undiscovered system of thought.
67Ibid., p. 671.
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In summary, James's account of thinking is perhaps best viewed as 
an integration of rationalism and empiricism which is embedded in a 
teleological formulation of mind. The rationalistic strain is clearly 
evidenced in his suggestion that a priori capacities must be posited to 
explain the origin of ideal conceptual systems. But, as we have said, 
these capacities are epistemological neutral. They allow humans to create 
conceptual systems which function to structure, organize and clarify the 
flux of sense experience. In fulfilling these functions, however, the 
empirical strain of James's psychology of thinking becomes manifest.
That is, the truth of a given conceptual system depends upon its verifi­
cation in experience. The teleological foundation of this integration 
can be seen in his insistence that all conceptual activities are grounded 
in and conditioned by the subjective interests or purposes of the thinker. 
From this perspective, each stage of the process of thinking— abstraction, 
classification, testing— can only be understood within the context of the 
plans, purposes and ideals of the person engaged in that process. We 
shall develop this theme in the next section.
Transitive States and Beliefs:
The Horizon of Values
Thus far we have examined James's reinterpretation of association- 
ism, as well as his formulation of reasoning and the a priori. A theme 
which pervades each of these topics is that human experience is condi­
tioned by the interests of the knower; that dynamic, emotional and aes­
thetic interests play a central role in the structuring of human experi­
ence. Given this, it is important to recognize a fundamental unity 
between James's early analysis of the motives of philosophical belief
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68and his treatment of thinking in the Principles.
In the first chapter we attempted to show that James, between 1874 
and 1884, sought to understand the diversity of philosophical opinion in 
terms of the different emotional and aesthetic ideals which they contain. 
In essence, he argued that philosophical systems, however abstract they 
may appear in print, come wrapped in an inarticulate matrix of emotional 
commitments. Furthermore, he argued that the vague sentimental tendencies 
which suffuse philosophical systems affect one's choice between philos­
ophies; that, all other things being equal, a person's choice between 
philosophies is determined by how compatible that system is with the be­
liever's aesthetic ideals.
In this section we hope to show that James's early analysis of the 
motives of philosophizing served as the working model for his psychology 
of the higher mental processes in the Principles.^ We shall build this 
interpretation by examining two important themes of the Principles, the 
transitive portions of the stream of thought and the psychology of belief. 
In fulfilling this goal we shall explore the implications of the teleo­
logical foundation of James's psychology of thinking.
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The essays are William James's "The Sentiment of Rationality," 
Mind 4 (1879):317-346, reprinted in The Will to Believe, pp. 63-110.
Idem, "Rationality, Activity and Faith," Princeton Review 2 (1882):58—86. 
Idem, "Reflex Action and Theism," Unitarian Review 16 (1881):389-416, 
reprinted in The Will to Believe, pp. 111-144. Page numbers from The 
Will to Believe will be cited whenever possible. Perry, in his Thought 
and Character of William James (l:495ff), first brought attention to 
James's "motives of philosophizing" essays.
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See Perry, Thought and Character of William James, 1:495. Perry 
notes that the substance of these essays was completed during 1877. This 
is one year before James was contracted to write a psychology text. Thus 
James was interested in the 'psychology of philosophy', the psychology 
of philosophical belief, before he began his systematic writing in psy­
chology.
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The distinction between the substantive and transitive portions of 
the stream of thought is a fundamental feature of James's descriptive 
psychology.^  Hume, for example, described mind as a procession of dis­
tinct ideas, "a kind of theater," he wrote, "where several perceptions
71successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away and mingle."
In terms of nineteenth century psychology, we have seen that Wundt's 
method of introspection institutionalized the empiricist concern for 
sensory elements by calling for a description in terms of the various 
contents of mind. In terms of James's distinction, empiricism was acutely 
sensitive to the substantive portions of experience; those seemingly 
stable images or sensations which seem to dominate experience. Beyond 
their stability and imaginal nature, these portions are easily labeled 
in terms of the objects they represent. From James's perspective, the 
nameability of these portions of the stream was a perniciously important 
feature, because that which could not be easily named was ignored and 
then explicitly denied! This position, taken to its extreme, can be seen 
in the nominalistic systems of Berkeley and Hume, who denied the possi­
bility of forming an abstract idea.
It was with this trend in mind that James called for the recognition
of the importance of the transitive portions of experience. He argued that
experience is more analogous to the "life of a bird," with its "flights
72and perchings," than Hume's theater of mingling ideas. In this analogy, 
the perchings or resting places are the sensorial images of the empiricist
70
The distinction first appeared in William James's "Some Omissions 
of Introspective Psychology," Mind 9 (1884):1-26.
71David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge 




tradition, what James called the substantive portions. He certainly did 
not deny the presence or importance of the substantive portions, but he 
did proclaim rather boldly thht "the definite images of traditional psy­
chology form but the very smallest part of our minds as they actually 
73live." This is an audacious challenge to a psychology which had been 
dominated by the analysis of sensational contents. But James sought to 
make clear that inarticulate schemes of relations surrounded each sub­
stantive state like a halo or fringe and that dimly felt feelings of 
direction suffused and united the successive substantive states. He was 
fully aware of the difficulty involved in describing these transitive 
states in verbal terms:
As a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer 
a crystal but a drop, so instead of catching the feeling of 
relation moving to its term, we find we have caught some 
substantive thing, usually the last word we are pronouncing.
But despite this difficulty, he pointed to the pervasiveness of these por­
tions of experience, "a good third of our psychic life consists in these 
rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of thought not yet arti­
culate."^ Confronted with the felt vagueness of the flow of experience 
as it actually appears, he asserted that his notion of the transitive
states was aimed at "the reinstatement of the vague to its proper place
76in our mental life." These must surely seem like strange utterances 
to the contemporary psychologist, but we must not let James's rhetoric 
keep us from the descriptive richness of his formulation of experience.
We must go beyond what he says about these states and focus on his de­
scriptions.
73Ibid., p. 255. 74Ibid., p. 244.
75Ibid., p. 253. 76Ibid., p. 254.
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As soon as we do this the revolutionary nature of James's descrip­
tion becomes manifest. He is not only challenging the traditional way of 
describing experience, he is seeking to replace the very terms employed 
in such a description. But revolutions, however eye-opening, tend to be 
unsystematic; and James's notion of the transitive portions is no excep­
tion to this rule. A German reviewer of the Principles expressed exas­
peration at the diversity of phenomena he found in James's treatment of
the transitive states and he was critical of James for not setting down
77organizing principles for classificatory purposes. In lieu of a 
systematic exposition, James offers the reader a long series of examples; 
brilliant, timeless descriptions of long-overlooked aspects of experience 
but without apparent organization. Happily, recent scholarship has begun 
the task of formulating the underlying structure in James's descriptions. 
Working from a phenomenological perspective, Aron Gurwitsch has articu­
lated what might be called the temporal and cognitive horizons in this 
aspect of James's psychology. Though we shall add another, distinctively 
Jamesian, horizon to Gurwitsch's analysis, his interpretation can serve 
as a valuable introduction to an extremely complex topic.
In a very early paper Gurwitsch argued that a fundamentally new 
conception of consciousness appears in James's discussion of the transi­
tive states, a conception which he said is "defined in terms of tempo- 
78rality." This is certainly true. The transitive portions are the means 
through which James pressed for the sensible continuity of the past,
77Aron Gurwitsch, "William James’ Theory of the Transitive Parts 




present and future. In the second chapter we examined James's account
of the given connectedness of the past-to-the-present in his analysis of
the feeling of thunder. Instead of describing this feeling as an isolated
impression, he noted the importance of the silence which interpenetrates
and feeds into the experience of thunder. Although the silence has passed
in objective, external time, his description of the feeling as thunder-
breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it makes clear that the past,
in experiential terms, is contained in the present. For James, a
primitive and dimly perceived "fading echo" mingles with and reverberates 
80into the present. This vaguely felt transition from the past-to-the-
present is at the basis of his argument for the continuity of experience;
and this continuity is a perfectly general characteristic of experience
as it actually appears. Imagine, for example, someone bursting into my
office while I am writing. I am, for a moment, disoriented and my first
reactions to my intruder are dimly but very definitely colored by the
feeling that I have been interrupted. Note, however, that this inarticulate
sense of having been interrupted is not composed of sensorial images.
Similarly, the silence which is broken by the thunder is not an image
or auditory echo. Instead, it might be better described as a dimly felt
background of experience which is indigenous to the transition from
silence to thunder. Thus Gurwitsch rightly pointed out that James was
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The transition from the present-to-future also finds its way into 
James's discussion of the transitive portions in the Principles; and 
again the transition is accomplished by indistinct portions of the fringes 
of experience. He mentions "attitudes of expectancy" and "signs of direc­
tion" as two definite but only dimly perceived classes of experience
82through which the present melts unsuspectingly into the future. In 
another place he offers the 'intention to say something before it is said' 
as an example of what he has in mind. This is a perfectly definite 
feeling which points toward but precedes the actual utterance. Further­
more, this indistinct feeling has an effect on the substantive portions 
of experience. Thus we sometimes say, after finishing an utterance—
"No, that's not what I mean!"— even before our listener has responded.
It seems, then, that our intention to say something is retained and checked 
at some level with the actual utterance. In comtemporary terms, it might 
be called a self-monitoring device of some sort. I have carried this 
example a bit beyond James to make clear that his formulation of the 
transitive portions is not simply an exercise in psychological descrip­
tion. James maintained that the transitive portions have an important
function, although they are themselves devoid of sensorial content. He
83also examined the experience of trying to recall a forgotten name.
Again, we have a definite feeling emerging from the past, filling our
present and pointing intensely toward the future but again the feeling
is imageless. Thus every pulse of thought, what he called the "specious
present," contains a vague halo of the past and an inarticulate anticipa- 
84tion of the future.
82
James, Principles, 1:251-252.
83Ibid., p. 251. 84Ibid., 1:609.
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In a later work Gurwitsch examined another dimension of James's
treatment of the transitive states, one which is contemporaneous with the
temporal horizon. That is, James observed that any substantive portion
or idea appears surrounded and suffused by a "fringe" or "halo of rela- 
85tions." Like the feelings of temporal continuity, the fringe of felt 
relations is imageless and only dimly perceived by the thinker. The 
process James is describing in formulating the substantive portion-fringe 
relationship is perhaps best communicated through a perceptual analogy.
That is, he is pointing to the non-perceptual analogue of the figure- 
ground relationship. Like the figure of perceptual experience, the idea 
or topic of thought stands out in clear focus as the central theme or 
problem toward which our thinking is directed. In other words, the topic 
of thought is the thing attended to— our reason for thinking. Surrounding 
this clearly felt topic, however, is a dim background or network of rela­
tions which form the frame of reference within which the problem appears. 
Again, James does not provide a systematic exposition of his notion of 
the fringe but from the examples he gives it is clear that it represents 
a terribly complex, multi-layered process. He notes, for example, that 
the rules of grammar are dimly felt in the periphery of experience and 
determine the sequence of words spoken:
A noun in a certain position demands a verb in a certain mood 
and number . . . .  Adjectives call for nouns, verbs for ad­
verbs . . . .  And this foreboding of the coming grammatical 
scheme combined with each successive uttered word is so prac­
tically accurate that a reader incapable of understanding 
four ideas of the book he is reading aloud, can nevertheless 
read it with the most delicately modulated expression of
intelligence.86
He also suggested that the "sense of familiarity" is supplied by the fringe 
85Ibid., p. 256. 86Ibid., p. 254.
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87of relations. This is the feeling that the present thought is the same 
as, or of the same kind as, a previous thought. In the last section we 
saw that classification into kinds is an a priori activity of the human 
mind. We now see that the appropriateness of any particular classifica­
tion is signaled by an inarticulate but very definite feeling in the 
fringe. James also alluded to the operational nature of thinking in his 
discussion of the fringe, the fact that thinking involves operating on 
symbols and relations. With respect to the cognitive or symbolic nature
of thinking, he quoted a lengthy passage from G. H. Lewes in support of
88the proposition that thought is a kind of algebra. These examples make 
clear that the notion of the fringe is a multi-layered structure which 
contains a truly heterogeneous group of phenomena. In hopes of providing 
some degree of order, we might anticipate James's conclusion and state 
that he is going to describe the process of thinking in terms of a par­
ticular type of relationship between the terms or symbols in the fringe
and those present in the topic of thought.
In contemporary terms, it might be said that the fringe was formu­
lated to do justice to the role of the cognitive horizon in thinking—  
the fact that any idea appears within a network of related ideas, a 
complex scaffolding of conceptual relations. The horizonal nature of the 
fringe is perhaps most clearly evidenced in James's suggestion that the 
meaning of any idea is provided by the fringe:
The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of
our thought. It is one of those evanescent and 'transitive' 
facts of mind which introspection cannot turn upon . . . .
In the (somewhat clumsy) terminology I have used, it pertains 
to the 'fringe' of the subjective state, and it is a feeling 
of tendency whose neural counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of g^  
dawning and dying processes too faint and complex to be traced.
87Ibid., p. 252. 88Ibid., p. 270. 89Ibid., p. 472.
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Having recognized the symbolic nature of thought, James is calling for 
what might be called a cognitive horizon formulation of meaning, a formu­
lation in which ideas appear escorted by a network of semantic relations. 
What he is reacting against is the correspondence theory of meaning. 
According to the latter formulation, meaning or knowledge is understood 
to be an image of the thing signified, the mental correlate of the 
external object. My thought of a man, for example, was thought to 
involve a mental image of some kind of a particular man. James criticized 
this account as a "preposterously false descriptive psychology" and an
examination of a few of his examples will make clear why he was unsym-
90pathetic with this account. He examines the meaning of man in two 
sentences— "What a wonderful man Jones is!" and "What a wonderful thing 
Man is!" In both sentences the same sound— man— is uttered but the word 
is intended and understood in two distinctively different senses in these 
sentences. His fundamental contention is that the difference in these 
meanings is not reducible to a difference in images, in the substantive 
portion of the stream. Having established this, he went on to argue that 
the different meanings of the word man are supplied by the fringes which 
surround the utterances. Thus the same word can mean different things 
depending on the penumbral halo of relations which surround one's utter­
ances. And however vague these halos might be, James argued that they 
are essential to the psychology of meaning. He also noted that entirely
different words or phrases can have the same meaning if they are escorted
91by the same fringe of relations. There is no paradox in this position, 
he wrote, if one recognizes that words or images can be taken in two 
senses, as physical stimuli— "qua sensations"— and as meanings— "qua
90Ibid., p. 471. 91Ibid., p. 269.
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92thoughts, qua sensations understood." In other words, James saw the
need for distinguishing between two levels of meaning, what might be 
called the surface and deep levels; and he recognized that the deep level 
could only be understood by articulating the cognitive horizon which 
surrounds a particular word or idea.
Gurwitsch employed the notion of the fringe in offering his own
93phenomenological account of thinking. But there is something distinc­
tively unJamesian in Gurwitsch's account. That is, he makes no mention 
of the interests of the knower, a construct which we have argued is cen­
tral to James’s psychology of thinking. By surveying his treatment of 
the transitive states we hope to show that the notion of interests is a 
fundamental constituent of James's formulation of thinking, as fundamental 
as the sensible continuity or symbolic nature of thinking. In other words, 
without denying that James recognized the cognitive nature of thought, 
we shall try to show that he demanded more of his psychology of thinking 
and that this something more is an explicit recognition of the role of 
the subjective interests of the thinker.
Prima facie evidence for this interpretation is not difficult to
find; remember that James posited that the interested nature of thought
94is one of its five essential characteristics. More detailed evidence
can also be found in his descriptions of the fringe. He wrote, for
example, that "the significance, the value, of the image is all in the
95halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it." He is referring to
more than cognitive meaning in this statement, he is alluding to the
92Ibid., p. 261.
93Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 307-365.
94 95James, Principles. 1:284-288. *JIbid., p. 255.
149
value of an idea, its specific relation to the present purpose of our 
thinking. Hodgson had taught James that cognitive relations, in and of 
themselves, were too numerous to explain the particular path taken in 
thought. What was needed was the recognition that the interests of the 
knower function to select the particular direction or flow of thought.
Thus James suggested that the primary function of the transitive states 
is "to lead from one substantive conclusion to another.Interests, 
felt in the fringe, function to select the most relevant cognitive rela­
tions offered in the stream. In this way, the particular interest or 
purpose stands within the vaguely felt background of awareness and guides 
and directs the flow of thought. As James wrote:
Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in 
the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, 
of furtherance or hindrance. . . . When the sense of furtherance 
is there we are 'all right'; with the sense of hindrance we are 
dissatisfied and perplexed and cast about us for other thoughts.
Now any thought . . . whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all 
right', is an acceptable member of our thinking . . . .  Provided 
we only feel it to have a place in the scheme of relations in 
which the interesting topic lies, that is quite sufficient to 
make of it a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of
ideas.97
This passage stands at the foundation of our interpretation for a number 
of reasons. At one level, this description of what goes on in thinking 
corroborates James's teleological account of reasoning. For James, 
thinking begins with a consciously felt interest or purpose in some seg­
ment of the stream, a desire to discover the means to a clearly envisioned 
end. But when the cognitive operations of thinking begin, i.e., selecting, 
classifying, searching for alternatives, this superordinate interest or 
purpose recedes into the dim background of our awareness. At this stage,
96Ibid., p. 243. 97Ibid., p. 259. (Italics mine.)
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our attention is focused on particular cognitive relations. In terms of
the figure-ground analogy, the cognitive relations become the figure and
the interest recedes to the ground. In moving to the background, however,
James says that the interest continues to be felt and continues having
an important effect on our thinking. The superordinate interest effects
thinking by guiding the selection of particularly interesting or relevant
cognitive relations. This effect is experienced as a dimly felt "feeling
of harmony," that distinctive relation between a particular cognition
and the purpose of thought. If one idea feels particularly relevant it
is brought into clear focus in thought and, if a feeling of harmony is
experienced, the person continues working out that idea until the desired
end is reached or discord is felt. If the latter feeling appears first,
we withdraw our attention from the discordant idea and return to the
original purpose and begin the process again. One must not underestimate
the importance of these transient feelings of harmony and discord. They
play an essential role in James's psychology of thinking. As he wrote,
"the most important element of the fringe is . . . the mere feeling of
98harmony or discord, of right or wrong direction in our thought." These 
feelings continually monitor the relation between the interests and cog­
nitions of the thinker.
It is also important to note that James's description of the role 
of feelings of harmony and discord in thinking in the Principles is 
remarkably similar to his analysis of the nature of philosophical belief. 
Remember that James posed the question of how the philosopher recognizes 
a rational answer to a problem in his 1879 essay, "The Sentiment of
98Ibid., p. 261.
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99Rationality." The answer he offered at that time was that a rational 
answer is accompanied by an inarticulate but very distinctive feeling, 
which he called the sentiment of rationality. In his 1879 essay he de­
scribed this experience as a "strong feeling of ease," or "perfect fluency" 
in thought, or as simply a feeling of " r e l i e f . I n  contrast, an un­
satisfactory solution is accompanied by a "state of puzzlement and per­
plexity" or "distress. His early analysis of philosophical belief
sought to demonstrate that the aesthetic ideals and interests of the 
philosopher play an important role in determining just what sort of system 
will produce these feelings of "ease" or "distress." What we are arguing 
is that the same basic model underlies James's account of thinking in 
general in the Principles, but by 1890 he had developed the sentiment of 
rationality into the notion of the fringe. There can be no doubt that 
James himself was aware that his formulation of thinking in the Principles 
was an elaboration and extension of the model he first articulated in his 
analysis of philosophical belief in the late 1870's. In both he says
that the process of thinking is governed by the absence of feelings of
. .  . 102 discord.
99James, The Will to Believe, pp. 63-110.
^^Ibid., pp. 63-64. ^*Ibid., p. 63.
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In the Principles, for example, James wrote that "the feeling 
of rationality . . . seems rather a negative than a positive thing, 
being the mere absence of shock, or sense of discord, between the terms 
of thought" 1:263-264. Compare this with the fundamental thesis of 
his "The Sentiment of Rationality" essay of 1879; that the sentiment 
of rationality "seems to be a negative rather than positive character." 
He then goes on to ask:
"Shall we then say that the feeling of rationality is constituted 
merely by the absense of any feeling of irrationality? I think 
there are very good reasons for upholding this view" pp. 63-64.
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In his early analysis of philosophical belief, James conceived of 
philosophical systems as a kind of projective test for intellectuals in 
the sense that they reveal a person's commitment to aesthetic and meta­
physical ideals which are unprovable. They disclose a person's fundamental 
world-view, which James argued was based on a teleological act of faith.
Now if he really is extending his motives of philosophical belief model 
to thinking in general in the Principles, one would expect to find that 
a thinker's fundamental metaphysical commitments play a central role in 
James's psychology of thinking. In fact, these fundamental metaphysical 
commitments do appear in James's psychology of thinking in the Principles 
as a very special layer of interests. In recognizing this fact we arrive 
at the paradoxical core of James's treatment of the higher mental pro­
cesses, a theme appears which is continuous with his earlier work and it 
becomes the source of both richness and contradictions. His position can 
be stated in any number of ways. Most simply, James is contending that 
thinking (cognition) is embedded in and conditioned by feeling (the 
thinker's aesthetic ideals). In terms which James might have used, we 
might say that thinking is inextricably interwoven with the emotional 
beliefs of the person engaged in thinking. In contemporary terms, it 
might be said that thinking always implies valuing, or that the cognitive 
horizon is suffused by a horizon of values.
Until now we have used the concept of interest rather loosely to 
denote a covert valuing process which becomes manifest in the knower's 
selection of particular aspects of phenomena. In fact, James himself uses 
the concept rather loosely throughout the Principles, although an impor­
tant distinction in his usage is discernable. At one level, he describes 
the knower as interested in achieving particular ends before he begins
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searching for whatever means which are available. This is the way he 
uses the concept of interests the vast majority of the time. We have 
called this the transient teleology in James's account of reasoning, or 
we might speak of the interests of the knower with a small *i'. In this 
sense, the means are wholly subordinate to the ends. This transient 
teleology is fully compatible with the biological-functional strain in 
James's psychology, a strain which conceives of mind as an organ or tool 
for adapting to the ever changing environment. This sense of interests 
admits the biologically obvious— that mind is wholly dependent upon the 
continued integrity of the body for survival.
But in presenting his psychology of belief, which occurs in his 
"Perception of Reality" chapter of the Principles, a deeper and more 
pervasive level of Interests emerges. This level of Interests, with a 
capital 'I', does not refer to a person's transient adaptations to his 
environment. At this level, the means become at least as important as 
the ends. This deeper realm of Interests refers to the relatively stable 
complex of metaphysical commitments which the person believes to be the 
most valuable way of viewing reality. It is, in fact, the thinker's 
tacitly-held world-view, which we have called the fundamental teleology 
in James's early thought. And like his analysis of philosophical belief, 
he rooted this fundamental teleology in the thinker's emotional consti­
tution. Thus, not only will the thinker strive to make the world intel­
ligible, he will also strive to make its intelligibility compatible with 
his fundamental emotional sensitivities. As a way of orienting oneself 
in the world, James's fundamental teleology gives notice to the fact that 
thinking of any form implicates and emerges from a horizon of values. If 
James's transient teleology gives notice to the fact that the thinker
154
approaches any problem with plans of action, then his fundamental teleology
gives notice to the fact that all the specific plans and purposes are
grounded in a Life Plan which the thinker is continually trying to verify.
As we have seen, James analyzed philosophical belief with the hope
of showing that different philosophers work on different "orders of real- 
103ity." Similarly, in the Principles he speaks of the various "orders" 
or "sub-universes of reality;" but now he distinguishes seven sub-uni­
verses in hopes of accounting for every shade of human belief. The seven 
are:
(1) The world of sense, or of physical 'things' as we instinc­
tively apprehend them . . .
(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the learned 
conceive them . . .
(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths believed 
or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathematical, 
metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic propositions.
(4) The world of 'idols of the tribe', illusions or prejudices 
common to the race . . .
(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian heaven and 
hell, the world of Hindoo mythology . . . etc. Each of these
a consistent system . . .
(6) The various worlds of individual opinion . . .
(7) The worlds of sheer madness and vagary . . .104
He distinguished these sub-universes as a preliminary attempt to formulate 
the very general frames of reference in which human thinking takes place: 
"Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another 
of this or some similar list."^^^ In this sense, the sub-universes are 
an essential aspect of James's psychology of thinking as well as belief.
They become, for James, the real life categories of human thought. But in 
calling the sub-universes categories or general frames of reference, we 
must make clear that James was speaking of more than knowledge systems
103James, The Will to Believe, p. 65.
104James, Principles, 2:292-293. 105Ibid., p. 293.
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per se. The notion of personal values permeates James's formulation of 
the sub-universes, and these values are rooted in the person’s emotional 
make-up:
. . . reality means simply relation to our emotional and 
active life. This is the only sense which the word ever has 
in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever excites 
and stimulates our interest is real; whenever an object so ap­
peals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind with 
it . . .  so far it is real for us, and we believe it. Whenever, 
on the contrary, we ignore it, fail to consider it . . .  so far
it is unreal for us and disbelieved.106
Beyond their emotional basis, a number of features of James's formulation 
of the sub-universes deserve to be made explicit. First, note that James 
places attention at the center of his formulation of psychological real­
ity (or belief)— what is attended to is ipso facto real and what is 
ignored is unreal. Thus the sub-universes of reality have a rather pre­
carious existence for James, "each world whilst it is attended to is 
real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention. 
Thus, for example, a scientist leaves the 'world of sense' and enters a 
very special enclave of the 'world of sense' when his child or wife enters
his laboratory. Again, when he is teaching, his students bring him face
to face with the 'world of opinion'; and when our scientist sits down at 
night to read a novel he enters the tenuous but entertaining 'world of 
vagary' (fantasy). These transitions between the various sub-universes 
are commonplace but generally unrecognized happenings and they depend upon 
changes in attention. As one might suspect, this view of reality brings 
us perilously close to a rampant subjectivism. James himself sees this 
as an unavoidable conclusion at some level: "The fons et origo of all real­
ity, whether from the absolute or practical point of view, is thus subjec­
tive, is ourselves.11
106Ibid., p. 295. 107Ibid., p. 293. 108Ibid., pp. 296-297.
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James also notes that each sub-universe has "its own special and
109separate style of existence." This characteristic is as important as 
it is commonplace and obvious. What he is referring to here is that each 
sub-universe has its own, somewhat unique, criteria of credibility and 
its own particular region of applicability. In a sense, each sub-universe 
is conditioned by the demands, possibilities and limitations of its own 
region of experience. An old adage, for example, might be positively 
false within some sub-universes but to the extent that it serves as a 
valuable and reliable guide to action in our common-sense world, it will 
continue to be believed. Again, James seems to be heading toward an 
untenable subjectivism in his attempt to do justice to all regions of 
human experience. If he was a pure logician he would have to choose 
between the variety of sub-universes and present one set of criteria for 
belief. But James is writing as a psychologist and his task is to do 
justice to all regions of human experience; he is concerned with thinking 
as it actually occurs in human beings rather than an abstract schematiza- 
tion of how people ought to think to arrive at absolute truth. And the 
psychological fact is that people face a wide variety of situations in 
their lives and they employ a variety of criteria to come up with answers 
to different types of problems. Thus James’s recognition that different 
sub-universes have separate and somewhat unique styles of existence is a 
brilliant psychological observation, however inappropriate it might be 
as a formulation of truth.
James sought to escape an untenable subjectivism by offering two 
general criteria for true belief (or knowledge). He presents the first 
as nothing more or less than the verifiability principle in science:
109Ibid., p. 291.
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. . .  no mere floating conception, no mere disconnected rarity, 
ever displaces vivid things or permanent things in our belief. A 
conception, to prevail, must terminate in the world of orderly 
experience . . . .  What science means by *verification1 is no more 
than this . . . .  Sensible objects are thus our realities or the 
tests of our realities. Conceived objects must show sensible 
effects or else be disbelieved. HO
He later elaborated this criterion for belief into his pragmatic concep­
tion of meaning, and then truth, but we are concerned with his psychology 
rather than his philosophy. Within this context, it is imperative to 
note that James's criterion for belief falls significantly short of 
rigorous scientific verifiability in practice. That is, he states that, 
to be believed, a proposition "must terminate in the world of orderly 
experience." In other words, a proposition will be believed if its effects 
are manifest in sensible experience. Conversely, a proposition will not 
be believed it if does not have any sensible effects. But, as any number 
of critics of pragmatism have noted, there is a difference between pro­
viding a scientific verification of a proposition and showing that it has 
an effect in sensible experience. That is, there are some classes of 
statements which can not be verified scientifically but which can be con­
strued as producing effects in sensible experience. The most obvious 
example is, of course, metaphysical statements. Thus propositions like 
'Man is free' or 'Everything has a cause' are not verifiable but it can 
be argued that they do have important effects in sensible experience.
The former gives the moralist the energy needed to continue striving to 
accomplish the seemingly impossible, e.g., to wipe out evil. The latter 
gives the scientist the energy to continue striving for his impossible, 
e.g., to build a unified understanding of the universe and wipe out ignor­
ance. In other words, as ideals, these metaphysical statements have
*^Ibid., p. 301. (James's italics.)
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important effects in experience although neither is strictly verifiable. 
And taken psychologically, both are believed (by some people) and both 
function to create the somewhat different styles of existence for their 
particular sub-universe.
The second general criterion which James presents is that a prop­
osition will be believed only if it does not contradict some already 
established belief. Belief, wrote James, is the "mental function of 
cognizing reality," and as such, it is experienced as an inarticulate but 
distinct feeling of harmony or non-contradiction.*** For James, then, a
proposition is believed if it produces a "cessation of theoretical agita- 
112
tion." The opposite of belief is experienced as a feeling of discord
113and it leads to the activities of "doubt and inquiry." When this de­
scription of belief and doubt is taken in conjunction with the notion of 
a variety of sub-universes, we have a kind of 'struggle for existence' 
between beliefs, with propositions competing with one another within a 
given sub-universe. The loser of any particular struggle finds itself 
'hustled and bandied about' among the various other sub-universes until it 
finds a region where it is not contradicted. Thus, for example, while a 
moral postulate may contradict established beliefs in the sub-universe of 
science, it will come to rest uncontradicted, and even warmly welcomed, 
in the sub-universe of ideal, ethical relations. The philosophical ques­
tion which begs to be answered is how one determines which of two contra­
dictory propositions is true when they come to rest uncontradicted in 
different sub-universes. That is, is there a criterion to settle disputes 
between James's sub-universes? The fact is that James avoided the philo­
sophical question in the Principles, although he spent the rest of his life
111 112 113Ibid., p. 283. Ibid. Ibid., p. 284.
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trying to answer it. In the Principles, however, we do find a psycho­
logical answer to this question and it leads us directly to the fundamental 
teleology in James's psychology of thinking.
James answers this question, and inserts what we have called a
fundamental teleology, in the following seemingly innocuous passage:
Each thinker . . . has dominant habits of attention; and these 
practically elect from among the various worlds some one to be 
for him the world of ultimate realities. From this world's 
objects he does not appeal. Whatever positively contradicts 
them must get into another world or die.H4
In terms of the text, he has just finished stating that the different sub­
universes have separate and special styles of existence. Now, with this 
passage, he answers the question of how real people settle real life dis­
putes between the claims of different sub-universes. The answer is 
strikingly simple, but it has far-reaching implications for a psychology 
of thinking. His answer is that each individual comes to choose the one 
sub-universe which is most compatible with his emotional constitution.
As he wrote:
The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities is 
thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional 
term. . . . Whatever things have intimate and continuous con­
nection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt.
This dominant sub-universe is the person's court of last appeal, his ul­
timate reality. In terms of a psychology of thinking, it might be said 
that a person's most serious work emerges from and is conditioned by his 
passionate commitment to a world-view which is itself unverifiable! It 
is as if a structured horizon of values comes to be superimposed upon the 
horizon of knowledge and effects a rearrangement and reorganization of
HA
Ibid., pp. 293-294. (Italics mine.)
^'’ibid., pp. 297-298. (Italics mine.)
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valued meanings which function as that person's Life Plan. In fact, it 
seems more reasonable to say that a person's horizon of values determines 
the content of his knowledge by leading him toward areas which are most 
compatible with his values. Whatever the case may be, the important thing 
for James is that our seemingly objective knowledge stands on a foundation 
which is itself unprovable and a function of our emotional tendencies.
All human beings begin their lives with the practical 'world of
sense' holding the preeminent and irrefutable position. This is a world
filled with objects and subjects and things that must be done to survive.
Other sub-universes may possess a reality of sorts but "these things are
116usually real with a less real reality than . . . the world of sense."
The person who never relinquishes the practical 'world of sense' displays, 
in his orientation and actions, an emotional commitment to a set of tacit­
ly-held beliefs which act to structure and organize his experience. The 
assumptions, values and beliefs of this world-view represent the funda­
mental teleology of the layman; and he imposes this world-view onto all 
experience and creates a more or less organized whole from a chaos of 
sensory flux. Of course, his world-view is partial— he may be unimpressed 
with the ideal worlds of theoretical science or religion unless they 
directly touch his world— but his world-view is the means through which 
he confers truth and reality to certain objects of experience.
Of course, other world-views are possible; humans, according to 
James, have the a priori capacity to create ideal conceptual systems which 
function as alternatives to the 'world of sense'. But any other world-view 
is also partial and it also both contains and reveals a fundamental tele­
ology which is rooted in the inarticulate emotional commitments of the
116Ibid., p. 294.
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thinker. The scientist, for example, subordinates the 'world of sense' 
to the abstract terms and relations of the 'world of science'. But this 
world is also founded on unprovable emotional commitments and its unique 
style of existence makes atoms in motion and universal laws the ultimate 
realities. For the scientist, these terms and relations contain an aes­
thetic beauty which is unparalleled in the cruder 'world of sense'. And 
thus he too imposes the assumptions, values and beliefs of his ideal 
world onto experience in an attempt to transform a chaos into a rigorous, 
logically consistent whole. But the only way he can accomplish this
transformation is to be partial or selective; to ignore some, and explicitly
deny the reality of other, aspects of experience in favor of those real­
ities which his fundamental teleology claims to be the 'most real reality'. 
With regard to the selectivity of the scientist's world, James wrote 
quite frankly that the concepts of science:
. . . are never matters of experience at all, but have to be
disengaged from under experience by a process of elimination, 
that is, by ignoring conditions which are always present. The 
elementary laws of mechanics, physics and chemistry are all of 
this sort. The principle of uniformity is of this sort; it has 
to be sought under and in spite of the most rebellious appear­
ances . . . .117
In other words, the process of science is a very human process, with its 
practitioners making a determined effort to show that the real world really 
is as their ideal system describes it. But the attempt of science to 
show that the 'ideal and real coincide' is grounded, like any other at­
tempt to reconcile the ideal and real, in the emotional and aesthetic 
interests of the thinker. Thus James wrote that:
The conceiving or theorizing faculty works exclusively for the 
sake of ends that do not exist in the world of impressions . . .
^^Ibid., p. 636. (James's italics.)
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but are set by our emotional and practical subjectivity. It is 
a transformer of the world of our impressions into . . . the 
world of our conception; and the transformation is effected in 
the interests of the volitional nature, and for no other purpose
whatsoever.
This conclusion, which stands at the foundation of James's psychology of 
thinking, should sound familiar, for it is the same conclusion he obtained 
in his analysis of the motives of philosophizing. For a psychology of 
thinking, it means that human conception is forever embedded in and con­
ditioned by the fundamental teleology of the thinker. Thinking, like nny 
other aspect of human existence, involves a teleological act of faith; 
and before we can understand human thought, we must understand the emo­
tional and aesthetic ideals which the thinker believes are the most accu­
rate representation of reality. This means that every ideal, logically 
consistent way of conceiving of the world is grounded in an inarticulate, 
tacitly-held world-view. In other words, every concrete, potentially 
answerable question emerges from a world-view which is unprovable and 
dripping with value judgments which serve to guide the person's thought.
We have covered an enormous amount of heterogeneous material in 
this chapter; a critique of philosophical associationism, an account of 
reasoning which was aimed at distinguishing human from brute intellect, 
a biological interpretation of Kant's a priori and lastly, a conception 
of experience which sought to bring the person's dimly felt interests and 
purposes back into the psychology of thinking. In the midst of this 
heterogeneity, however, there lies a fundamental unity which all the 
particular formulations and critiques stem from. This theme is a teleo­
logical conception of mind. James's critique of a passive interpretation
1 1 Q
Ibid., p. 634. (Italics mine.)
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of associationism set the stage for a formulation of reasoning which 
emphasized the interested, purposive nature of human experience. But 
his account of reasoning raised further questions, most importantly, how 
is it that humans are able to deal with objects in terms of their essen­
tial properties. In answering this question James offered a unique, 
biological interpretation of the a priori, an interpretation which tied 
the process of conception to the purposes and interests of the conceiver. 
Finally, this interpretation of the a priori gave rise to a conception of 
human nature in which human beings are passionately striving to show that 
the flux of sensory experience is really only a working out, in concrete 
form, of a system of ideal terms and relations. We began this chapter
with an excerpt in which James said that the "whole man within us is at
119work when we form our philosophical opinions." We have tried to show 
that the "whole man"— with his intellectual, volitional, aesthetic and 
emotional demands— is also at the foundation of James's formulation of 
the higher mental processes in the Principles.
119James, "Rationality, Activity, and Faith," p. 74. (Italics mine.)
CHAPTER 4
JAMES’S INTEGRATION OF NATIVISM AND EMPIRICISM: 
PERCEPTUAL REALISM
I must say a word or two on your articles now appearing in Mind, 
on the "Perception of Space." I don't know anything that has 
given me greater pleasure, or excited more genuine admiration 
in my mind, than these articles. . . . You are working out in 
detail, and with psychological proofs, my very conception of 
space as an inseparable but distinguishable element of certain 
classes of sensations . . . [Hodgson to James, April 8, 1887]. *
I'm glad you smiled on Santayana . . . and still gladder you 
smiled on my space articles, which were all written out seven 
years ago. I always supposed myself that they were but a filling 
out of your Time and Space framework [James to Hodgson, April 18,
1887] .2
The articles which Hodgson is expressing admiration for in the above 
letter are a series of four essays which James published in the journal 
Mind during 1887. They were later revised, integrated and republished as 
the "Space Perception" chapter of the Principles. The goal of this chap­
ter is simply to understand what James meant when he said that his account 
of space was "but a filling out" of Hodgson's "Time and Space framework."
We shall argue that Hodgson's method of reflection, and the new conception 
of experience which it produced, formed the essence of the "framework" of 
James's formulation of space perception. Specifically, we shall attempt 
to show that these elements of Hodgson's philosophy stood at the foundation
Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of Williams James,
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:641-642. (Italics mine.) 
Hereafter cited as Perry, Williams James.
^Ibid., p. 642. (Italics mine.)
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of James's critique of, and alternative to, the empiricist account of 
space. In the process, we shall present James's explanation of the per­
ception of spatial attributes as an attempt to integrate nativism and 
empiricism through a perceptual realism which emphasizes selective atten­
tion.
Realism is a position which states that material objects exist
externally to us and independent of our perception of them. These objects
are conceived of as emitting a wide variety of patterns of physical energy
which are structured by other sources in the environment. Put simply,
the perceptual realist conceives of the perceiver as possessing mechanisms
(e.g., sense organs, perceptual structures) which allow him to perceive
and respond to a subset of the objective properties of objects. As such,
the properties of external objects are directly apprehended by the per-
3
ceiver in perception. From the context of nineteenth century philosophy 
and psychology, this doctrine can be distinguished from idealism and 
phenomenalism. In the words of Berkeley, the originator of modern idealism 
as well as the empiricist account of space, esse is percipi— "to be is to 
be perceived."^ For the idealist, objects simply do not exist apart from 
our perception of them. Phenomenalism can be viewed as a refinement of 
idealism. It states that the perceiver is only immediately aware of his 
own mental states, which nineteenth century philosophers and psychologists 
called sensations. The phenomenalist sought to reduce material objects 
to particular combinations or groups of sensations, transitory events which 
the perceiver learns to locate in the external world. Phenomenalism can
3




be viewed as an improvement on the intuitively offensive doctrine of 
idealism in the sense that material objects came to be defined in terms 
of groups of possible as well as actual sensations. Thus John Stuart 
Mill defined matter as "groups of permanent possibilities of sensation," 
thereby evading the position that objects cease to exist when not per­
ceived.^ We shall find James rejecting the phenomenalistic accounts of 
empiricism and offering a unique version of perceptual realism.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section 
we shall examine James's critique of the empiricist account of the origin 
of spatial attributes. The aim here is to show that he employed Hodgson's 
critique of elementism to refute the empiricist attempt to create spatial 
attributes from the association of non-spatial sensations. In the second 
section we shall examine James's nativistic formulation of the direct 
apprehension of primitive spatial attributes. In addition to the impor­
tance of Hodgson, it will be argued that James's commitment to a percep­
tual realism underlies the nativistic strain of his account. The latter 
theme will be explored more fully in the last section, where we shall 
examine James's attempt to retain a perceptual realism while acknowledging 
the importance of intellectual factors in our mature perception of spatial 
relations.
James's Critique of the Empiricist 
Account of Space Perception
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to present a general sketch 
of the empiricist account of space perception in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Theories of visual perception literally abounded
^Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed., s.v. "Phenomenalism," by 
R. J. Hirst.
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during this period and there was a variety of somewhat different theories 
even within the empiricist camp. Faced with this diversity at the theo­
retical level, we shall turn to the empiricist account of three concrete 
issues in the psychology of perception. The issues are the unconscious 
inference explanation of color contrast, the doctrine of the eccentric 
projection of sensations and the muscular feeling explanation of visual 
form. Our reasons for choosing these topics are twofold. First, they 
will provide the historical and theoretical background for our examination 
of James's account of space perception. Second, in examining James's 
critique of the empiricist accounts of these issues, we shall see the 
sense in which the Principles is a continuation of Hodgson's polemic 
against an elementistic conception of experience.
Simultaneous Color Contrast
The first thing we must do in approaching this topic is to divest 
ourselves of the Freudian notion of the unconscious. Our topic demands 
that we examine a pre-Freudian formulation of unconscious mental processes, 
a formulation which had its roots in the early nineteenth century idealis- 
tic philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann. From 
these speculative beginnings, a truncated and less extravagent version 
of the unconscious found its way into the early perceptual theories of 
Wundt and Helmholtz. Thus, in the period when psychology was beginning 
to achieve institutional status as a natural science, reference to uncon­
scious mental processes was a central feature of the empiricist formulation
^For a general sketch of the relationship between Schopenhauer, 
von Hartmann and Freud see Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Uncon­
scious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Basic 
Books, 1970), pp. 208-210.
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of perception. At the same time, however, there was a great deal of 
confusion, and some controversy, over what the concept of unconscious 
mental processes really meant.
David Klein has recently examined Helmholtz's use of the phrase 
unbewusster Schluss, literally "unconscious conclusion" rather than "un­
conscious inference."^ Helmholtz's fundamental contention is rather 
straightforward. If perception is viewed as a genetic process, then it 
is obvious that an intellectual or cognitive component is an essential 
aspect of that process. That is, certain meanings or relations are habit­
ually associated with certain sensory contents and after much practice 
the cognitive terms come to be perceived immediately, as if they were 
directly given by the sensory object. Helmholtz's primary theoretical 
objective was to make clear that these acquired meanings and relations 
are the products of past experience, thus challenging that nativist posi­
tion that certain relations (e.g., spacial attributes) are intuitively 
given. In this respect Helmholtz was working in the venerable tradition 
of British empiricism, which sought to reduce perception to the associa­
tion of phenomenal contents with learned meanings and relations. Helmholtz 
employed the term unbewusster Schluss to make clear that perception is 
pervaded with inferences or conclusions which are unconscious in the sense 
that the perceiver is not directly aware of the intellectual act which 
gives meaning and stability to his perceptual experience. Thus, in ex­
plaining why certain illusions persist, Helmholtz wrote that:
Even when we have learned to understand the physiological 
origin and connection of the senses, it is impossible to get 
rid of the illusion in spite of our better knowledge. This
David B. Klein, The Unconscious: Invention or Discovery (Santa 
Monica: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 53-61.
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is because inductive reasoning is the result of the unconscious 
and involuntary activity of the memory.8
This explanation is clear and seems innocent enough. Perception involves 
the generation of inductive generalizations based on the effects of past 
experience. Let us now turn to Helmholtz's explanation of a more com­
plicated phenomenon, simultaneous color contrast.
The phenomenon of simultaneous color contrast is easy enough to 
describe. If a rather small gray patch is placed on a colored background 
and a piece of transparent white tissue paper covers both surfaces, the 
area of the gray patch takes on a hue which is the complement of the 
colored background. If, for example, the background is green, the center 
patch is perceived as pink-red. Pastore, who examines the empiricist ex­
planation in some detail, quotes Helmholtz stating that the induced com­
plementary hue results from "acts of unconscious or involuntary judgment"
9
acquired in experience. Helmholtz's explanation can be summarized as 
follows. First, since the green background covers a larger surface, the 
person unconsciously assumes that the entire surface has a greenish hue 
to it. At the same time, however, the person also unconsciously perceives 
the white patch in the center, i.e., the retinal impressions of the center 
patch are objectively white. The person then makes yet another unconscious 
inference, that the white patch is, in fact, an object located behind a 
greenish veil. As we shall see, this reversal of the spatial relations 
of the green and white surfaces is essential to Helmholtz's explanation. 
Through these unconscious mental operations Helmholtz obtained the premises
8Ibid., p. 55.
9
Nicholas Pastore, A Selective History of Theories of Visual Percep­
tion: 1650-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 167.
Although we shall criticize Pastore's interpretation of James, the value 
of this work for organizing this chapter must be acknowledged.
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from which the final unconscious inference is made. It is as if a person
in the color contrast situation is obtaining white sensations from an
object located behind a green veil. The question then becomes— what color
would such an object have to be to produce white sensations? The answer,
in terms of the laws of color combination at least, is pink-red; the
wavelengths of green combine with those of pink-red to produce white.
But Helmholtz argued that an analogous series of unconscious acts produced
the experience of pink-red in the color contrast situation. If this is
the case, the illusion certainly is intellectual or cognitive rather than
sensory. Sully, an English follower of Helmholtz, described the series
of intellectual acts in the following manner:
Not directly seeing the under sheet, and perceiving the green 
light shimmering through the thin white veil, we necessarily 
conceive this visible upper sheet to be of a pale green hue; 
and from this assumption, we reason that beyond the inferred 
greenish veil where the scrap lies— the pure retinal impression 
of which must be a dull white— there is a red.10
Sully offered this explanation as scientific fact, an example par excellence
of how a series of unconscious acts could produce an experience which
armchair philosophers had supposed was directly given.
However convoluted this explanation may seem to someone acquainted 
with the lateral inhibition explanation of color contrast, the Helmholtz- 
Sully explanation is important in the sense that it reveals a number of 
tendencies of the empiricist program. At one level, this explanation is 
an example of the psychologists' fallacy, the tendency to substitute our 
knowledge about the object under study for its internal means of produc­
tion. We have already quoted James giving credit to Hodgson for clearing
^James Sully, Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and 
Aesthetics (London: Henry S. King and Co., 1874), p. 68.
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up the confusion of the "analysis of an idea with its means of production" 
in our discussion of James Mill's analysis of a complex idea.^ Now, 
while Helmholtz's explanation is based on a mechanical analysis of a 
perceptual phenomenon, the underlying logic is identical to Mill's. That 
is, both shared the assumption that if some sort of model can be schema­
tized which produces the same results as are evidenced in a given organism, 
then the operations which produce the results in the model must also 
occur in the organism. In other words, in building a model which simu­
lates the behavior of art organism, one also obtains a full articulation 
of the theoretically relevant internal structures of the organism. A 
number of philosophers who have examined the relation between computer
simulation and explanation have concluded that such a position is tenuous, 
12
at best. Thus, for example, just because a computer can be programmed 
to play a more or less good game of chess, it does not necessarily mean 
that the programs which the computer employs are in any way similar to 
the rules which govern the behavior of the human chess player.
Of course, Helmholtz did not have computers, but he did have the 
materials needed to combine colors mechanically. With this primitive tech- 
hology, it was easy to demonstrate that a pink-red object viewed through 
a greenish veil produces the impression of white. Most importantly, it 
also seems clear that Helmholtz had this color mixture model in mind when 
he sought to explain the perception of pink-red in the color contrast
^William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1890), 2:281. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
12
See Jerry Fodor, Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Psychology (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 121-152; 
Keith Gunderson, Mentality and Machines (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and 
Co., 1971), pp. 39-59.
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situation. That is, in offering a psychological explanation for the illu­
sion, he assumed that the mental state under study (the perceiver in the 
color contrast situation) must also know what he, the scientist, knows 
about the laws of color mixture. In making this assumption he imposed his 
own knowledge into his explanation of how pink-red is actually produced 
in the human brain. The foremost difficulty with this explanation involves 
understanding why the perceiver should reverse the spatial relations be­
tween the green and white surfaces. Helmholtz's answer, that the color 
contrast situation unconsciously reminds the perceiver of a white object 
partly occluded by a green surface, seems forced. In fact, positing this 
hypothetical reversal, which must take place if the perceiver behaves 
just like the mechanical model, seems to be rooted in the demands of the 
mechanical model rather than empirical evidence. If and only if the white 
object was behind the greenish veil would the perceiver's brain simulate 
the laws of color mixture. Thus, in lieu of empirical evidence, Helmholtz 
allowed his model to dictate the particular operations which go on within 
the perceiver's head.
There must have been some rather powerful reason for Helmholtz, the 
arch-empiricist, to forsake experience; and this something is rooted in 
his undying commitment to atomistic conception of experience and the ner­
vous system. This commitment is manifest in what Pastore called the "law
of isolated conduction," the physiological model which underlies Helmholtz's
13theory of perception. It can be viewed as the physiological embodiment
of Hume's description of mental life as a succession of discrete impres­
sions. "We may allow," wrote Helmholtz,
13Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 165.
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. . . that each of . . . the cones has a nervous fiber which, 
through the mediation of the optic nerve, extends to the brain 
in isolation in order to conduct there the impression it receives, 
so that the state of excitement of each of these cones may give
rise to one isolated sensation.14
In fact, this physiological model represents Helmholtz's reformulation of 
Johannes Muller's doctrine of the law of specific nerve energies, and, 
as such, it set the foundation for both his research and theory in percep­
tion.^ Pastore has noted that Helmholtz's assumption was an essential
feature of nineteenth century empiricism and he integrates it with the 
constancy hypothesis, the notion that there is a point for point corre­
spondence between retinal excitations and visual sensations.Within 
this assumptive frame of reference there can be no interaction between 
adjacent retinal receptors, either excitatory or inhibitory, and any dif­
ference between retinal receptors is assumed to result from an intellectual 
contribution. Its pervasiveness should also be noted. Here we have a 
physiological model of the nervous system which provides the believer with 
a philosophical conception of experience as well as the fundamental cate­
gories of a psychology.
In a sense, Helmholtz's law of isolated conduction can be viewed
•0
as an expression of his aversion to the positing of innate physiological 
mechanisms, which he saw as overused and unverified. His explanation of 
color contrast is certainly consistent with the assumptive foundation of 
the law of isolated conduction. Adding the green background to the gray 
patch does not, for Helmholtz, change the nature of the retinal excita­
tion corresponding to the gray patch. What is changed is the perceiver's 
conception of what the gray patch is seen as, from a simple patch of 
color to an object located behind the green background.
14Ibid. (Italics mine.) 15Ibid., pp. 128-132.
16Ibid., pp. 164-165.
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Of course, the law of isolated conduction (and the constancy hy­
pothesis) is diametrically opposed to Ewald Hering's nativistic explana­
tion of color contrast in terms of the lateral inhibition of adjacent 
retinal receptors. But James found nothing aversive in positing innate 
physiological mechanisms and he did see problems with adopting Helmholtz's 
explanation in particular and the constancy hypothesis in general. Thus 
he endorsed Hering's explanation and rejected Helmholtz's. Gurwitsch and 
Linschoten have documented James's rejection of the constancy hypothesis.^ 
We shall close this section by sketching the relation between James's 
rejection of the constancy hypothesis and Hodgson's critique of empiricism.
The constancy hypothesis is rooted in a physicalistic conception 
of experience, where the contents of experience are assumed to perfectly 
mirror the physical attributes of obejcts in the world. As we have seen, 
Hodgson rejected this frame of reference on the basis of his distinction 
between first and second intention descriptions. We have also seen that 
Hodgson's critique of elementistic empiricism became the empiricist ver­
sion of the psychologists' fallacy in the Principles. Thus it should not 
be surprising that James viewed Helmholtz's law of isolated conduction as 
an example of the psychologists' fallacy. He wrote that:
Helmholtz . . .  is no more careless than most psychologists in 
confounding together the object perceived, the organic condi­
tions of the perception, and the sensations which would be 
excited by several parts of the object . . . providing they 
came into action separately . . . .  If each organic condition or 
part of the object is there, its sensation, he thinks, must 
also be there, only in a 'synthetic' form— which is indistin­
guishable from what the authors we formerly reviewed called an 
'unconscious'— state.18




This passage is illuminating in two respects. First, we find James apply­
ing a Hodgsonian principle— the psychologists' fallacy— against Helmholtz's 
explanation of simultaneous color contrast. Second, from this passage it 
is also clear that James viewed references to unconscious mental processes 
as an erroneous but necessary supplement to a psychology which assumes 
that experience comes to us in a disjointed, elementistic manner. The 
unconscious synthesis must be called upon to give the unity and structural 
integrity which disjointed sensations can not themselves possess. James 
chose to view the automatic categorizations of perception as simply cere­
brally represented habits, thus avoiding the confusing connotation that
19mental states could be unconscious.
The Eccentric Projection of Sensations
The doctrine of the eccentric projection of sensations is a nine­
teenth century version of a problem which was first created and answered 
by Bishop George Berkeley in his eighteenth century empiricist manifesto,
An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision. The problem involves the phenom­
enal locus of visual impressions experienced for the first time, and more 
generally, with a psychological explanation of the genesis of external 
space. The two questions are intimately related. In fact, Berkeley's 
answer to the first question, that the first visual impressions are lo­
cated in the "eye or mind," is little more than a corollary to his more
general position that distance judgments are "entirely the effect of ex- 
20perience." For if distance cues are themselves entirely derived from
19Ibid., 1:164-176; 2:111-114. In discussing the role of unconscious 
inferences in the process of perception James wrote that: "To call percep­
tion unconscious reasoning is thus either a useless metaphor or a positively 
misleading confusion between two different things." 2:113.
20Berkeley Selections, ed., Mary Calkins (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1957), p. 33.
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the association of tactile feelings (e.g., reaching, walking) and visual 
impressions, then as yet unpaired visual impressions must have the same 
phenomenal location as thoughts or feelings. In fact, Berkeley adopts 
this line of reasoning in his examination of a newly resighted blind 
person.
From what hath been premised, it is a manifest consequence, 
that a man born blind, being made to see, would at first have
no idea of distance by sight; the sun and stars . . . would
all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. The objects 
introduced by sight would seem to him (as in truth they are) 
no other than a new set of sensations, each . . .  as near to 
him as . . . the most inward passions of the soul.21
Berkeley's account and its idealism literally set the foundation for later
empiricist theories of space perception. The notion of the muscle sense,
for example, became a seminal issue in the nineteenth century because
Berkeley held that spacial relations are entirely derived from muscular
feelings.
The empiricist account seemed to gain experimental support from
Cheselden's report in 1728 that a resighted boy said that objects "touched
22his eyes" in a fashion analogous to the way objects touch the skin.
Although this description is open to alternative interpretation, it made
Berkeley's theory sufficiently attractive for the late eighteenth century
French empiricist, Etienne de Condillac, to adopt it with only slight
revisions. In the mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill described
Berkeley's account as "one of the least disputed doctrines in the most
23disputed and disputable of all Sciences, the Science of Man." In the
^Ibid. (Italics mine.)
22Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 97.
23
John Stuart Mill, "Bailey on Berkeley's Theory of Vision," West­
minister Review 38(1842): 318-336, pp. 318-319.
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period between 1860 and 1890 George T. Ladd, Alexander Bain, Hippolyte 
Tain and Helmholtz adopted the fundamental tenets of Berkeley's empiricist 
position, including the eccentric projection of sensations.
The doctrine of the eccentric projection of sensations can be 
broken down into two complementary parts. The first is a refinement of 
Berkeley's contention that visual impressions are originally experienced 
in the eye or mind. By the mid-nineteenth century this position was em­
bodied in the empiricist contention that only the spectral colors and 
shades of light are immediately given in retinal stimulation. Form, 
solidity, distance, direction and location were thought to be learned 
through the association of muscular feelings and visual sensations. But 
in stating that only colors and shades of light are given in vision, the 
empiricist was left with explaining the fact that visual objects seem to 
be immediately apprehended in external space. The specifics of this 
explanation took a variety of forms but all seemed to agree that we learn 
to project or extradict our originally non-spatial visual sensations into 
space. This is the second part of the doctrine of the eccentric projec­
tion of sensations. Ladd, for example, said that this projection was 
achieved through a mental act, "an act which in its perfection results
24
from a long and intricate process of development." For Bain, the loca­
tion of sensations in external space was the result of the association 
of muscular feelings and visual sensations. Perhaps the most detailed, 
and certainly the most audacious, exposition of this process was presented 
in Taine's On Intelligence.
24
George T. Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology: A Treatise 
of the Activities and Nature of the Mind from the Physical and Experimental
Point of View. (New York: Scribner, 1888), p. 383.
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Taine, the French empiricist, saw the implications of Berkeley's
position clearly and he brought them to their logical conclusion. "A
sensation," he wrote, "engenders, by its presence alone, an internal
25phantom which appears as an external object." Now, if objects are
themselves simply groups of sensations, we are led to the inevitable
conclusion that external objects are "nothing more than resemblances or 
26
phantoms." For such a phenomenalism, it becomes a matter of semantics 
whether perceived objects are real or merely veridical hallucinations, and 
Taine devoted over thirty pages of his treatise to defending the latter 
proposition. In the process, he explained that these phantoms appear in 
external space because of "localizing judgements," through which we pro­
ject our sensations to "the spot in which we are accustomed to meet the
27cause or conditions it excites." In a passage which states clearly
everything James thought was wrong with the eccentric projection doctrine,
Taine wrote that:
All our sensations of color are thus projected out of our body, 
and clothe more or less distant objects, furniture, walls, 
houses, trees, the sky, and the rest . . . .  Thus all our sen­
sations are wrongly situated, and the color is no more extended 
on the arm-chair than the sensation of tingling is situated at 
my fingers' ends. They are all situated in the sensory centers 
of the encephalon; all appear situated elsewhere, and a common 
law allots to each of them their apparent location.28
The crucial part of this passage is the contention that sensations are
really situated "in the sensory centers of the encephalon." It is this
confusion between the spatial reference of a sensation and its physical
25
Hippolyte Taine, On Intelligence, trans. T. D. Haye (London:
Reeve and Co., 1871), p. 264.
26Ibid., p. 265. 27Ibid.
28James, Principles, 2:33, quoting from Taine's De 1'Intelligence,
2 vols. (Paris, 1870), 2:47-53. (Italics mine.)
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antecedent, argued James, which stood at the heart of the doctrine of the 
eccentric projection of sensations.
Again, this confusion can be presented in terms of the psychologists'
fallacy. The fallacy involves the psychologist imposing his knowledge
about the location of the cause of the sensation onto his description of
the spatial properties of the sensation itself. That is, the psychologist
knows that the neural antecedent of a sensation is located within the
cranium of the perceiver. Knowing this, he mistakenly assumes that the
sensation under study must also locate itself in the same physical space
as the psychologist locates its cause. As James said, the eccentric
projection theorists tacitly assume that the sensation "must place itself
29where they place it." Thus when Taine asserts that sensations are 
really located "in the sensory centers of the encephalon" he is confusing 
physiology with psychological description. In fact, this initial con­
fusion does create a phantom and it haunts the empiricist until it is 
pro jected into the external world through a mental act of some sort. As 
we shall see in the second part of this chapter, James argued that spatial 
qualities are given, along with colors and shades of light, in visual 
experience. Within this formulation, the phantom is transformed into a 
real object and the mysterious mental act of projection becomes unnecessary.
Muscular Feelings and the Perception of Form 
We must now turn to some of the murky details of the empiricism- 
nativism controversy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Given 
this as unavoidable, it will be helpful to offer a means for distinguish­
ing empiricist from nativist theories of perception. The criterion we
29James, Principles, 2:34.
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have chosen involves the perception of two-dimensional spatial attributes,
i.e., length and width or visual form. This is the criterion which
underlies Woodward’s classification of nineteenth century theories of 
30perception. It is also the criterion which Ribot pointed to when he
summarized the empiricism-nativism debate in the following manner:
What is the peculiar object of sight? This very simple ques­
tion sums up the debate. If we reply: Color, we are empiricists.
If we reply: Color extension, we cast our lot with the nativists.
Thus the nativists argued that length and width— two-dimensional visual 
form— is given in visual sensations. In contrast, the empiricists stated, 
following Berkeley, that visual sensations are originally non-extended 
and they sought to explain all spatial properties in terms of non-visual 
muscular feelings. This criterion gains historical support from the fact 
that Berkeley tried to reduce visual form as well as distance and solid­
ity, to the association of visual impressions and muscular feelings.
In moving from Berkeley to the second half of the nineteenth century 
however, one must take note of an important change in what empiricists 
meant by muscular feelings. That is, after 1850 the feelings arising from 
the movements of the ocular-motor muscles of the eye-ball migrated to the 
center of theoretical interest in the empiricist explanation of visual 
form. A number of factors facilitated this change, but at the theoretical 
level, Woodward has shown that Hermann Lotze’s theory of local signs
served to redirect the visual form debate around the question of feelings
32arising from eye-movements.
30William Woodward, "From Association to Gestalt: The Fate of Hermann 
Lotze's Theory of Spatial Perception, 1846-1920," Isis, 1979, in press.
31
Theodore Ribot, German Psychology Today: The Empirical School, 
trans. James Mark Baldwin (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886), 
pp. 126-127. (Italics mine.)
32
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Lotze's theory of local signs first appeared In 1846 and it is best
viewed as an attempt to explain the perception of two-dimensional extension
33(form) in terms of non-visual feelings. Imagine that a point of light 
stimulates the periphery of the retina. According to Lotze, an innate 
reflex automatically brings the visual sensation to the fovea. While this 
reflex is innate, Lotze hypothesized that the reflex gives rise to psycho­
logical "feelings of movement" which are not innate but which specify the 
relation between the point stimulated and the fovea. For Lotze, there 
are as many unique feelings of movement as there are points on the retina 
and the person gradually learns the system of muscular feelings which 
correspond to the spatial relations of the visual field. This is a unique 
combination of nativism and empiricism, non-spatial visual sensations are
associated, by means of an innate reflex, with feelings of movement which
specify the spatial relations of the visual field. In time, each retinal 
point comes to have its own local sign which is defined in terras of feel­
ings of movement. With experience, the spatial relations of the visual
field are mapped out in terms of a coordinated system of muscular movements.
The perception of visual form becomes possible when the local signs 
for each retinal point have been learned. Once these relations have been 
learned, an array of visual sensations would suggest, through what Lotze
called the mere "tendencies of movements," the connected series of eye move-
34ments which would be needed to outline the figure. Thus, for example, 
a straight line would be signalled by a connected series of increasingly 
strong feelings of movement in the same direction. In contrast, a circle 
would be signalled by a connected series of movements equidistant from the
34Ribot, German Psychology, p. 87.
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fovea. Although the details of Lotze's theory are complex and assume an 
incredible degree of sensitivity to minute muscular movements, it is his­
torically important because it established a precedent, plausible rationale 
and terminology for understanding the origin of spatial relations.
Wundt was one of the many experimental psychologists who developed 
and elaborated Lotze’s theory. He agreed with the two fundamental fea­
tures of Lotze's theory: that spatial qualities are not given in vision 
and that they must be explained in terms of feelings which arise from 
eye-movements. In fact, even when Wundt differs from Lotze's formulation 
of the theory of local signs, the difference seems to consist of a Wundtian 
twist to a basically Lotzean theme. One area of difference is Wundt's 
doctrine of "feelings of movement," which states that any visual impres­
sion produces a feeling of the motor (efferent) discharge needed to bring
35the impression to the fovea. There are subtle differences between 
"feelings of innervation" and "tendencies of movement" but the explanatory 
principle is the same: the intensity of muscular feeings are the psycho­
logical basis of spatial estimations. Thus Wundt explained the over-esti­
mation of a filled as opposed to an empty (----- ), line by
saying that a filled line offers more muscular resistance than an empty 
line of equal length. This increased resistance results in greater amounts 
of motor innervation and the illusory expansion of the length of the filled 
line. Wundt also departed from Lotze in suggesting that a psychological 
synthesis occurs when muscular feelings are combined with local visual 
sensations. This synthesis is similar to Mill's mental chemistry in the 
sense that attributes present in neither of the elements are created when 
the elements are combined. For Wundt, spatial attributes are created out
35Ibid., p. 204.
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of non-spatial elements in the synthesis. But Lotze too had stated that 
spatial attributes must be reconstructed by the soul and whether one calls 
it a reconstruction or synthesis, the fact remains that an internal pro­
cess creates attributes not present in the elements given.
Empiricism found its most rigorous proponent in the work of Helmholtz. 
For Helmholtz, visual sensations come to be interpreted as signs or sym­
bols for practical action. Spatial attributes are entirely the product of 
the association of muscular feelings of the eye with the bodily movements 
needed to outline the object. The message is essentially the same if we 
move to the British school of empiricism. Bain, for example, wrote that
"visible picture [form] is, in fact, a train of rapid movements of the
36eyes, hither and thither, over luminous points, lines and surfaces."
For both Helmholtz and Bain, visual sensations functioned to merely direct 
the eye movements which define the variety of visual forms.
James's critique of the empiricist account of the derivation of
spatial attributes can be broken down into two parts: (1) the rejection
of the proposition that spatial attributes are not intrinsically visual
and (2) the subsequent subordination, in James, of the role of muscular
feelings in explaining the origin of spatial attributes. Given Ribot's
criterion for distinguishing nativist from empiricist theories, we shall
emphasize his critique of the empiricist contention that visual form is
not immediately given. This emphasis leads us to a passage where Helmholtz
gives voice to the rule or principle which underlies the empiricist approach
to space preception. In his Physiological Optics he wrote that:
No elements in our perceptions can be sensational which may 
be overcome or reversed by factors of demonstrably experimental
36
Alexander Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 3rd ed. (New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1868).
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origin. Whatever can be overcome by suggestions of experience 
must be regarded as itself the product of experience and custom.
If we follow this rule it will appear that only qualities are 
sensational, whilst all spatial attributes are results of habit 
and experience.37
By qualities Helmholtz means light and colors, those sensational properties
which the empiricist thought to be given in retinal stimulation. By
spatial attributes he means form, direction, distance, solidity, etc.,
those ostensibly visual properties which empiricism sought to reduce to
more primitive sensory data, viz., muscular feelings. Pastore has called
this Helmholtz's modification rule and it stands at the foundation of
38the empiricist program in ways which deserve to be made explicit.
First, the relationship between the law of isolated conduction and 
the modification rule should be made explicit, for together they created 
the fundamental categories of the empiricist approach to perception. As 
a law which assumes a point for point correspondence between retinal ex­
citation and psychic effects, the law of isolated conduction provides a 
physiological model which portrays the receptor-to-brain connection as a 
telegraph system. In assuming this type of connection, Helmholtz allows 
his physiological model to create the fundamental unit of his psychology, 
viz., sensations. His elementistic definition of sensation is, in fact, 
a deduction from an elementistic physiological model; nothing else is 
possible with punctate receptors transmitting excitations through isolated 
nerves. With this definition of sensation in hand, Helmholtz reasoned that 
any attributes of perception which change with experience cannot, by the 
very fact that they change, be sensational. Thus, in a sense, the
37James, Principles, 2:218, quoting from Helmholtz's Handbuch der 
Physiologischen Optik (Berlin, 1856-1866), p. 438.
38
Pastore, Visual Perception, pp. 165-167.
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modification rule is simply an elaboration of the physiological model 
which underlies the law of isolated conduction; it states that any changes 
which do occur must be intellectual or cognitive, the result of brain 
processes. The two rules complement one another perfectly. The law of 
isolated conduction defines what is sensational and the modification rule 
specifies the processes through which sensations are changed. Together 
these assumptions created the most powerful tradition in nineteenth cen­
tury psychology, an atomistic empiricism. Its fundamental strength lies 
in its professed ideal of imposing a scientific, physicalistic framework 
onto the last frontier of science— the human mind.
The empiricism of Helmholtz’s system becomes clear by applying his 
modification rule to the question of the origin of spatial attributes.
It is obvious that spatial attributes vary continuously in perception; 
widely different spatial relations are perceived as the same (e.g., the 
constancies) and the same spatial stimulus can be perceived as different 
(e.g., the Muller-Lyer illusion). Since spatial attributes vary with 
experience, they must be themselves products of experience. In this 
manner Helmholtz rejected the sensational status of spatial attributes 
and he went on to argue, based on the law of isolated conduction, that 
all spatial attributes are the product of intellectual acts.
James wrote that the modification rule had achieved "an almost
39deplorable celebrity" in his time. At a purely logical level, James 
pointed to a glaring inconsistency in Helmholtz's employment of the maxim. 
On one hand, Helmholtz maintained that spatial attributes cannot be sen­
sational because they are easily changed with experience. On the other 
hand, Helmholtz was willing to say that light and color are immediate
39James, Principles, 2:218.
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visual sensations. To this James wrote that:
Helmholtz's reservation of 'qualities' is inconsistent. Our 
judgements of light and color vary as much as our judgements 
of size, shape, and place, and ought by parity of reasoning 
to be called intellectual products and not sensations.40
That is, brightness and color constancies are at least as easy to demon­
strate as shape and size constancies. If Helmholtz applied the modifica­
tion rule consistently, he would have to deny that anything is sensational 
by his definition. But this conclusion would then contradict the law of 
isolated conduction, which states that percepts are the joint product of 
sensory elements and memory. In fact, James argued that any sensory 
quality whatsoever can be changed or overpowered by our knowledge and 
therefore that the modification rule is an inadequate criterion for dis­
tinguishing between the sensational and intellectual components of per- 
41ception.
Thus far we have attempted to show that the modification rule is 
intimately tied to the physiological model underlying the law of isolated 
conduction and that James rejected the former. It should not be surprising, 
then, that he rejected the law of isolated conduction also. In fact, we 
have already examined his critique of the law of isolated conduction in 
our discussion of Hering's explanation of color contrast. A more general 
point deserves mention at this juncture. That is, James offered the 
lateral inhibition explanation for an entire class of illusions (e.g., the 
rotating spiral, color contrast, apparent motion, Wundt's filled line 
illusion) which the empiricists offered as evidence for their claim that 
spatial qualities are derived from muscular feelings. Take Wundt's
40Ibid.
^William James, "The Perception of Space (III)," Mind 12(1887): 
321-353, pp. 329-333.
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explanation of the over-estimation of the length of a filled line as an 
example. His explanation in terms of the increased feelings of innerva­
tion needed to traverse the filled line is more than a way of understanding 
a curious visual illusion. If verified, Wundt’s account gives credence 
to the entire empiricist program of seeking to reduce visual form to mus­
cular feelings! Thus when James offered the lateral inhibition explana­
tion for this entire class of illusions, he was challenging the empiricist 
account of space as well as their explanations for these particular phe­
nomena. Instead of assuming that spatial attributes are the product of
intellectual acts, James's explanation assumes that these illusions are 
entirely visual. In place of the atomism of empiricism, he offered what
might be called a field-view of sensation or perception; what is given in
the stimulation of a sense-organ is conditioned by the state of excitation 
of the entire field of sensory receptors. Just as the substantive portion 
of the stream of thought is conditioned by the transitive portions which 
surround it, the focus of the perceptual field is conditioned by the 
stimulation of its peripheral portions. In both cases James went to 
experience rather than a physiological model to obtain the fundamental 
categories of his psychology.
Let us briefly turn to James's rationale for relegating muscular 
feelings to a subordinate role in the perception of spatial attributes.
It is obvious that muscular feelings do come to signify spatial relations. 
We can, after all, indicate the unit of space called a foot with our hands 
even when our eyes are closed, or trace a figure in the air with the tip 
our finger. How can he argue that muscular feelings do not constitute our 
spatial ideas without denying the obvious fact that muscular feelings come 
to signify spatial relations? The answer is easier than it at first seems.
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Even If one holds that spatial attributes are given in vision, it is 
reasonable to argue that particular muscular feelings come to be asso­
ciated with particular visual lengths and forms; and that after enough 
practice the originally visual sensation can be signified in muscular 
terms. Within this framework, James conceived of muscular representa­
tions of spatial relations as the learned product of afferent feedback
42obtained by tracing visual forms with the hands and arms.
James’s Spatial Quale and Perceptual Realism
James's account of space perception is notoriously difficult and 
painfully detailed. The chapter on "The Perception of Space" is the 
longest in the Principles, filling 148 pages! Given this we must go 
directly to the theme which integrates the details of this frightfully 
complex subject. Our examination of the empiricist account will help us 
understand the importance and uniqueness of James's fundamental contention. 
Thus, in the face of the empiricist attempt to create spatial attributes 
from some more primitive sensory elements, James wrote that:
. . . all spatial knowledge is sensational at bottom, and 
that, as sensations lie together in the unity of consciousness, 
so no new element whatsoever comes to them from a supra-sensible 
source.43
This is James's fundamental contention, but what exactly does he mean?
One way it can be clarified is to contrast the role which intellectual 
factors are supposed to play in the space perception theories of James 
and the empiricists. For the empiricist, spatial ideas were thought to 
be composed of, or constituted by, intellectual contributions which are 
the product of experience. Since empiricism from Berkeley to Helmholtz
42
James, Principles, 2:193-197.
^Ibid., p. 152. (Italics mine.)
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denied that spatial attributes are immediately given in vision, these
attributes had to be construed as the product of some sort of intellectual
construction. Thus in Helmholtz's system space was explained in terms of
unconscious inference, or an act of the understanding. Similarly, Wundt
conceived of space as a product of a psychological synthesis, J. S. Mill
viewed it as a product of mental chemistry and finally, Lotze's psychology
44created spatial attributes through a reconstruction of the soul. Beneath 
the terminological diversity, however, there is a fundamental conceptual 
unity. Having denied that spatial attributes are immediately given, the 
empiricist sought to construct space in a piece-meal fashion through a 
mental act.
In the face of this approach, James sought to explain the origin 
and development of our knowledge of space "without the aid of any mysteri­
ous 'mental chemistry' or power of 'synthesis' to create elements absent
45from the original data of feeling." In other words, James sought to 
reduce all our spatial knowledge to terms which are themselves sensational 
and immediately given. He called this immediately given feeling of exten­
sity the spatial quale (feeling). For James, the spatial quale is a 
primitively given feeling of three dimensional space; it is immediately
given in the same sense that light or color is immediately given. Just
as any visual sensation must contain a specific quality of light, so it
must also contain a specific spatial quality. Here, then, is the fundamen­
tal contention of the passage we began this section with: all spatial 
knowledge is entirely derived from a primitive spatial feeling, the spatial 





In terms of the contents of our perception of space, "the content of the 
ordered [our mature space perception] remains identical with that of the 
multiplicity [the spatial quale]— sensational through and through.
Of course, by saying that the spatial quale is immediately given James 
is siding with the nativists. And while we shall treat the nativistic 
aspect of James's formulation of space perception in some detial, the 
remainder of this chapter is organized around a more fundamental conten­
tion— that James was, above all a perceptual realist. As he says above 
in rather bold terms, all the contents of attributes of our mature spatial 
knowledge (e.g., form, solidity, distance) are contained, in potential 
form, in our first visual experience. In this sense, James— the perceptual 
realist— was directly challenging the claim of a phenomenalistic empiricism. 
Our senses bring us into contact with real, externally located and poten­
tially discriminable objects rather than discrete, mind-located sensations. 
In addition, James held that the attributes embedded in our first primitive 
space-sensations are discovered, but not created, through acts of selective 
attention. This important qualification will be examined in the next sec­
tion. It saved James from an untenable naive realism and brings the 
activity of the perceiver into the foreground of his account of perceptual 
development.
We must begin our examination by clarifying the somewhat clumsy
terminology which surrounds James's treatment of sensation. For James,
sensation is "the immediate psychic effect of a peculiar sort of nerve- 
47process excited." That is, sensation is the most primitive psychological 
effect of a physiological process, an effect which is uncontaminated by
46 47Ibid. Ibid., p. 145.
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Intellectual (brain) processes. The word uncontaminated is somewhat con­
troversial in the abstract but it becomes less so in concrete cases.
That is, sensations, for James, are uncontaminated in the same sense that 
the lateral inhibition theory of color contrast portrays that phenomenon 
as uncontaminated by brain (intellectual) processes. James was fully 
aware that his definition of sensation created an abstraction which was 
never fully realized in adult life. But he said that sensations must be
postulated as the psychic function through which "we first become aware
48of the bare immediate natures" of the objects of experience. Defined 
in this manner, sensation is synonymous with what James called knowledge 
by acquaintance. In fact, the latter phrase is preferable because it 
does not imply that sensations actually constitute our experience of whole 
objects; we are first acquainted with objects, as-yet-undiscriminated wholes 
rather than disjointed sensory elements. In the second chapter we argued 
that James's knowledge by acquaintance is synonymous with what Hodgson 
called first intention descriptions. Thus it should not be surprising 
to find James writing, in a section of "The Cognition Function of Sensa­
tion," where he is discussing our primitive acquaintance with light, that
. . . the best taught born-blind pupil lacks a knowledge 
which the least instructed seeing baby has. They can never 
show him light in its 'first intention'; and the loss of that 
sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace.49
Thus sensation, knowledge by acquaintance, and first intention descriptions
are synonymous for James; he employed Hodgson's philosophy to define the
most primitive units of his psychology in a non-elementistic way.
In the Principles he argued that a primitive space-sensation is 
given in sensory stimulation of any kind, just as intensity is given.
48 49
Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 4. (Italics mine.)
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Every experimental psychologist was willing to admit that intensity is 
an inseparable but distinguishable element of sensory stimulation. But 
it was James's contention that extensity should also be assigned the same 
sensational status as intensity. "Extensity," he wrote,
. . . being an entirely peculiar kind of feeling indescribable 
except in terms of itself, and inseparable in actual experience 
from some sensational quality which it must accompany, can itself 
receive no other name than that of sensational element.50
For James, a spatial quale accompanies not only visual sensations but all
sensory stimulation whatsoever. This immediately felt sensational quality
is what allows us to feel thunder as more extensive than a squeaking
blackboard, that full immersion in a bath is more extensive than a wet
finger. While James examines all the senses in some detail, our discussion
will be limited to visual extensity.
In vision, James describes the spatial quale as a vague, undifferen­
tiated feeling of "vastness" or "volume" which accompanies any visual 
sensation.This primitive visual space contains all the attributes of 
our mature spatial knowledge in potential form. It is a space within 
which depth has yet to be discriminated from length and width, where left 
and right have yet to be assigned a specific direction. James said that 
the first primitive feeling of space is experienced as a mere "there" which
accompanies the first visual sensation, but these vague spatial feelings
52are without a specific location or direction. In calling it a mere 
"there," James was simply trying to avoid committing the psychologists' 
fallacy, which in this case would involve imposing his mature knowledge 
about space onto his description of the primitive spatial quale. As he 
wrote in describing a child's first experience of a visual object, the
50Ibid., p. 136. 51Ibid. 52Ibid., p. 8; p. 35.
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object "fills its own place" but the location of that place can only be
53determined after the child acquires a more refined spatial knowledge.
In spite of the vagueness of the first spatial quale— a vagueness which 
is, in fact, an essential feature of that notion— one thing must be made 
clear. That is, for James, our first visual sensations are spatial.
In other words, what we mean by visual sensations as they are actually 
experienced is inherently, though originally only vaguely, spatial; just 
as any visual sensation, must be of a certain intensity to be experienced, 
so it must also possess extensity.
However straightforward this point might be, given James's notion 
of the spatial quale, it deserves to be elaborated upon for two reasons. 
First, the spatial quale makes the doctrine of the eccentric projection 
of sensations superfluous. There is no need to project sensations into 
external space if sensations are themselves intrinsically spatial. The 
need for an additional mental act disappears when sensations are not 
confused with the brain processes which produce them. Only the brain 
processes are inside our heads and only those physiological processes 
would need projecting into the world. But, since we become conscious of 
objects rather than brain processes, the act of projection is an unneces­
sary encumbrance on the psychology of perception.
More importantly, however, Nicholas Pastore, whose Selective History 
of Theories of Visual Perception has become the authoritative work in this 
area, has argued that James contradicts himself with regard to the notion 
of the spatial quale. That is, Pastore suggests that there are two con­
tradictory perception theories in the Principles and that what he calls 
James's "second theory" is founded upon the "apparent denial of any
53Ibid., p. 35.
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sensation of extension or s p a c e . O n e  of the central pieces of evidence
which Pastore offers in support of his interpretation is that James once
wrote, in discussing sensation, that "the first time we see light, in
55Condillac's phrase, we are it rather than see it." He interprets this 
sentence to be a tacit endorsement of the empiricist position that visual 
sensations are originally located in the mind rather than in the world.
If this can be substantiated, then James is: (1) saying that visual sen­
sations are originally non-spatial and (2) setting up a purely empiricist 
account of space alongside his avowedly nativistic notion of the spatial 
quale. Although James is ambiguous in places, we shall argue that he 
offers only one theory of perception in the Principles, a theory which 
integrates empiricism and nativism. In the course of this chapter we will 
examine other evidence which Pastore offers in support of his interpreta­
tion. For now we shall show that James's allusion to Condillac was merely 
a passing jab at the rationalistic theory of knowledge.
Pastore's interpretation is prima facie implausible because it 
amounts to a blatent contradiction of the notion of the spatial quale.
It becomes strikingly implausible, however, when one reads the pages which 
immediately precede and follow the controversial sentence. Two pages 
before the Condillac allusion James wrote, and I retain his own italics, 
that "in both sensation and perception we perceive the fact as an immedi­
ately present outward reality. A l t h o u g h  James's reputation as a con­
sistent thinker has been much-maligned by historians of psychology, it 
seems incredible that he would reverse his position on such an important
54Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 239.
55James, Principles, 2:4; also see James, Psychology, p. 14.
56James, Principles, 2:2.
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issue without warning, in a matter of two pages! Furthermore, four pages
after the controversial sentence we find him again describing a position
which is thoroughly consistent with his formulation of the spatial quale.
Here again he considers the hypothetical case of a child’s first sensation.
The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the entire 
Universe. . . .  In this dumb awakening to the consciousness of 
something there, a mere this . . . the infant encounters an ob­
ject in which all . . . the ’categories of the understanding' 
are contained. It has objectivity, unity, substantiality, causal­
ity, in which any later object or system of objects has these 
terms. 37------  --------- ------ ---------- --------------
James's reference to "objectivity" is nothing else than the spatial quale 
which accompanies the child's first sensation. Again, these are the words 
of a perceptual realist; the child's first sensation is identical, in 
terms of content, to the same sensation experienced by a mature person.
Of course, the mature person will know more about the sensation— he can 
locate it in space and time and assign a meaning to it— but these concep­
tual operations do not transform the content of the sensation.
Given these two explicit statements which are fully consistent with 
his spatial quale, it seems positively incredible that James would insert 
between them, as Pastore says, an implicit endorsement of the empiricist 
account of space. But what else could James have had in mind when he 
wrote that "the first time we see light, in Condillac's phrase, we are it 
rather than see it"? The key to a different, and entirely consistent in­
terpretation of this sentence is contained in James's 1885 essay, "On the
58Function of Cognition." It is here that he first challenged Ferrier's 
First Proposition, that any knowledge whatever presupposes a knowledge of 
a self as distinct from the object of knowledge. Now by writing that "the
57Ibid., 2:8.
58
William James, "On the Function of Cognition," Mind 10(1885):27-44.
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first time we see light . . . we are It . in the Principles he may
be simply challenging the epistemological foundation of the rationalist
formulation of knowledge. This challenge is fully compatible with the
spatial quale, as well as the related position that the "primordial con-
59dition" of human experience is a "consciousness of objects." In terms 
of our interpretation, the child jLs light simply because he has, as yet, 
no knowledge of self, or anything else except light. In other words, I 
understand James to be agreeing with Condillac’s position that knowledge 
of self is itself derived from our knowledge of objects. Later experience 
will bring the child knowledge of self, as well as other optical knowl­
edge but, as James wrote in the sentence immediately following his allusion
to Condillac, "all our optical knowledge is about what this experience
60
gives." Although James's reference to Condillac is ambiguous because 
he does not specify the particular sense in which he is agreeing with the 
empiricist, it does not necessarily contradict his formulation of the spa­
tial quale. What Pastore fails to recognize is that James could agree 
with the empiricist critique of the rationalist formulation of knowledge 
without endorsing the empiricist formulation of knowledge or space.
When one examines the assumptions which underlie James's treatment 
of the visual spatial quale the importance of Hodgson's thought appears 
at a number of levels. For example, that the psychologists' fallacy con­
tinually surfaces in his critique of the empiricist account is itself 
testimony to the importance of Hodgson. It is hardly coincidental, then, 
that it is at the end of his "Perception of Space" chapter that James 
accuses empiricism, as a school, of being "guilty of that confusion which
c q
James, Principles, 1:273. Ibid., 2:3.
197
Mr. Shadworth Hodgson has done so much to clear away, viz., the confound-
t
61 fing of the analysis of an idea with its means of production." This
allusion to Hodgson is hardly coincidental because Hodgson provided the
clearest formulation of what James called the psychologists' fallacy in
his examination of the empiricist formulation of the origin of spatial
62attributes in his Time and Space in 1865. We began this chapter with 
James writing that "I always supposed myself that they [the 1887 space
perception articles] were but a filling out of your Time and Space frame-
63
work.11 We shall now see what James had in mind when he spoke of
Hodgson's "framework."
We must return to Hodgson's Time and Space, but not simply because
his account of space is the same as the Principles. In fact, there are
64significant differences in their formulations of space. We must turn 
to Time and Space because Hodgson cut through the Gordian knot which had 
bound empiricism to an atomistic elementism from the time of Hobbes in 
that work. How did he accomplish this feat? Put simply, he turned to 
experience and refused to allow a physiological model to determine the 
nature of his description of visual experience. Put more complexly, Hodgson 
called for an assumptionless description of the phenomenon of seeing itself. 
His basic message to psychology might be summarized in the following manner:
61Ibid., pp. 280-281.
62Hodgson, Time and Space.
^Perry, William James, 1:642.
64
Hodgson, still working partly within the traditional empiricist 
framework with regard to the psychological origin of space, argued that 
the third dimension was a joint product of visual and tactile sensations, 
see Time and Space, pp. 80-82. In contrast, James maintained that all 
three dimensions of space are the immediate product of visual sensations, 
see Principles, 2:212-216.
198
If psychology is going to deal with experience at all, it must begin with 
rigorous descriptions of experience and let those descriptions be the data 
from which psychological theories are constructed. In effect, Hodgson 
called for a reversal of the methodological orientation of traditional 
empiricist psychology, replacing physicalistic assumptions with pure des­
criptions. In doing so, he set the "framework" for James's account of 
the perception of space.
This reversal can be seen in Hodgson's argument for the immediate
visual apprehension of form. As we have seen, empiricism sought to reduce
form to a series of muscular movements over time. In response to this
formulation Hodgson turned to a description of visual experience.
The eye opened to light sees a whole surface, one small portion 
of it distinctly, the rest indistinctly; it see part bright, 
part dark, part clear, the rest obscure; this is the phenomenon 
of seeing; and I cannot conceive how any one can suppose that the 
space-relations of this surface are reducible to relations in 
time . . . .  the extended surface is seen at once, and is seen 
as something different from feelings which are not extended.65
As a refutation of a time-honored theory this statement seems simple- 
bordering-on naive. Is it at all reasonable to attempt to refute a psy­
chological theory on the basis of a description of the phenomenon being 
explained? With this question, what had seemed simple becomes frightfully 
complex. As we noted in the second chapter, Hodgson devised his method 
of reflection to guard against the imposition of assumptions of any kind 
onto our descriptions of experience. According to the method of reflection, 
one must voluntarily abstract all of one's knowledge about the experience 
being described and present the experience as it is actually experienced.
Most importantly, one must guard against the seemingly irresistable tendency 
to assume that the logical elements which are distinguishable upon reflecting
^Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 66.
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on an experience are the psychological elements from which the experience 
is produced. For example, even though we can logically distinguish visual 
space into length, width and depth, we have no right to assume that any 
one of these dimensions antecedes the others within the life of the indi­
vidual. But this is exactly what empiricists since Berkeley had done in 
formulating a psychological theory of the perception of the third dimension! 
By applying this logic to the perception of the third dimension, Hodgson 
reasoned that one must not assume that depth appears later than the other 
two dimensions.
Sight contributes, at the least, perception of superficial 
extension; so also touch; the combination of the two produces, 
at the least, perceptions of the three dimensions, for part 
of the visual superficies is pushed to a distance from the 
body . . . when we touch the body and not the rest of the 
superficies . . . .  This is the origin, the creation of the 
third dimension of space when reasoned of as if it were an empiri­
cal object. 6 b '
Hodgson is playing the role of devil's advocate in this passage; this is
the logic behind the empiricist account of space. It is his refutation
of this position that is of the utmost importance. Thus, immediately
after this description he points to the fallacy underlying this line of
reasoning.
Sight and touch, however, come into operation together, and 
consequently the perception of the third dimension of space 
begins simultaneously with that of its superficial extension.
The perception . . .  of things in space of three dimensions 
is a highly complex state and object but not necessarily later 
in time than that of the simpler states . . . of which it is 
composed; it is we who import the notion of growth in time to 
it, by our analyzing it into its elements and then composing 
it afresh by their combination.67
This argument, which James later called the psychologists' fallacy, is the
Ibid., p. 80. (Italics mine.)
67Ibid., p. 81. (Italics mine.)
first step in Hodgson's critique of an atomistic empiricism. To complete 
his refutation and set the "framework" for James's account of space, we 
must return to Hodgson's method of reflection.
In the second chapter we noted that Hodgson, in an article written 
in 1876, said that one of the persistent problems of traditional empiri­
cism was that it failed to give serious consideration to the question of
68what is given in sensu. In other words, empiricism tacitly assumed an 
atomism which it inherited uncritically from the Newtonian conception of 
science. What we have referred to as the law of Isolated conduction can 
be viewed as a nineteenth century rendition of this atomistic Weltanschaunng. 
Hodgson recognized that this world-view provided a curiously a priori 
answer to the question of what is given in sensu. What is given must be 
discrete sensory elements, the mental analogues to Newton's atoms.
Hodgson also recognized that empiricism's alliance with a physicalistic 
atomism resulted in an unconscious abnegation of its professed master—  
experience. Thus in an 1884 essay we find Hodgson demanding that empiri­
cism return to experience:
. . .  we must have recourse in the first instance to experi­
ence itself, and see what its content is, apart from any hypo­
thesis of its cause . . . .  What I say then is this,— throw 
yourself frankly on experience . . . .  Experience without leading 
strings is the thing to aim at and work for.69
Instead of assuming that experience is composed of elements which are as
discrete as their assumed causes, Hodgson said that the question of what
is given in sensu can only be answered by returning to experience. He
recognized that this return involved a "radical change in our method of
68Shadworth Hodgson, "The Metaphysical Method in Philosophy,"
Mind 9(1884):48-72, p. 55.
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philosophizing" but this was the only way to get at "experience without 
leading s tr i n g s . T h i s  radical change in method is, of course, the 
method of reflection. What must be made clear, however, is that Hodgson 
stated that a rigorous application of this method would allow us to answer 
the question of what is given in sensu. In fact, for Hodgson, employing 
the method of reflection was the only way philosophers and psychologists 
could rediscover what is given in sensu.
We can now offer Hodgson's answer to the question raised earlier—  
whether a description of the experience of a phenomenon can, in and of 
itself, serve as a refutation of a psychological explanation of that phe­
nomenon. Hodgson's answer is clearly yes, but only if the explanation 
makes reference to inferred psychological processes which can not be veri­
fied in a rigorous application of the method of reflection. Thus, if an 
explanation makes reference to hypothetical mental processes which can 
never be experienced— like, for example, Wundt's sensations or Helmholtz's 
unconscious inferences— it is necessarily wrong. Hodgson's method of 
reflection also had a vitally important influence on James's account of 
space perception, for the empiricism-nativism controversy revolved around 
the question which Hodgson's method was designed to answer— what is given 
in sensu.
One way of approaching this issue is to contrast the implications 
of Hodgson's method of reflection and Helmholtz's modification rule with 
the origin of spatial attributes in mind. We have already seen that 
Helmholtz employed the modification rule as a criterion for arguing that 
spatial attributes are not given in sensu, i.e., he reasoned that since
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spatial attributes vary with experience they must themselves be products 
of experience. He also noted, however, that the converse of this rule is 
definitely not v a l i d . T h a t  is, just because perceptual attributes can 
not be altered, we can not assume that they are given in sensory stimu­
lation, for large amounts of practice will make some attributes so strong 
that they can not be overcome by even a determined effort. Remarkably, 
in employing the method of reflection one obtains a criterion which is 
the exact opposite of Helmholtz's!
Hodgson's method of reflection involves the voluntary adoption of 
an attitude which is radically different from our usual way of experiencing
the world. In 1884 he described this attitude as one of "pure receptivity,"
72and its rigorous application allows one to get at "experience pure."
In our everyday experience we immediately impose learned meanings onto 
the objects of our perceptual experience, so that a particular configura­
tion of green and brown is seen as a tree. Hodgson said that the method
of reflection was designed to "undo" or "invert" the effects of past ex-
73perience by consciously holding our everyday assumptions in abeyance.
Thus, in a state of pure receptivity one ignores the tree-ness and even
the object character of this particular segment of perceptual experience.
Instead, Hodgson wrote that one
. . . takes the green and brown expanse as it comes, in its
proper place in the stream of consciousness . . . .  So taking
it, I am aware of the larger expanse of which it was a part, 
and also that while seeing it I heard (suppose) a sound, making
part with it of one stream of consciousness.74
^Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 167.
72
Hodgson, "Metaphysical Method," p. 56.
73 74Ibid., p. 61. Ibid.
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This, for Hodgson, is what is given in the experience of seeing a tree—  
patches of extended color in particular forms. The difference between 
Hodgson and Helmholtz reduces to one fundamental proposition: Hodgson 
believed that one could, and in fact, must "undo" the effects of past 
experience by a systematic suspension of everyday assumptions, while 
Helmholtz believed that such an inversion was unnecessary. While Hodgson's 
method is an expression of his desire to achieve absolute certainty, its 
plausibility and attractiveness is tied to his demand that we adopt a 
state of mind which is radically different from normal experience. Within 
this state of pure receptivity, experience appears as it is given in sensu. 
Thus, in marked contrast to Helmholtz's criterion, Hodgson would argue 
that what remains unchanged and intact within this radically different 
state is the uncontaminated product of sensory stimulation. Thus in 
Hodgson we find an alternative to Helmholtz's modification rule.
Although James rejected the modification rule, he seems to offer 
no explicit, general alternative criterion for determining what is given 
in sensu. Instead, he seems to treat each topic in space perception in­
dividually, bringing experimental evidence to support his position when­
ever possible. He refers to Exner's studies on apparent motion, for
example, in the context of his argument that movement is a "primitive form 
75of sensibility." But there are large gaps in the experimental litera­
ture and he fills these gaps with descriptions which seek to bring the 
reader back to the sensational or acquaintance mode of experience. Most 
importantly, these descriptions give credence to the idea that he had 
Hodgson's method of reflection in mind when he claimed that spatial attri­
butes are given in vision. We have already noted that his knowledge by
"^\james, Principles, 2:172.
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acquaintance is synonymous with Hodgson's first intention descriptions, 
but now we are making a more specific claim. That is, we shall attempt 
to show that there are times when James says that spatial attributes are 
given in vision on the basis of descriptions which approximate Hodgson's 
state of perfect receptivity.
Evidence for this contention is not hard to find. We have already 
noted, for example, that James describes the "primordial condition" of 
human experience as a vague "consciousness of o b j e c t s . W h a t  he calls 
the "primordial condition" is remarkably similar to Hodgson's state of 
"perfect receptivity" except that James, the psychologist, points to 
altered states which appear involuntarily, e.g., during a hypnotic trance, 
a faint or our experience under the influence of anesthetics. He pro­
vides a more elaborate description of anesthetic intoxication in one part 
of the Principles;
Such anesthetics as chloroform, nitrous oxide, etc., sometimes 
bring about transient lapses [of self consciousness] even more 
total, in which numerical discrimination seems gone; for one 
sees light and hears sound, but whether one or many lights and 
sounds is quite impossible to tell. Where the parts of an ob­
ject have already been discerned . . . we can with difficulty 
feel the object again in its pristine unity.77
In terms of the structural tone of experience, this passage is reminiscent 
of James's description of a state of dispersed attention, and in both he 
is describing a state similar to Hodgson's perfect receptivity. The ac­
tive, discriminating, attentive mode of experiencing the world recedes 
and objects return to their "pristine unity." The important thing for 
understanding James's nativistic notion of the spatial quale is that the 
pristine objects which appear in this state are accompanied by a primitive
^James, Principles, 1:273.
77
Ibid., pp. 487-488. (Italics mine.)
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spatial vastness. Thus James wrote that even when consciousness is reduced 
to its most primitive level it "presents us with concreted objects, vaguely
continuous with the rest of the world which envelops them in time and
78
space." Thus, after abandoning Helmholtz's criterion for distinguish­
ing between the sensory and intellectual components of perception, James 
seems to adopt the criterion contained in Hodgson's method of reflection.
The importance of this fact cannot be over-emphasized— it served as the 
basis of the nativistic strain of James's formulation of space. Hodgson's 
criterion is also implicit in James's retort to the doctrine of the eccen­
tric projection of sensation.
As I look at my bookshelf I cannot frame to myself an idea, 
however imaginary, of any feeling which I could ever possibly 
have got from it except the feeling of the same big extended 
sort of outward fact which I now perceive.79
What is striking about this passage is that here James is offering the 
irretrievability of non-spatial visual sensations as proof of the untena- 
bility of the notion of projection. Like Hodgson's purely experiential 
refutation of the empiricist account of the perception of the third dimen­
sion, James is rejecting a psychological theory on purely descriptive 
grounds.
Helmholtz would interpret the irretrievability of non-spatial visual 
sensations as an example of the overriding importance of past experience 
and unconscious inferences— we have had so much experience locating the 
bookshelf in external space that the originally non-spatial character of 
the visual sensations is unrecoverable. But then his psychological theory 
must contain an additional unconscious act of projection. In contrast, 
Hodgson would interpret the irretrievability of non-spatial visual sensations
78Ibid., p. 487. 79Ibid., 2;31-32. (Italics mine.)
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as James does, as evidence that visual sensations are themselves origin­
ally spatial! The criterion actually employed determines whether one 
offers a nativistic or empirical formulation of space. If more explicit 
evidence of Hodgson's impact is needed, one need only turn to James's 
purely descriptive argument for the givenness of the third dimension.
Here he wrote that:
It is impossible to lie on one's back on a hill, to let the 
empty abyss of blue fill one's whole field, and to sink deeper 
and deeper into the merely sensational mode of consciousness 
regarding it, without feeling that an indeterminate, palpitating, 
circling depth is as indefeasibly one of its attributes as its 
breadth. . . . Mind, I say nothing as yet about our estimate of
the 'real' amount of this depth or distance. I only want to 
confirm its existence as a natural and inevitable optical con­
sort of the other two dimensions.80
What James calls "the sensational mode of consciousness" is, for all in­
tents and purposes, Hodgson's attitude of "perfect receptivity;" and, on
the basis of a description of experience in this state, we find James 
arguing that three dimensional space is immediately given in visual stimu­
lation.
James's contention that a primitive three dimensional spatial quale 
is given in vision is perhaps his most radical departure from the empiri­
cist account of the origin of spatial attributes. And while he expressed 
sympathy for Hering's and Stumpf's formulations of the direct intuition
of three dimensional space in the Principles, two factors suggest that
81Hodgson was also important in this respect. First, and most importantly, 
James admitted that the physiological process which underlies the immediate
80
Ibid., pp. 212-213. (Italics mine.)
81
For James's examination of the nativistic theories of Stumpf and 
Hering see his Principles, 2:220-222. Surprisingly, he endorses neither 
of these explanations explicitly, although he is clearly sympathetic to 
these nativistic formulations.
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82apprehension of depth had yet to be discovered. This fact would be 
something of an embarassment to a nativistic theorist unless he had some 
other means to support his formulation. According to our interpretation, 
however, Hodgson's method of reflection provided James with exactly what 
he needed— a criterion, independent of physiology, for determining what 
is given in sensu.
Second, Hodgson himself offered a preliminary outline of the psycho­
logical origin of the formal elements (space and time) in his Time and 
Space. The interesting aspect of this sketch is that he noted that the
83"constitution of the nerve" had been curiously ignored in previous theories.
In response to this omission, he made reference to Johannes Mtlller's doc­
trine of specific nerve energies, which states that the nature of the sen­
sation is conditioned by the structure of the nerve stimulated. Given 
this principle, he speculated that the psychological origin of time and 
space may be rooted in the constitution of the nerve.
May it not depend on the constitution of the nervous matter that 
we have space and time at all in our perceptions, and on the 
particular constitution of the objects perceived that we have g^  
this and that size, length, figure and order in the perceptions?
Although there is no indication that Hodgson was aware of Hering's theory, 
which appeared a year before his Time and Space, both share some fundamen­
tal similarities. Both, of course, are clearly nativistic. More impor­
tantly, however, both Hodgson and Hering grounded their nativism in 
hypothetical neural mechanisms which operate within the sensory systems.
In this way, both avoided the untenable elementism and mental synthesis
82
James, Principles, 2:213; 220.
83Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 216.
208
of the empiricist formulation of space. I am certainly not suggesting 
that Hodgson’s preliminary outline held more weight in James's mind than 
the more elaborate theories of Hering and Stumpf. What I am arguing, 
however, is that Hodgson's method of reflection, and, to a lesser degree 
his outline, provided the "framework" for James's theory of space percep­
tion and disposed him to view nativistic theories with a sympathetic eye.
Before turning to James's account of the development of mature 
perceptual knowledge, we must return to Pastore's "second theory." In 
addition to asserting that James's second theory holds that sensations
are originally non-spatial, Pastore states that it portrays the first
85perceptual experience of a child as being "totally chaotic." He bases
this rather extreme characterization on James's often-quoted remark that
the first experience of a child is "one great, blooming, buzzing, con- 
86fusion." From this premise, Pastore reasons that a total chaos has no
stable, internal subdivisions and therefore James's second theory fails
to provide a conception of objects which the child's primitive perceptual
structures can discriminate. In support of this contention, Pastore states
87that James himself wrote that sensations are "originally homogeneous."
If this is true, James places himself in a curious logical bind— how can 
one explain how attentional acts single out objects from an originally 
homogeneous sensory mass? We shall attempt to show that James never stated, 
or even implied, that the first real perceptual experience of a child is 
either: (1) totally chaotic or (2) entirely homogeneous. In doing so, we 
must conclude that Pastore's formulation of the "second theory" in the 
Principles is based on a series of fundamental misconceptions of James's 
psychology of perception.
85Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 239.
86 , , , 87_,Ibid. Ibid.
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Pastore's second allegation is easily dispelled by giving voice to
Linschoten's distinction between the two ways which James employs the term 
88sensation. At times, James uses sensation in a genetic sense, to sig­
nify the first real experience of a child. In this sense, a child's 
original experience is sensational because it is the immediate effect of 
sensory stimulation. At other times, however, he uses the word sensation 
in a quite different sense, to refer to an abstraction which results from 
a conscious isolation of logically distinguishable qualities of experience. 
In this sense, and in this sense alone, particular colors, sounds, exten­
sity and other homogeneous feelings are sensations. Pastore's claim that
"James supposes sensations to be originally homogeneous" is founded upon
89a failure to distinguish between these two meanings of sensation.
That James himself had this distinction in mind becomes clear when one
turns to the section of the Psychology where he states that sensations
are homogeneous. He had just completed discussing sensations as abstract
sensible qualities when he wrote:
Sensation, thus considered, differs from perception only in 
the extreme simplicity of its object or content. Its object, 
being a simple quality, is sensibly homogeneous.90
Taken in context, it becomes obvious that James was speaking of sensations
as abstract sensible qualities when he stated that they are homogeneous.
These sensations are adult abstractions which James stated are never
actually experienced alone in real life. Thus there is no reason to believe
that James ever maintained that the first real experience of a child is
homogeneous. In fact, a child's original experience is as heterogeneous
as the objects which he is innately prepared to discriminate.
88Linschoten, Psychology of William James, pp. 88-98.
89Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 239.
90
James, Psychology, p. 14.
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Pastore offers remarkably little support for his claim that "James
91describes the original experience of a baby as being totally chaotic."
The substance of his interpretation consists of his unquestioningly as­
suming that when James says that a child's first experience is a "pri­
mordial chaos," he means that it is totally chaotic. Beyond this, the 
only textual evidence he offers is a segment of the 'blooming, buzzing 
confusion' sentence. In fact, if he had reproduced that sentence in its
entirety he would have found James writing that even these first confused
92sensations possess a primitive extensity. In response to Pastore's 
contention, we might simply list some of the perceptual structures which 
James does say would function to structure a child's first experience. 
These include figure (form), solidity, color, shades of light, movement, 
and relative magnitude and distance. Of course, he maintained that these 
features are only vaguely cognized by the child, but these features would 
provide enough structure to guide the child's first discriminations and 
actions.
The crux of Pastore's claim seems to be rooted in the fact that 
James describes the child's first experience as "primitive," "vague," and 
even "chaotic." But there is no need to assume, on the basis of these 
adjectives alone, that James ever conceived of the child's first percep­
tions as being totally chaotic. It may well be primitive in the sense 
that it is not guided by a mature knowledge about the objects perceived,
91Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 239. (Italics added.)
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James, Principles, 1:489. The complete sentence reads:
"The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin and entrails 
at once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing con­
fusion; and to the end of life, our location of all things 
in one space is due to the fact that the original extents 
or bignesses of all the sensations which came to our notice 
at once, coalesced together into one and the same space."
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vague in the sense that only the most gross objective differences are 
immediately perceived, and even chaotic in the sense that the constancies 
which give stability to adult perception have yet to be learned, but it 
still possesses a certain form and structure. A more accurate summary of 
James's position is contained in his suggestion that: "The law is that
93all things fuse that can fuse, and nothing separates except what must."
And as a perceptual realist, gross differences between figures, colors 
and shades of light are just the sort of objective differences which James 
said must separate themselves immediately in the child's first experience. 
These discriminations are the immediate result of the innate physiological 
mechanisms of the child's sense organs.
Perceptual Realism and the Role of Intellect 
In the previous section we found, among other things, that James's 
nativistic formulation of space was rooted in his commitment to a percep­
tual realism. That is, by holding that a primitive sense of space is 
immediately given, he avoided the need to posit that spatial attributes 
are created, through a mental synthesis, from elements which are them­
selves non-spatial. But James's nativism is only the first step toward 
a complete account of perception. He recognized clearly that intellectual 
factors (viz., knowledge) play an essential role in a person's mature 
perception of spatial relations. In fact, James's full account of the 
perception of space is best viewed as an attempt to integrate nativism 
and empiricism and we shall now show that a perceptual realism also stood 
at the foundation of the empirical side of his account of space. In the 
process we shall look at his formulation of space from two perspectives.
93James, Principles, 1:488.
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We shall first examine his explanation of one type of perceptual relation, 
shape constancy, viewing it as paradigmatic of his treatment of spatial 
relations. After noting the problems with his explanation, we shall con­
trast his general approach to perceptual development with that of tradi­
tional empiricism.
Let us begin James's treatment of shape constancy by presenting his
own summary of the role which intellectual factors play in the perception
of spatial relations. He wrote that:
In completely educated space-perception, the present sensation
is usually just what Helmholtz (Physiol. Optik, p. 797) calls
it, 'a sign, the interpretation of whose meaning is left to 
the understanding'. But the understanding is exclusively re­
productive and never productive in the process; . . . its 
function is limited to the recall of previous space-sensations 
which the present one has been associated and which may be 
judged more real.94
Although he is not speaking specifically of shape constancy in this passage, 
the principles and processes he alludes to can be applied to shape con­
stancy, or any other space relation (e.g., distance, solidity, position).
His commitment to perceptual realism stands squarely behind his qualifi­
cation of Helmholtz's position. In stating that the "understanding is 
exclusively reproductive and never productive" he is bringing attention 
to the fact that association can only recall sensations which have them­
selves been given in previous experience. What he is challenging, of course,
is the empiricist tendency to give association the power to create attri­
butes which have never actually been given as sensations. His perceptual 
realism therefore demands that he show that even our most refined spatial 
knowledge can be conceived of as a reproduction of space-sensations which 
are immediately given. Of course, he recognized that association and
94
Ibid., 2:269. (Italics mine.)
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selective attention may "shuffle and manipulate these data [the origin­
ally given space-sensations] and hide them behind imagined ones," but 
it is his task as a perceptual realist to show that all the shuffling
95and manipulating in the world does not create new sensational attributes.
Let us now turn to shape constancy.
Shape constancy is easy enough to describe. A square table can 
produce an infinite number of retinal configurations and only one of them 
is actually square. Similarly, if a person looks down the length off a 
dinner table at a row of plates, the retinal configurations produced are 
a series of ellipses rather than circles. In spite of the diversity of 
retinal configurations, however, we perceive the shapes of objects as 
remaining constant. Now the first item James's explanation of shape con­
stancy needs is an immediately given sensation of form or shape. Of 
course, he argued that visual form is immediately given in retinal stimu­
lation. His task therefore involves showing how experience enriches an 
initially vague and meaningless visual form so as to achieve shape constancy 
without positing any sort of mental synthesis; how our pirmitive acquaint­
ance with visual forms develops into our mature knowledge about objects.
Of this developmental process James wrote that:
We have native . . . optical space-sensations; but experience 
leads us to select certain ones from among them to be the 
exclusive bearers of reality; the rest become mere signs and 
suggesters of these.96
As we shall see, James limited the role of past experience to the reproduc­
tion of past space-sensations. These reproductions give meaning to and 
guide our selection of that which is given by the senses but they do not 
anything de novo to the content of what is given.
95Ibid., pp. 145-146. 96Ibid., p. 237.
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James’s explanation of the acquisition of shape constancy actually
involves two complementary processes, selective attention and association.
First, in the process of dealing with the object, the perceiver gradually
learns to choose or select one version of it to represent its "real"
97shape. A number of characteristics of this selection process should
be made explicit. Most importantly, James said that the real shape is a
98sensational copy of the object, retrieved from memory. This proposition 
saves his perceptual realism, it gives him the power to reduce our mature 
knowledge of objects in space to reproductions of previously experienced 
sensational objects. This real shape is the retinal configuration pro­
duced when the object is viewed under ideal conditions. The circular 
sensation of a plate, for example, is obtained by viewing the plate in a 
vertical plane directly in front of the perceiver. Although he was aware 
that this perspective was statistically rare, he seemed to think that it
held "so many aesthetic and practical advantages" that everyone would
99eventually discover it. Moreover, he said that once this real shape is 
discovered, it acquires an "extraordinary pre-eminence" over any of the 
other retinal configurations which the object can p r o d u c e . T h i s  leads 
to the second process involved in James's explanation of s.hape constancy. 
At the same time that the perceiver is learning to choose the real shape 
of a given object, he is also learning that the real shape can be signaled 
by a wide variety of related retinal configurations. Depending on the 
perceiver's perspective, for example, a circle can produce, by a series 
of continuous gradations, any number of elliptical configurations. 
According to James, the perceiver must learn to associate an entire class
97 Qft
Ibid., pp. 237-238. °Ibid., pp. 237-239.
99t,,, oqo 100t,Ibid., p. 239. Ibid.
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of retinal configurations with the real shape; the non-circular deviations 
are relegated to the status of mere "signs" for the real shape "signified.
With this introduction, James's explanation of shape constancy can 
be summarized in the following fashion. Suppose, for example, that a 
person is looking at a round plate from an oblique perspective. Accord­
ing to James, the elliptical pattern of retinal stimulation does not get 
combined with, and then transformed or synthesized by stored representa­
tions of the perceiver's knowledge about the plate. Instead, the perceiver 
simply ignores the elliptical retinal configuration. In this sense, non­
circular deviations of a real circle have the same status for James as a 
wide variety of subjective phenomena which do not serve as signs for 
external objects. There are, for example, fibers and granules floating 
in the vitreous humor of the eye which cast shadows on the retina and can 
appear as little dark moving dots. But these muscoe volitantes are rarely 
attended to in everyday life because they do not signal the appearance of 
external objects. Similarly, the non-circular retinal configurations are 
not attended to because they too do not represent a practically important
reality. Both James and Helmholtz agreed that perception is dominated
102by attention to phenomena which are important to the perceiver. In
contrast to muscoe volitantes, however, James said that the non-circular
patterns of the plate are important to the perceiver in an indirect way;
they function as signs for the real shape signified, which has been stored
in memory. In other words, the non-circular sensation suggests or evokes
103an "imagined sensation" of the real shape of the object. And the per­
ceiver, who has learned through experience that it is more convenient to
101Ibid., pp. 240-244. 102Ibid., 1:285; 2:240-244.
103Ibid., pp. 179-180.
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deal with one real version of a visual form than a multiplicity of fluc­
tuating forms, attends to the "imagined sensation" and completely ignores 
what is given in the senses. James offered the same basic explanation 
for both size constancy and the perception of other spatial relations 
(e.g., distance, location). As he wrote:
Our rapid judgements of size, shape, distance and the like, are 
best explained as processes of simple cerebral association.
Certain sense-impressions directly stimulate brain-tracts, of 
whose activity ready-made conscious percepts are the immediate 
psychic counterparts. They do this by a mechanism either 
connate or acquired by habit.
There is no synthesis or unconscious inference in James's explanation, the 
sense data simply stimulate brain tracts which lead to the reproduction 
of previously experienced, and more practically valuable, sensations.
In this way, he sought to give experience a vital role in our mature spa­
tial perceptions while retaining the fundamental tenet of perceptual real­
ism, "that all spatial knowledge is sensational at bottom.
There are a number of problems with James's explanation of percep­
tual relations. First, his suggestion that sensory stimulation gives rise 
to an "imagined sensation" of the real object makes his theory cumbersome- 
bordering-on-unwieldy. If we take James at his word, the perceiver would 
need a distinct "imagined sensation" for every concrete object perceived. 
That is, every plate, glass, table, door, picture ad infinitum would need 
a stored replica of its real shape for its shape to be conserved. James's 
theory can be viewed as a template-matching model and it shares all the 
problems of such a model. Furthermore, if "imagined sensations" play such 
a vital role in perception, why are they so difficult to experience?
James himself seemed to be aware of this problem when he wrote, somewhat
104Ibid., 1:169. 105Ibid., 2:152.
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unconvincingly, that the imagined sensation "is felt in its entirety but 
vaguely. The problem is, how can one be sure that a vaguely felt
object is, in fact, a sensational copy of a previous sensation? Thus 
James's account of the perception of spatial relations can be challenged 
from the theoretical and experiential perspectives. What he was unwilling 
to admit is that an abstract rule system could serve as the general basis 
for the conservation of the shape (or size) of an infinite number of ob­
jects, that knowledge can supply stability and meaning to what is given 
without changing its contents. This position would have been inconsistent 
with his version of perceptual realism.
James's perceptual realism can be viewed as a reaction to a com­
plex of related tendencies which formed the empiricist approach to percep­
tion and perceptual development. In fact, to the extent that this prin­
ciple led him to offer an untenable formulation of spatial relations, it 
is perhaps best viewed as an over-reaction. At the same time, however, 
it must be noted that James's commitment to perceptual realism stood at 
the foundation of his alternative to the general empiricist approach to 
perception. In closing this chapter we shall contrast these two divergent 
approaches to perceptual development.
As we have seen throughout this study, empiricism conceived of 
sensations as punctate mental analogues which result from isolated sensory 
excitations. As such, sensations were assumed to be the atomistic ele­
ments of mental life. Linschoten noted the problem with this position by 
stating that: "Empiricism presupposed atomism on simply rational grounds—  
and there certainly are some traces of contradiction in this position.
106Ibid., p. 163.
^^Linschoten, Psychology of William James, p. 87.
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In any case, the empiricist conceived of these mental elements as devoid 
of intrinsic structure; the unrelated elements were thought to be united 
or synthesized into whole objects through association. This conception 
of sensation set the stage for two intimately related features of the 
empiricist approach to perceptual development. First, empiricism conceived 
of perceptual development as a progression from the simple to the complex, 
from the meaningless element to the meaningful whole object of mature 
perception. All knowledge could therefore be reduced to the various com­
binations of a fixed number of simple sensory bits. A child's first ex­
perience begins as a hodgepodge of internal sensations and he must gradually 
learn that certain sensational complexes signify whole objects located in 
the external world. Moreover, they supposed that the elements which con­
stitute the percept can be discovered through a reflective analysis of 
the percept of idea. The second dominant feature of the empiricist program 
is that the association of ideas became the fundamental organizing prin­
ciple of the human mind. This internal organizing mechanism was the 
necessary complement to sensations which were themselves incoherent. Thus, 
the process of association was forced to carry an awesome load single- 
handedly— creating structure, unity and meaning from an originally chaotic, 
meaningless mass of sensations.
The empirical psychology of James's era was clearly dominated by 
this approach, and we have tried to show that James criticized this tradi­
tion throughout the Principles. And although he does, at times, slip back 
into the terminology of that tradition, one finds a new and radically 
different conception of perceptual development taking form in James's 
psychology. This formulation appears most clearly in his descriptions 
of perceptual experience. Thus, in reconstructing the first experience
219
of a child, he found "original sensible totals" rather than an incoherent
mass of elements.
Experience from the very first, presents us with concreted 
objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of the world which 
envelops them in space and time, and potentially divisible into 
inward elements and parts. These objects we break asunder and 
reunite.
The structureor form of a child's first experience is therefore very 
primitive, and even chaotic by adult standards. It is a world in which 
objects appear in an indefinite space and change their shapes and sizes 
continuously. It is a world in which objects make abrupt exits and en­
trances, and emit strange, sometimes frightening, sounds. But the fact 
remains that James's conception of a child's perceptual world does contain 
a certain structure. First and foremost, it is a world which is composed 
of objects located in the world rather than in the child's head. More­
over, it is a world in which the objects stand out from their background;
a world in which gross visual discriminations can be made and motions can 
109be perceived. In this sense, the original experience of a child is, 
for James, far more than a total chaos. It is perhaps best conceived as 
a perceptual field whose primitive structure is a joint product of the 
objects perceived and the primitive structure of the child's innate physio­
logical mechanisms. In this light, the nativistic strain of James's formu­
lation of perception can be viewed as a retort to the empiricist conception 
of sensation. Where the empiricist found a jumbled, incoherent mass of 
sensations, James found a primitive structure. And his own conception of 





On the sensory basis of the figure-ground distinction see James, 
Psychology, p. 339.
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Linschoten has shown that James conceived of perceptual development 
as a movement from whole to part rather than from part to w h o l e . T h a t  
is, in contrast to the empiricist approach, James conceived of perceptual 
development as a progressive articulation of the originally given "sensible 
totals" into more differentiated, segregated, meaning-filled objects.
Within this framework, 'attention carves out objects' and the brain assigns 
meaning to what is given in the senses.
While Linschoten's treatment is valuable'and illuminating, we would 
add that a perceptual realism underlies James's approach to perceptual 
development. That is, his psychology of perception is grounded in a 
methodological dualism between the "knowing mind and the thing known.
This is the framework which psychology, as a science, must adopt and within 
it, objects are conceived of as existing independent of the perceiver, 
emitting patterns of energy which are structured in accordance with physi­
cal laws. On the other hand, the perceiver is conceived of as possessing 
perceptual structures which enable him to attend to particular patterns 
of energy. It is within this realistic formulation of the subject-object 
relation that James's account of perceptual development is articulated.
At first, the perceiver's perceptual structures are very crude and 
lack differentiation. Thus, as James said, a child's first experience 
is "potentially divisible into inward elements and parts," but his innate 
perceptual structures allow him to discriminate between only the gross 
differences in physical stimulation, e.g., bright lights, loud sounds, 
moving objects. But even these primitive structures give form and meaning 
to the child's first awkward explorations of the world. From this first
^Linschoten, Psychology of William James, pp. 83-98.
^^James, Principles, 1:218.
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exploration onward, experience functions to enrich and articulate the 
child's diffuse perceptual structures, thereby actualizing discrimina­
tions which had existed previously as mere potentials. The process is 
cyclical and mutually enriching: exploration provides the child with 
more knowledge about the world, and that knowledge, in turn, allows him 
to make finer and more meaning-filled discriminations and explorations.
In time, sensory experience comes to be subordinated to learned meanings, 
the sensory flux serve as mere signs for the real objects signified.
But knowledge does not add something de novo to sensory impressions; 
throughout the process of perceptual development our senses bring us 
into contact with real objects and relations which exist externally to 
us. Within James's formulation of perception, knowledge simply enables 
the perceiver to understand and attend to the increasingly complex rela­
tions which the world offers continuously. Thus, while James was willing 
to speak in terms of the creativity of the knower within the context of 
the higher mental processes, he steadfastly avoided the temptation to 
state that the perceiver creates his world in perception.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The objectives of this final chapter are twofold. We shall first 
summarize the impact of Hodgson on the three areas of James's psychology 
that have been examined in this study. The aim here is to provide a 
succinct statement of the fundamental insights which James-the-psychologist 
obtained from the works of Hodgson, which he described early in his career 
as "the greatest mine of philosophical wealth now extant."* In conjunc­
tion with this synopsis, we shall offer a brief, and admittedly truncated, 
outline of the ramifications of the essential tenets of James's psychology 
in the period between 1890 and 1920. A detailed or extended examination 
of the legacy of James's psychology is clearly beyond the scope of this 
study. At the same time, however, it is important to situate James within 
the mainstream of psychological theory in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries for two reasons. At a rather egocentric level, this 
outline will provide a preliminary scheme for the future research of this 
writer. More importantly, however, there is the hope that even a prelimi­
nary sketch will give the reader some sense of the continuity between the 
issues which emerge in the Principles and early twentieth century psycho­
logical theory.
In terms of philosophical assumptions, we have argued that Hodgson's
*Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
2 vols., (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:616.
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system provided James with a set of principles which served as the method­
ological foundation of his psychology. Beginning with a critique of the 
two dominant philosophical traditions of the nineteenth century, Hodgson 
offered a new philosophical method (the method of reflection) which gave 
rise to a fundamentally new conception of experience (the stream of con­
sciousness). Of course, the history of philosophy is littered with new 
methods and a wide variety of appeals to experience. What Hodgson recog­
nized, however, was that any given appeal to experience appeared within 
and was buttressed by a deeper, more pervasive and less explicit theory 
of experience. In addition, he recognized that this tacitly-held theory 
of experience is important for philosophers and psychologists because it 
contains the principles which specify what different thinkers mean by and 
count as experience. It is this deeper, tacitly-held theory of experience 
which Hodgson's method of reflection sought to clarify and make explicit.
Hodgson's philosophical principles appear in a variety of forms at 
each level of the Principles■ They appear most clearly in the critical 
strain which pervades James's psychology, in the unambiguous and continual 
rejection of the sensationalistic atomism of nineteenth century empirical 
psychology (viz., the psychologists' fallacy). Most importantly, it was 
the empiricist theory of experience as a succession of discrete ideas which 
James sought to replace with his formulation of the stream of thought.
Thus when he said that psychology must begin with a rigorous description 
of the immediate experience of individual minds, he meant to exclude the
2
abstract sensorial elements of the empiricist on methodological grounds.
In a very important sense, it was James's methodological commitment to the
2
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., (New York; 
Henry Holt and Co., 1890), 1:224. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
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description of the concrete experience of human beings in real life which 
gave rise to the fundamental units of analysis of his psychology. In 
terms of the higher mental processes, the unit of analysis became a person’ 
purposive search for the attainment of an adequate means to particular ends 
Thinking came to be treated as an essentially cognitive-emotive process, 
with the thinker choosing one of the "teeming multiplicity of objects and 
relations" which appear simultaneously with the stream. The nature of 
the explanatory constructs of his psychology of the higher mental processes 
a biological a priori, his teleological formulation of conception and his 
recognition of the importance of belief— all stem from his initial descrip­
tion of the fundamental unit of human cognition. The disembodied passage 
of successive ideas was replaced by a formulation of thinking which em­
phasized its plan-filled, goal-directed character. The predominance of 
James's descriptive orientation also appears at each stage of his treatment 
of perception. Here too, we find a continual rejection of any attempt to 
create the objects of perception from the synthesis of sensory elements 
which are never encountered in real life. Here too, there is a method­
ological commitment to begin with descriptions of perceptual experience, 
where whole objects are carved out of what is immediately given. Finally, 
the nature of his explanation of the process of perception— which combines 
nativism and empiricism and recognizes both the activity of the perceiver 
and the reality of external objects— is conditioned by his description of 
the fundamental unit of perception. This intimate reciprocity between 
the descriptive (methodological) and explanatory (theoretical) aspects of 
James's system is the means through which he tried to integrate scientific 
psychology and what would today be called phenomenological description.
3Ibid.
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And it is in this sense that James's psychology is an attempt to bring 
Hodgson's conception of scientific psychology to fruition.
In terms of the specifics of James's formulation of the higher 
mental processes, Hodgson's influence appears at two levels. It appears 
most clearly in the adoption of Hodgson's dynamic or active interpretation 
of the laws of association in the Principles, which portrays the particular 
direction of thought as a joint product of association and the interests 
of the thinker. At a less explicit level, however, James retained the 
ideal of rigorous description even when he rejected the explanatory con­
structs of Hodgson's system. Thus, for example, he went beyond Hodgson 
in stating that a priori processes must be posited to explain human think­
ing, but he supported his claim with detailed descriptions of thinking as 
it actually occurs in the lives of individual minds.
In a very important sense, evolutionary theory is the doctrine which 
stands between the formulations of the higher mental processes found in 
Hodgson and James. While both clearly recognized the dynamic, as well as 
cognitive aspects of human thinking, James had the advantage of developing 
his formulation of thinking in a period which recognized the importance 
of phylogenetic development for psychology. James took advantage of this 
opportunity and offered a dynamic, cognitive psychology which was founded 
upon a biological interpretation of the a priori. At long last, associa- 
tionism could be challenged on scientific grounds. In the process, he set 
the foundation for a functional psychology, a psychology which, James 
Angell later wrote, conceived of mind as "primarily engaged in mediating 
between the environment and the needs of the organism."^ If we only
^James Angell, " The Province of Functional Psychology," Psycho­
logical Review 14(1907):61-91.
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substitute the notion of interests or subjective interests for Angell's 
needs, the Jamesian flavor of the functionalist program comes through 
clearly— the organism approaches any situation in search of a solution 
to a problem which is interesting, or satisfies some momentary need.
While the substitution of needs for interests seems innocuous 
enough in some respects, at another level it represents a significant 
change in the direction of psychology in the early twentieth century. 
Psychology after James became more experimental, more biological and less 
concerned with the grand problems of human nature which inspired James.
If purpose was to be considered at all, as it was in the most sophisti­
cated behaviorisms of John Dewey, Ralph B. Perry and Edwin B. Holt, it 
first had to be cleansed of its teleological implications. Purpose had 
to be construed as a predetermined effect of the past on the present.
James had an important and direct influence on each of these thinkers, 
whose works in psychology can be viewed as an attempt to deal with the 
notion of subjective interests in an objective, thoroughly scientific 
fashion.
But alongside this trend there was another strain of functional 
psychology which, for a variety of reasons, refused to carry the banner of 
an objectivistic, mechanistic, experimental psychology. Mary Calkins, 
William MacDougall and James M. Baldwin are representatives of this strain 
of functionalism. At first glance, these thinkers seem to have little in 
common. In fact, each developed a somewhat unique system during their 
careers— MacDougall's hormic psychology, Calkins' personalistic psychology
’’Ralph B. Perry, "Docility and Purpose," Psychological Review 25 
(1918):1-20; Edwin B. Holt, The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics 
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1915); John Dewey, "The Psychology of 
Effort," Philosophical Review 6(1897):43-56.
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and Baldwin's genetic logic. But looking closer we find that each of 
these people took up a theme which James himself championed and each, like 
James, sought to do full justice to the complexity of human nature. For 
MacDougall, the themes were teleology and human freedom, as he sought to 
show that the foresight of future goals have a causal efficacy in experi­
ence. In the process, he explicitly rejected the mechanistic format of 
Holt, Perry and Dewey. The central feature of Calkins' psychology is "a 
mind in process, a someone who is experiencing . . .  in a word in intro­
spection I find a self."^ Thus Calkins' personalistic psychology was 
founded upon the introspective description of immediate experience and she 
continually refused to reduce the self to terms which are not directly 
experienced. Baldwin, as a thinker and a person, was perhaps most like 
James. Tiring early of laboratory work, he took up the task of articulating 
a genetic account of the origin of the principles which make human thought 
possible. Within this Kantian program, he developed and elaborated James's 
notion of the biological a priori. Most importantly, however, Baldwin 
offered a psychology of the higher mental processes which sought to account 
for the values (interests) as well as the knowledge (cognition) of human 
experience.^ Baldwin went beyond his mentor in a number of important res­
pects, but his life-long concern with the origin and development of the 
higher cognitive and aesthetic features of human experience reveals a clear 
indebtedness to James's psychology.
With regard to James's formulation of perception, our interpretation 
emphasizes his commitment to a perceptual realism and relegates the nativism
^Mary W. Calkins, The History of Psychology in Autobiography. 5 vols. 
ed. Carl Murchinson (Worcester, Ma.: Clark University Press, 1930), 1:44.
^Ibid., p. 4; pp. 16-19; p. 21.
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vs. empiricism controversy to a conceptually subordinate position. Taken 
historically, it seems likely that evolutionary theory diffused the latter 
issue, so that philosophical empiricists (e.g., Spencer, Huxley, James) 
could embrace a nativism based on racial inheritance without necessarily 
contradicting themselves. We have argued that Hodgson’s method of reflec­
tion was important 7or James because it served as his methodological basis 
for a perceptual realism. That is, those properties which we later point 
to as constituting the reality of objects (e.g., externality, substance,
form) are immediately given in sense experience. For James, then, the
/
intellect carves out, but does not create, whole objects in external space.
Our interpretation becomes significant when we look to the theoreti­
cal issues which dominated the psychology and philosophy of perception at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. What we find is the emergence of 
New Realism, a doctrine which was articulated in the works of Holt, Perry,
g
Dewey and Bertrand Russell between 1905 and 1912. Like James in the 
Principles, the New Realists sought to refute the idealism and phenomenal­
ism which reigned supreme in late nineteenth century philosophy and psy­
chology. Furthermore, their fundamental contention was that the perceiver 
directly apprehends the objective properties of objects. The psychology 
of illusions played an important role in the New Realist program and Holt—  
the psychologist in the group— applied a version of James's selection 
theory of perception to that problem in the cooperative manifesto of that 
school.^
g
John Dewey, "The Realism of Pragmatism," Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods 2(1905):324-327; Edwin B. Holt, Walter 
J. Marvin, William P. Montague, Ralph B. Perry, Walter B. Pitkin and 
Edward G. Spaulding, The New Realism; Cooperative Studies in Philosophy 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1912).
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Not surprisingly, the more tender-minded interpreters of James refused 
to embrace the principles of the tough-minded New Realists. Calkins, for 
example, adopted the position of a thoroughgoing idealist and became an 
outspoken and remarkably persistent critic of New Realism.*0 Baldwin, like 
James, is more difficult to classify. In his Thought and Things he devel­
oped a theory of reality called pancalism, which sought to integrate the 
data of fact (truth) with the data of value (interests).** From our per­
spective, Baldwin's system might be viewed as an elaboration, from the 
developmental point of view, of James's pluralistic notion of the sub­
universes of reality. Most importantly, both recognize the psychological 
importance of a variety of somewhat different worlds or realities in the 
life of the individual. Moreover, unlike the New Realists, neither thinker 
opted for what Morton White has called "scientific imperialism," the 
belief that observation and experiment are the only methods of achieving 
true knowledge. In. terms of the integration of realism and idealism,
James, and to a greater extent Baldwin, viewed human development as a 
progressive movement from a perceptual realism to a biologically-based
Mary W. Calkins, "The Idealist to the Realist," The Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8(1911):449-458; Idem, "Mr. 
Muscio's Criticism of Miss Calkins' Reply to the Realist," The Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9(1912);603-606; Idem, 
"Unjustified Claims of Neo-realism," Philosophical Review 22(1913):53-56; 
Idem, "Idealist to Realist, Once More: A Reply," Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods 11(1914):297-298; Idem, "Bertrand Russell 
and Neo-Realism," Philosophical Review 24(1915):533-537.
**James M. Baldwin, Thought and Things: A Study of the Development 
arid Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1906-1911). Baldwin's integration of fact (truth) and value (interest) 
is contained in the third volume of this work, Interest and Art Being Real 
Logic. I. Genetic Epistemology. For Baldwin's pancalism see his Genetic 
Theory of Reality: Being the Outcome of Genetic Logic as Issuing in the 
Aesthetic Theory of Reality Called Pancalism (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
1915).
